Syracuse University

SURFACE
Dissertations - ALL

SURFACE

December 2019

The Nature of Being
Byron Simmons
Syracuse University

Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/etd
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons

Recommended Citation
Simmons, Byron, "The Nature of Being" (2019). Dissertations - ALL. 1137.
https://surface.syr.edu/etd/1137

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the SURFACE at SURFACE. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Dissertations - ALL by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact
surface@syr.edu.

Abstract

There would seem to be differences which lie not in the natures of certain entities, but in their
being. Take, for example, the difference between an actual and a merely possible dollar. This
difference is utterly unlike the difference between a cat and a canary, a mountain and a molehill,
or a table and a tablet. For these things differ in their nature. But an actual and a merely possible
dollar need not differ in their nature. They might have exactly the same size, shape, weight, and
chemical composition; they might well be perfect—perhaps even indiscernible—duplicates. Yet,
for all their similarities, there still seems to be an important and peculiarly ontological difference
between them: one is actual, the other is merely possible. Or take, for another example, the
difference between a number and a nightingale. A nightingale has a determinate size, shape, and
weight. These properties help to make up its nature. But while a number appears to determinately
lack any of the properties that help make up the nature of a nightingale, the true extent of the
difference between them does not seem to be captured solely by a difference in their natures.
There is a further and, it seems, peculiarly ontological difference between them: one is abstract,
the other is concrete.
This dissertation is an examination of the nature of being. I argue that being is
fragmentary: that is, that there are different ways of being. I also argue that these ways of being
are best understood as sufficiently general, non-qualitative properties which do not admit of real
definition. In chapter 1, I argue against the view—recently defended by Kris McDaniel and Jason
Turner—that these different ways of being are best understood not as properties, but rather as
perfectly natural quantifiers ranging over distinct domains. In chapters 2-4, I develop an account
of the distinction between qualitative and non-qualitative properties. I first argue, in chapter 2,

that this distinction should not be understood in linguistic terms; the qualitative properties should
not be taken to be those properties that can be designated descriptively without the aid of directly
referential devices (such as demonstratives, indexicals, or proper names). I next defend, in
chapter 3, a causal account of the natue of the qualitative properties, according to which a
property is qualitative if and only if it plays—or is grounded in properties that play—a
fundamental causal role at some world. I combine this positive account of the nature of the
qualitative properties with a positive account of the nature of the fundamental non-qualitative
properties, according to which a fundamental property is non-qualitative if and only if it is not
subject to various principles of recombination. I then attempt to undermine an alternative,
ontological account of the fundamental non-qualitative properties, according to which a
fundamental property is non-qualitative if and only if it is the property of enjoying a fundamental
way of being. For this account will only be plausible if haecceities such as being Socrates and
being Plato are individualistic ways of being: that is, ways of being that can only be enjoyed by a
single individual. But, as I argue in chapter 4, we should not take haecceities to be individualistic
ways of being. In chapter 5, I argue that what makes a property peculiarly ontological—what
makes it a way of being—is its emptiness. I defend the claim that a way of being is empty, and
thus does not contribute to the nature of the entities that enjoy it, if and only if it is sufficiently
general, it is non-qualitative, and it does not admit of real definition. I start by assuming that
there is a generic way of being that absolutely everything enjoys, and that this way of being is
itself empty. I then show that other intuitively empty ways of being are importantly analogous to
this generic way of being. I am left, then, with a version of pluralism about being which accepts
a generic way of being. In chapter 6, I take up some recent objections—due to Trenton
Merricks—to combining pluralism with a generic way of being.
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Introduction

Absolutely everything there is—or, better, absolutely every entity—enjoys some way of being.1
But the being of an entity appears to be distinct from the nature of an entity: we learn, it seems,
nothing about what something is merely by learning that it is. So what, then, is being?
Any plausible account of the nature of being must, at the very least, provide us with
answers to three important questions:2
Q1 Is being unitary or fragmentary? Is there only one way of being which absolutely every
entity enjoys or are there different ways of being?
Q2 Is being the same as existence? Does everything that enjoys some way of being exist in
some way or are there any non-existent entities?
Q3 How should being be represented in our metaphysical theories? Are ways of being most
perspicuously expressed by quantifier expressions, by predicates, or by something else
entirely?
We can ask, first, how many ways of being there are. To hold that there is only one way of being
which absolutely every entity enjoys and, thus, that being is unitary is, I will assume, to hold that
while entities might differ in their nature, they do not—and, indeed, cannot—differ in their

1

An entity, as I will use the term, is something that enjoys some way of being. This allows me to remain officially

neutral about whether there are any non-entities, that is, items, things, or objects that do not enjoy any way of being
at all. For a defense of the Meinongian (or noneist) thesis that there are non-entities, see Routley (1980) and Priest
(2005).
2

See Moltmann (forthcoming) for a similar list of questions. Note, however, that she frames these questions as

questions about the nature of existence rather than being.

1

being. Likewise, to hold that there are different ways of being and, thus, that being is
fragmentary is to hold that there are peculiarly ontological differences between certain entities,
differences which lie not in their nature, but in their being. We can ask, next, about whether
being is the same as existence. I will assume that existence is itself a way of being.3 Thus, if there
are non-existent entities, that is, entities that enjoy some way of being but do not themselves
exist, then being will turn out to be fragmentary. In order to maintain that being is unitary, we
would have to hold that existence is the only way of being. We can ask, finally, about how being
should be represented in our metaphysical theories. I will assume that there is something
substantive at issue here. If, for example, ways of being are most perspicuously expressed—and
best reflected—by quantifier expressions, this should tell us something important about what
being is, about the nature of being itself: namely, that it is quantificational.4
A consensus arose among philosophers in the twentieth century about how these
questions should be answered. The current orthodoxy consists of three theses:

3

This assumption appears to be denied by Russell (1903: 449) who distinguishes between being and existence, but

insists ‘that there is only one kind of being, namely, being simpliciter, and only one kind of existence, namely,
existence simpliciter’.
4

On a more deflationary interpretation of perspicuity, there is nothing deep about the claim that being is most

perspicuously represented by quantifier expressions. It just tells us that we should use a different piece of linguistic
machinery to designate aspects of an entity’s being than we do to designate aspects of its nature. I shall be working
instead with a metaphysically substantive understanding of perspicuity. Thanks to Daniel Nolan for encouraging me
to draw this distinction.

2

The Monistic Thesis: being is unitary.5
The Equivalence Thesis: being is the same as existence.
The Neo-Quinean Thesis: being is perspicuously expressed by particular—or
existential—quantifier expressions.6
The neo-Quinean thesis appears to stand as the central pillar of this orthodoxy. For suppose that
being is best expressed in terms of quantification. Then, since we can say in one breath that
Socrates, Smaug, and the number 2 have being and are three things, there would seem to be a
generic way of being enjoyed by absolutely everything there is.7 But, it might be claimed, once
we grant that there is a generic way of being, we should lower our credence in the claim that
there are specific ways of being enjoyed by only some of what there is, and should, in the interest
of ideological parsimony, embrace the monistic thesis instead.8 Yet once we come accept the

5

The monistic thesis should not be mistaken for what we might call the universality thesis. For while the

universality thesis merely holds that there is a generic, unrestricted way of being that absolutely every entity enjoys,
the monistic thesis adds that this generic way of being is the only way of being.
6

The neo-Quinean thesis, as I understand it, tells us only that ways of being should be represented in our

metaphysical theories by existential quantifier expressions. It does not tell us that the existential quantifier
expressions which appear in our best metaphysical theories should be taken to represent ways of being. I thus
distinguish the neo-Quinean thesis from what I shall call the converse neo-Quinean thesis. Together, these two
theses support the stronger claim that to be is to be the value of a variable.
7

This is van Inwagen’s (1998: 17, 2009a: 61-3, 2009b: 41-2) counting argument. Berto (2013: 32) notes that it

serves as a powerful argument for the univocity of being.
8

Szabó (2003: 13) suggests that the acceptance of something like the neo-Quinean thesis has led philosophers to

give little credence to the idea that there are different ways of existence. Builes (2019: 400) suggests that
considerations of ideological parsimony should lead from the acceptance of the neo-Quinean thesis to the acceptance
of the monistic thesis.

3

monistic thesis, we will have good reason to accept the equivalence thesis as well. For we are
assuming that existence is a way of being, and so, by the monistic thesis, must itself be the only
way of being. There is, to put the orthodox view in a nutshell, exactly one way of being that all
entities enjoy, namely, existence, and this way of being is best captured by the existential
quantifier of first-order formal logic.
Being, on this orthodox account, is the emptiest of all concepts: it does not at all
contribute to the nature of the entities that enjoy it.9 For while an entity’s nature is captured by
various predicates, its being is expressed by the existential quantifier. We can, in this way, avoid
what Peter van Inwagen (2001: 4) calls ‘the mistake of transferring what properly belongs to the
nature of [an entity]…to the being of [that entity]’. For, on this account, the concept of being is
‘closely allied with the concept of number: to say that there are Xs is to say that the number of
Xs is 1 or more—and to say nothing more profound, nothing more interesting, nothing more’.
The orthodox account thus appears to be ‘the highest development of what may be called the
“thin” conception of being’.
In this dissertation, I will provide an alternative, pluralistic account of the nature of being.
This account is committed to a thin conception of being: that is, it holds that an entity’s being is
distinct from its nature.10 But, unlike the orthodox account, it takes being to be fragmentary: that
is, it takes there to be different fundamental ways of being. The primary motivation for this
account comes from the observation that certain entities appear to differ not in their nature, but in

9

It is, as Hegel puts it, ‘the poorest and most abstract determination’ ([1827/ 1830] 2010: 101/ GW 20: 92).

10

I believe, following D. C. Williams (1963: 754, cf. 757) that it is the ‘very distinction’ between the being and the

nature of an entity is the ‘only license’ for pluralism. An avowed pluralist who nevertheless fails to accept a thin
conception of being is not, I think, really a pluralist about being at all.

4

their being. Take, for example, the difference between an actual and a merely possible silver
dollar. This difference is utterly unlike the difference between a cat and a canary, a mountain and
a molehill, or a table and a tablet. For these entities differ in their nature. But an actual and a
merely possible dollar need not differ in nature. They might have exactly the same size, shape,
weight, and chemical composition; they might be perfect—perhaps even indiscernible—
duplicates. Yet, for all their similarities, there still seems to be an objective and peculiarly
ontological difference between them: one enjoys actual existence, the other does not.11 This
phenomenon of objective, ontological difference is, I believe, the basic phenomenon that any
pluralist about being should attempt to capture and explain. But how exactly should a pluralist
capture this phenomenon?
Recent defenders of pluralism—such as Kris McDaniel (2009, 2010b, 2017) and Jason
Turner (2010, 2012, forthcoming)—have sought to capture and explain the basic phenomenon of
ontological difference in quantificational terms. They have combined the pluralistic thesis that
there are different ways of being with the neo-Quinean thesis that ways of being are most
perspicuously expressed in our metaphysical theories by (semantically primitive) quantifier

11

Or take, for another example, the difference between a present and a past silver dollar. These two dollars need not

differ in nature. They might have exactly the same size, shape, weight, and chemical composition; they might be
perfect—and, if ours is a world of two-way eternal recurrence, perhaps even indiscernible—duplicates. Yet, for all
their similarities, there might still be an objective and peculiarly ontological difference between them: one enjoys
present existence, the other does not.

5

expressions.12 They have endorsed what I will call quantificational pluralism.13 This is the least
heterodox version of pluralism about being.
I believe, however, that only a more thoroughly unorthodox account of the nature of
being can adequately capture the basic phenomenon of ontological difference. I maintain, against
the current orthodoxy, that a way of being is a special kind of fundamental property: namely, a
sufficiently general, non-qualitative, indefinable property.14 And, since properties are best
represented in our metaphysical theories by predicates, these special ontological properties
should be represented in our theories by special predicates. My account of the nature of being
thus combines the following theses:
The Pluralistic Thesis: being is fragmentary.
The Difference Thesis: being is not the same as existence.
The Anti-Quinean Thesis: being is perspicuously expressed by special predicates.
Note, however, that the difference thesis is not essential to this account. For given the pluralistic
thesis that there are different ways of being, we can either identify one of these ways of being
with existence (or actuality), or we can say that more than one of these ways of being are
themselves ways of existing. I will often talk as if there are ways of being—such as abstract
possible subsistence—that are not themselves ways of existing, but this convention is
dispensable. What is important is not what we call a way of being, but whether we recognize a

12

A quantifier expression is semantically primitive (in a language) whenever it cannot be defined in terms of an

absolutely unrestricted quantifier and some restricting predicate.
13

This view, or one much like it, appears to have been held by both Herbert W. Schneider (1962: 10) and Nino B.

Cocchiarella (1969).
14

A property is fundamental just in case it is an ultimate source of objective similarity.

6

way of being as such. I will, to this end, say something about the extent of being’s fragmentation.
I recognize the following ways of being: actual existence (enjoyed by every part of our world),
concrete possible existence (enjoyed by every part of our world as well as by dragons, unicorns,
etc.), abstract possible subsistence (enjoyed by the number 2, but not by the parts of our world or
by dragons, unicorns, etc.), and a generic being way of being (enjoyed by absolutely everything
there is).
I will defend this account of the nature of being and the extent of its fragmentation in the
following chapters. In chapter 1, I will argue that ontological pluralists should not accept the
neo-Quinean thesis, and thus should not be quantificational pluralists. For if ways of being are
perspicuously represented by quantifier expressions, then ways of being should themselves be
quantifiers.15 And if ways of being are quantifiers, then they should be more natural than their
corresponding domains. But since it does not appear to be the case that these quantifiers are more
natural than their corresponding domains, quantificational pluralism does not appear to be true.
The pluralist about being should, I think, reject the neo-Quinean thesis. This leaves the pluralist
with the difficult problem of explaining what it is that is peculiarly ontological about ontological
differences. The pluralist can, I think, make headway on this problem by recognizing that
ontological differences appear to be importantly non-qualitative.

15

I distinguish between quantifier expressions which are pieces of language or ideology, and quantifiers which are

those parts or aspects of the quantificational structure of reality. This allows me to distinguish between language and
reality, between a quantifier expression in a language and the quantificational structure of reality that that expression
is supposed to represent. Note, however, that a quantifier—that is, whatever part of aspect of reality that a quantifier
expression designates—might be, but need not be, an entity.

7

To this end, I shall develop an account of the distinction between the qualitative and the
non-qualitative properties. This distinction plays an important role in cashing out the intuitive
notions of duplication and indiscernibility. Duplicates instantiate the same intrinsic qualitative
properties, while indiscernibles instantiate the same intrinsic as well as the same extrinsic
qualitative properties. Take, for example, a world consisting of nothing but two duplicate iron
spheres—Castor and Pollux—located a small distance apart. These two spheres are indiscernible
duplicates. But for all their qualitative similarities, there is still an important non-qualitative
difference between them: one has the property being identical to Castor, the other does not. Or
take, for another example, an actual and a merely possible dollar. These two dollars might, it
seems, be perfect—perhaps even indiscernible—duplicates. But for all their qualitative
similarities, there is still an important non-qualitative difference between them: one has the
property being actual, the other does not.
In chapter 2, I will take up the commonly held assumption that there is an interesting
connection between the qualitative/non-qualitative distinction and various linguistic facts.16 It is
often held that if we had a sufficiently rich language (containing general—but not necessarily
primitive—predicates for all the basic qualitative properties and relations, and allowing for
complex infinitary constructions), we could describe the complete qualitative profile of every
possible object. But it is also held that unless this language were to contain demonstratives (such
as ‘this cat’ and ‘that dog’), indexicals (such as ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘now’, and ‘actual’), or proper names
(such as ‘Socrates’ and ‘Plato’), it would lack the resources to specify any of an object’s nonqualitative properties. The basic idea can be summed up as follows:

16

See, for example, Carnap (1947b: 138), Adams (1979: 7), Lewis (1986: 221), Gallois (1998: 249), and Divers

(2002: 349 n 12).

8

The Linguistic Thesis: necessarily, a property or relation is qualitative if and only if it
can be designated descriptively without the aid of directly referential devices (such as
demonstratives, indexicals, or proper names).
I will argue that this thesis fails in both directions: there might, on the one hand, be nonqualitative properties that can be designated descriptively, and there appear to be, on the other
hand, qualitative properties that can only be designated directly. I will suggest that while the
linguistic thesis is ultimately untenable as stated, it can be plausibly recast as a thesis about our
concepts rather than the properties they designate.
In chapter 3, I will put forward and defend my preferred account of the distinction
between the fundamental qualitative and the fundamental non-qualitative properties.17 This
account can be summed up as follows:
The Causal Thesis: a fundamental property or relation is qualitative if and only if it
plays a fundamental causal (or nomic) role at some world.
The Necessary Connections Thesis: a fundamental property or relation is nonqualitative if and only if it is not subject to the true principles of recombination.

17

This chapter is essentially an extended commentary on the following passage from Phillip Bricker (2006: 49-50):
The fundamental non-qualitative properties and relations are needed to provide the underlying framework
for logical space. Here I include, in addition to sameness-of-ontological-kind properties, identity, partwhole, instantiation, and perhaps spatiotemporal and other external relations. Fundamental qualitative
properties and relations, on the other hand, can be distinguished as those that are subject to principles of
recombination: they are distributed over logical space every which way.

9

The Humean Link: a fundamental property or relation plays a fundamental causal (or
nomic) role at some world if and only if it is subject to the true principles of
recombination.
This causal account will properly class the fundamental ontological properties of being actual,
being concretely possible, and being abstractly possible as non-qualitative properties. For it
seems that none of these properties will play a fundamental causal role at any world and each of
these properties would appear to be a source of various necessary connections and exclusions.
There is, however, an alternative account of the nature of the non-qualitative properties
that I like almost as much.18 On this alternative account, the qualitative/non-qualitative
distinction aligns with the distinction between the being and the nature of an entity. Those
properties that contribute to an entity’s nature are, on this account, taken to be qualitative, while
those properties that contribute to an entity’s being are taken to be non-qualitative. This yields
the following:
The Ontological Thesis: a fundamental property is non-qualitative if and only if it is the
property of enjoying a fundamental way of being.
This ontological account will correctly class the fundamental ontological properties of being
actual, being concretely possible, and being abstractly possible as non-qualitative. Yet, unlike

18

This account is suggested by a stray remark in McDaniel (2017: chapter 6). For in section 6.5, McDaniel (2017:

181) promises to give a brief discussion of the question: ‘What is a qualitative property?’. But in section 6.7, where
this discussion is supposed to take place, we find nothing of the sort. What we find instead is simply the suggestion
that non-qualitative properties such as being Socrates and being Plato are individualistic ways of being. If this
section is indeed supposed to contain an answer to the question at hand, it would appear to be that a fundamental
property is non-qualitative if and only if it is the property of enjoying a fundamental way of being.
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my preferred causal account, this ontological account need not class the fundamental
mereological and spatiotemporal relations as qualitative, it will be consistent with the possibility
of fundamentally de re laws, and it will also be consistent with the claim that there could be
fundamental and essentially epiphenomenal qualitative properties. These considerations might be
taken to count in favor this alternative, ontological account of the qualitative/non-qualitative
distinction over my preferred, causal account. But the overall plausibility of the ontological
thesis will, however, ultimately turn on whether or not fundamental haecceities such as being
Socrates or being Plato are individualistic ways of being: roughly, ways of being that can only
be enjoyed by one individual.19
In chapter 4, I will introduce a view I’ll call haecceitistic fragmentationalism, which
holds, roughly, that there are haecceitistic ways of being. It combines a belief in fundamental
haecceities such as being Plato and being Aristotle with a belief in ways of being. A haecceity,
on this view, is not a complex property that somehow has an individual as a constituent; it is
simply an individualistic way of being. I will argue that, as pluralists, we should not believe in
such individualistic ways of being. For we should, as pluralists, accept a distinction between
actual and merely possible entities. But if we accept this distinction, we should be modal
realists.20 The modal realist who accepts individualistic ways of being faces two problems: it

19

Note that I distinguish between the non-fundamental property being identical to Socrates, had by a single

individual at a single world, from the seemingly fundamental property being Socrates, had by many different
individuals at many different worlds. It is the latter property that is here being taken as a fundamental way of being.
20

I don’t mean to claim that the pluralist has no choice but to accept modal realism here. For those who, following

Kit Fine (1994), reduce possibility to the essences of things and who believe that non-actual entities—or entities that
do not figure in reality—have essences might attempt to distinguish between essential being (which is enjoyed by
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does not sit well with the possibility of island universes and it conflicts with a plausible claim
about the relation between a way of being and an ontological category: namely, that for every
way of being, there is a corresponding ontological category. The haecceitist who thinks that there
are fundamental non-qualitative properties such as being Socrates can, I think, avoid these
objections. But only at the cost of denying that haecceities are individualistic ways of being. This
should, I think, undercut whatever advantage the ontological thesis might be thought to have
over the causal thesis. Thus, in the remaining chapters, I will return to the task of developing and
defending my preferred form of pluralism.
In chapter 5, I will argue that pluralists can plausibly take various restricted ways of
being to be empty and that this emptiness is not well captured by taking these ways of being to
be expressed by semantically primitive existential quantifier expressions. I will defend the view
that a fundamental way of being is empty not because it is quantificational, but because it is
sufficiently general, lacking in qualitative content, and does not admit of real definition. The
motivation for this view comes, first, from the assumption that the generic, unrestricted way of
being is empty and, thus, does not contribute to the nature of the entities that enjoy it; and,
second, from the observation that the specific, restricted ways of being which appear to be empty
are analogous to the generic way of being in three respects: they are sufficiently general, they are
non-qualitative, and they do not admit of real definitions.

everything that has an essence) and actual existence (which is enjoyed by everything that is actual, or which figures
into reality). There might be, on this account, actual people who have the same nature or essence as various merely
possible people, but there would still be an important ontological difference between them: the actual people enjoy
actual existence, the merely possible people do not. I do believe, however, that modal realism with absolute actuality
is preferable to this Finean alternative.
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The plausibility of my account turns on the acceptance of a generic way of being. It is, I
think, because the specific, restricted ways of being are importantly analogous to the generic,
unrestricted way of being that they should all be thought of as ways of being. But Trenton
Merricks (2019: 601-4) has recently raised three objections to combining pluralism with a
generic way of being: such a view conflicts with what Merricks takes to be the pluralist’s core
intuition, is vulnerable to the charge that it posits a difference in being where there is simply a
difference in kind, and is in tension with various historically influential motivations for
pluralism. If Merricks is correct, then my attempt to capture what is peculiarly ontological about
various properties is doomed to fail.
In chapter 6, I will argue that none of Merricks’s objections give us reason to think that
pluralism should not be combined with a general, unrestricted way of being. The main issue that
divides us is whether the pluralist is minimally committed to what I will call weak, strong, or
extreme fragmentation:21

21

The extreme thesis entails the strong thesis: if there are absolutely no ontological similarities between certain

entities, then clearly there are no fundamental ontological similarities either. And the strong thesis appears to entail
the weak: if there are no fundamental ontological similarities between two entities, then—assuming that everything
enjoys at least one fundamental way of being—there would need to be some kind of fundamental ontological
difference between them.
The ontological elitist, who holds that holes and shadows are almost nothings, would deny the assumption
that every entity enjoys at least one fundamental way of being. She would deny that the weak thesis follows from the
strong: neither holes nor shadows enjoy any fundamental ways of being, so there cannot be any fundamental
ontological similarities between them; but given that they don’t enjoy any fundamental ways of being, there cannot
be any fundamental ontological differences between them either.
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Weak Fragmentation Thesis: there are fundamental ontological differences between
certain entities.
Strong Fragmentation Thesis: there are no fundamental ontological similarities
between certain entities.
Extreme Fragmentation Thesis: there are absolutely no ontological similarities between
certain entities.
Merricks tends to think that the special, restricted ways of being are best taken to be disjoint. But
not all the ways of being need to be like this. I claim that actual existence is nested in concrete
possible existence, Meinong ([1910] 1983: 57-61/ AMG 4: 73-78) claims that existence is nested
in subsistence, while Moore (1903: 110-12) and Russell (1903: 71, 449-50) claim that existence
is nested in being. There have certainly been pluralists motivated by, say, considerations of
divine simplicity or divine transcendence, who have accepted stronger and more extreme
versions of pluralism. But these pluralists have simply gone beyond what is minimally required
of pluralism as such: namely, the recognition of various ontological differences.
Another issue which divides us is whether the pluralist can opt for a thin conception of
being or whether she must accept a thick conception of being. Merricks, following van Inwagen,
appears to think that the pluralist cannot help but to ascribe to the being of an entity that which
should be properly ascribed to its nature. I believe, however, that the pluralist who takes ways of
being to be adequately general, qualitatively empty, and appropriately indefinable can accept a
sufficiently thin conception of being. The pluralist thus has good reason to think that ways of
being are only correlated with certain kinds of differences among generically existing entities.
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Chapter 1: Should an Ontological Pluralist be a Quantificational Pluralist?

Abstract: Ontological pluralism is the view that there are different ways of being. Recent
defenders of this view—such as Kris McDaniel and Jason Turner—have taken these ways of
being to be best understood as perfectly natural quantifiers ranging over distinct domains. They
have thus endorsed, what I shall call, quantificational pluralism. I argue that this focus on
quantification is a mistake. For if quantificational pluralism is true, then a quantifier should be
more natural than its corresponding domain; but since it does not appear to be the case that a
quantifier is more natural than its corresponding domain, quantificational pluralism does not
appear to be true. Thus, I claim, an ontological pluralist should not be a quantificational pluralist.

1.1 Introduction
Ontological pluralism—or pluralism about being—is, roughly, the view that there are different
ways of being. The core pluralist insight, as I see it, is that there are peculiarly ontological
differences between certain things. Take, for example, the difference between an actual and a
merely possible hundred dollars. This difference is utterly unlike the difference between a cat
and a canary, a mountain and a molehill, or a table and a tablet. For these things differ in some of
their intrinsic qualitative properties. But an actual and a merely possible dollar need not differ in
any such properties. They might have exactly the same size, shape, weight, and chemical
composition; they might well be perfect—perhaps even indiscernible—duplicates. Yet, for all
their similarities, there still seems to be an important and fundamentally ontological difference
between them: one is actual, the other is merely possible. Or take, for another example, the
difference between a number and a nightingale. A nightingale has a determinate size, shape, and

15

weight. It has a determinate number of feathers, it sings a pretty song, etc. These properties help
to make up its positive intrinsic qualitative character. But a number doesn’t have a size, shape, or
weight. It isn’t anywhere or anywhen. It instead appears to altogether lack a positive qualitative
profile. A number and a nightingale are thus radically different qualitatively. Yet the extent of
the difference between them seems to go beyond this. There appears to be a further nonqualitative and, it seems, fundamentally ontological difference between them: one is abstract, the
other is concrete. To be a pluralist is thus to recognize various objective, ontological differences.
But what exactly is it that makes these differences peculiarly ontological?
Recent defenders of ontological pluralism—such as Kris McDaniel (2009, 2010b, 2017)
and Jason Turner (2010, 2012, forthcoming)—have sought to capture and explain the basic
phenomenon of ontological difference in terms of quantification. To this end, they have endorsed
what I will call quantificational pluralism. There are, on this view, several fundamental
quantifiers that range over distinct domains. These quantifiers are supposed to be highly natural;
they are supposed to carve reality at the joints. Entities enjoy different ways of being, on this
view, when they are ranged over by different fundamental quantifiers. So, to return to our
examples, the difference between an actual and a merely possible dollar is to be explained by the
fact that the former but not the latter is ranged over by the fundamental actualist quantifier, @,
which ranges over all and only actual entities; while the difference between a number and a
nightingale is to be explained, at least in part, by the fact that the former but not the latter is
ranged over by the fundamental subsistentialist quantifier, a, which ranges over all and only
abstract entities.22 These differences are, moreover, said to be peculiarly ontological because

22

I here assume—following McDaniel (2009: 303-4, 314-15, 2017: 11, 24-6)—that subsistence is a fundamental

way of being enjoyed by all and only abstract entities. It is, on this view, disjoint from what we might call
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they involve differences in quantification. Ontological differences, on this view, are
quantificational differences.23
I will argue that this focus on quantification is a mistake. It does not, I think, really help
to capture and explain the basic phenomenon of ontological difference. For the domain of a
fundamental quantifier would seem to comprise a natural class. But we can ask: is a quantifier’s
domain a natural class because it is ranged over by a natural quantifier, or is a quantifier a natural
quantifier because it ranges over a natural class? The direction of explanation should, I think, be
clear: a quantifier inherits the naturalness of its domain. But the domain of a quantifier, being a
natural class, would seem to be best represented by a predicate. If this is correct, it leaves the
pluralist with the difficult—although I do not believe insurmountable—task of saying exactly
what it is about these classes that makes them peculiarly ontological.

existence—or, perhaps, concrete existence—which is a fundamental way of being enjoyed by all and only concrete
entities. This is not, however, the only way to understand the distinction at hand. Indeed, this is not how Meinong
([1910] 1983: 57-61/ AMG IV 73-78) understands it. He agrees that existence and subsistence are fundamental ways
of being, but he thinks they are nested rather than disjoint: ‘what can exist must’, Meinong claims, ‘first of all
subsist’ ([1910] 1983: 58/ AMG IV 74). Yet not everything that subsists can enjoy existence: abstract entities—or
what Meinong calls ideal objects—merely subsist. See also Meinong (1921: 18, trans. in Grossmann 1974: 228 /
AMG VII 20).
23

Quantificational pluralism, or a view very much like it, appears to have first been suggested—and then quickly

rejected—by Morton White (1956: 68). It makes a cameo appearance in W. V. Quine’s Word and Object (1960:
241-2) as the view that the difference between the way in which abstract objects such as numbers and classes exist
and the way in which physical or material objects exist is due to ‘a difference in two senses of “there are”’, and can
later be seen in Herbert W. Schneider’s claim that ‘[i]t may be necessary to have several kinds of existential
quantifiers in logic, if ontology finds that things have different ways of being’ (1962: 10). A more developed version
of this view was defended by Nino B. Cocchiarella (1969).
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1.2 Quantificational pluralism
Ontology is concerned with absolutely everything there is. It is the science of being as such. We
ask ontological questions when we ask, for example, whether there are numbers, whether
dragons exist, or whether some things are carnivorous plants. But what exactly are we asking
when we ask such questions? Current orthodoxy holds that these questions should be formulated
in the idiom of quantification. A central tenet of this meta-ontological orthodoxy is that talk of
being is best understood in terms of particular—or existential—quantification. Ontological
questions thus have something like the following form: ‘x(Fx)?’; they are quantificational
questions.24
The orthodox view rose to prominence in the twentieth century, and with its rise came the
subsequent decline of the doctrine that there are different ways of being. There has, however,
been a recent resurgence of interest in this doctrine. This is due, no doubt in part, to the fact that
McDaniel (2009) and Turner (2010) have shown us how to square this seemingly heretical
doctrine with a central pillar of current orthodoxy. The pluralist can simply grant that talk of
being is best captured by existential quantification, but insist that there are multiple fundamental
existential quantifiers. So while the monist and the pluralist about being agree that ontological
structure is quantificational structure, they disagree about the ‘shape’ or ‘complexity’ of that
structure. This locates the disagreement between monists and pluralists right where we should
expect it: over whether being—and, thus, fundamental quantification—is unitary or

24

This way of understanding current orthodoxy is due to Kit Fine (2009: 157-8). Adherents of this orthodoxy

include Quine (1948, 1969) and van Inwagen (1998, 2009a).
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fragmentary.25 If the quantificational structure of reality is unitary as the monist believes, there
will be exactly one fundamental—and perfectly natural—existential quantifier expression. (I
shall talk of a quantifier expression when I mean to talk about a piece of language or ideology,
and of a quantifier—or of the meaning of a quantifier expression—when I mean to talk about

25

The received view of being incorporates three theses:
The Neo-Quinean Thesis: being is perspicuously expressed by particular—or existential—quantification.
The Monistic Thesis: being is unitary: there are no ontological differences between any entities.
The Equivalence Thesis: being is the same as existence.

The neo-Quinean thesis is what I am calling the central pillar of current orthodoxy. The monistic thesis is an
endorsement of ontological monism—or monism about being—the view that there is exactly one fundamental way
of being. It should not be confused with the weaker claim that there is a way of being that absolutely everything
enjoys. For this is something that even some pluralists will accept. (See footnote 28 below.) The equivalence thesis
is needed to properly license the identification of particular with existential quantification in the neo-Quinean thesis.
It is denied, for example, by Russell (1903: 449), Moore (1903: 110-12), and Meinong ([1910] 1983: 57-61/ AMG
IV 73-78), who take existence to be the way of being enjoyed by entities in space and time. I shall, however, simply
assume the equivalence thesis here.
I have sought to improve upon a similar list due to van Inwagen (1998, 2009a) by isolating the central
commitments of the received view. The equivalence thesis is the same as van Inwagen’s Thesis 2. (No improvement
here.) The monistic thesis corresponds to van Inwagen’s Thesis 3 according to which existence is univocal, but
removes its apparent commitment to the claim that being is the same as existence and ensures that the thesis
concerns being rather than ‘being’. (This strikes me as a minor improvement.) The neo-Quinean thesis corresponds
to van Inwagen’s Thesis 4 according to which the meaning of ‘existence’ is adequately captured by the existential
quantifier of formal logic, but removes its apparent commitment to both the claim that being is the same as existence
and the claim that being is unitary. (This strikes me as a substantial improvement.)
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some part or aspect of the quantificational structure of reality.26) Being will thus be
perspicuously represented in our fundamental theories by the unrestricted existential quantifier
expression, ‘’, of formal logic. For a representation is metaphysically perspicuous to the extent
that it reflects reality’s ultimate structure, and the existential quantifier expression of formal
logic, being both simple and unrestricted, will perfectly reflect the fundamentality and
universality of being on the monist’s picture. But if the quantificational structure of reality is
fragmentary as the pluralist believes, there will be fundamental ways of being enjoyed by only
some of what there is. The existential quantifier expressions corresponding to these restricted
ways of being won’t range over everything there is, they will be restricted quantifier expressions.
But if these restricted quantifier expressions are to perfectly reflect the fragmented ontological
structure of reality, they should lack non-demonstrative, non-circular definitions in the language
of our fundamental theories since such definitions would be suggestive of further—more
fundamental—structure. So, for example, if the restricted quantifier expressions corresponding to
the restricted ways of being were ultimately defined in terms of an unrestricted quantifier
expression and various primitive restricting predicates, that would suggest that the ultimate
quantificational structure is unitary. For there would only be one undefined existential quantifier
expression in the fundamental language: namely, the unrestricted existential quantifier of formal
logic. The fundamental language would then fail to adequately reflect reality’s fragmented
ontological structure. A more perspicuous representation would instead take the fundamental
restricted quantifier expressions to lack any non-demonstrative, non-circular definitions; that is,

26

This will allow us to distinguish between language and reality, between a quantifier expression in a language and

the quantificational structure of reality that that expression is supposed to represent. Note that a quantifier—that is,
whatever part of aspect of reality that a quantifier expression designates—might but need not be an entity.
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it would take them to be semantically primitive.27 A language with multiple semantically
primitive quantifier expressions ranging over different domains will, it seems, perfectly reflect
the ontological structure of reality on the pluralist’s picture. McDaniel formulates ontological
pluralism along these lines as ‘the view that there are possible languages with semantically
primitive restricted quantifiers that are at least as natural as the unrestricted quantifier’ (2010a:
635, 2017: 146) and tells us that ‘there are ways of being just in case there is more than one
perfectly natural quantifier expression’ (2013: 12, cf. 2009: 314, 2017: 122).28 Turner follows

27

Note that this doesn’t mean that these quantifiers need to be unary (or type 〈1〉) quantifiers rather than binary (or

type 〈1, 1〉) quantifiers. McDaniel could take sentences with the possibilist quantifier, which ranges over both actual
and merely possible entities, to have the following form:
‘px(x is a dragon)’ (or ‘Somethingp is a dragon’),
where the quantified phrase ‘p’ (or ‘somethingp’) is taken to be a semantically primitive unary quantifier. But he
could instead take them to have something like the following form:
‘[px : x is a dragon] (x hordes treasure)’ (or ‘Somep dragons horde treasure’),
where the determiner ‘p’ (or ‘somep’) is taken to be a semantically primitive binary quantifier. Note that while
McDaniel usually takes the semantically primitive restricted quantifiers to be unary, he sometimes suggests that he
would be willing to allow them to be binary (see, for example, McDaniel 2017: 34-5).
28

The language of our fundamental theories must, on this view, contain semantically primitive restricted quantifier

expressions. If, in addition to the special, restricted ways of being corresponding to these semantically primitive
quantifier expressions, there is a fundamental way of being that absolutely everything enjoys, then the language of
our fundamental theories will need to include yet another semantically primitive unrestricted quantifier expression to
capture this general, unrestricted way of being. But whether the pluralist accepts that there is a fundamental way of
being that everything enjoys will depend upon just how fragmented that pluralist takes being to be; that is, it will
depend upon whether she accepts the strong—or just the weak—fragmentation thesis.
Weak Fragmentation Thesis: there are ontological differences between certain entities.
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suit, describing it as ‘the doctrine that a logically perspicuous description of reality will use
multiple quantifiers which cannot be thought of as ranging over a single domain’ (2012: 419),
and telling us that, by the pluralist’s lights, ‘[t]here are multiple joint-carving existential
quantifiers—each of which ranges over a different [domain]—and any fundamental theory that
has a hope of getting things right must use them all. To put ontological pluralism in a nutshell:
the true fundamental theory uses multiple existential quantifiers’ (2010: 9).29 It should, however,
be clear that the view so formulated is not simply ontological pluralism, it is quantificational
pluralism.30 Our official formulation of this view can now be given as follows.

Strong Fragmentation Thesis: there are no ontological similarities between certain entities.
(We can say that there is an ontological difference between two entities when there is a way of being that one enjoys
that the other does not, and that there is an ontological similarity between two entities when there is a way of being
that they both enjoy.) To be a pluralist is simply to accept the weaker of these two theses. For both of these theses
conflict with the monistic thesis from footnote 25 above. Historically, some pluralists have taken certain ways of
being to be nested rather than disjoint (where we’ll say that two ways of being are nested when everything that
enjoys one of them enjoys the other, but not vice versa; and that two ways of being are disjoint when nothing that
enjoys one of them enjoys the other). So, for example, Meinong ([1910] 1983: 57-61/ AMG IV 73-78) claims that
existence is nested in subsistence, while Moore (1903: 110-12) and Russell (1903: 71, 449-50) claim that existence
is nested in being. This point does not appear to be sufficiently appreciated by Trenton Merricks (2019: 601-2), who
takes something like the strong fragmentation thesis to be the core ‘conviction or insight or intuition’ that motivates
pluralism. (See section 6.1 below.)
29

A fundamental theory is, for Turner (2010: 9), a theory that only uses expressions of a fundamental language, and

a fundamental language is in turn a language where every simple expression is fundamental. The pluralist, on this
picture, is thus committed to there being more than one fundamental—or perfectly natural—existential quantifier.
30

I do not mean to suggest that either McDaniel or Turner would insist otherwise. Indeed, it should be clear that

McDaniel takes ontological pluralism—the view that there are different fundamental ways of being—to be distinct
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Quantificational pluralism is the view that:
i.

there are different fundamental ways of being, and

ii.

these ways of being are most perspicuously represented, both logically and
metaphysically, by different semantically primitive existential quantifier
expressions ranging over distinct domains.

The question I wish to consider here is whether someone who accepts the claim that there are
different fundamental ways of being should also accept the neo-Quinean thesis that being is
perspicuously expressed in an ideal metaphysical language by (semantically primitive)
existential quantifier expressions—or, to put this another way, whether an ontological pluralist
should be a quantificational pluralist.

from quantificational pluralism, which is, he thinks, the position you arrive at when you combine ontological
pluralism with ‘the neo-Quinean orthodoxy that there is a deep connection between quantification and existence’
(2017: 80). For, as McDaniel points out:
If you accept that there is a close connection between existence and quantification, then you will be
attracted to Quine’s slogan that to be is to be the value of a bound variable. And if you also think that there
are fundamentally different ways to exist, you will hold that there are different fundamental quantifiers.
You should then hold that to be in some fundamental way is to be within the scope of a fundamental
quantifier. (2017: 92)
It thus strikes me as a mistake to complain as Nick Stang (2019) does that McDaniel simply assumes that the idea
that there are different ways of being ‘needs to be articulated through the idea of what quantifiers would appear in a
metaphysically ideal language’ and that ‘the way to express the question of whether being is univocal or whether it
fragments is to cast…it in terms of a question about the style of the quantifiers in an ideal metaphysical language’.
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1.3 The priority of the domain
Suppose that there are multiple highly-natural, existential quantifiers that range over different
domains. The domains of these quantifiers would seem to comprise highly-natural classes: that
is, they would appear to have a high degree of internal unity. For entities belonging to the same
domain appear to be objectively similar to each other, and entities belonging to distinct domains
appear to be objectively different from each other. But what, if anything, can we say about the
relationship between the naturalness of one of these quantifiers and the naturalness of its
corresponding domain? I will assume that we can make meaningful comparisons between the
naturalness of a quantifier and its domain.31 I will also assume that a quantifier and its domain
will never both be perfectly natural: one will always be metaphysically prior to the other.32 And I
will assume, finally, that if a quantifier expression is the most perspicuous representation of a
fundamental way of being, then the quantifier designated by that expression will be perfectly
natural. Thus, if quantificational pluralism is true, the quantifiers that represent the various ways
of being will be more natural than—and metaphysically prior to—their corresponding domains.
I shall argue that the most natural quantifiers do not appear to be more natural than their
corresponding domains. But the nature of this argument will depend upon what it takes for an

31

This assumption could be challenged, but it strikes me as fairly plausible.

32

This assumption could also be challenged, but it does not appear to be something that the quantificational pluralist

can plausibly deny. For a domain is best understood as a class, and a class is most perspicuously represented by a
predicate. But it is a central part of quantificational pluralism that ways of being are better represented by quantifier
expressions than by predicates. If, however, it were to turn out that the meanings of the fundamental quantifier
expressions and their corresponding domains are both perfectly natural, then the ontological structure of reality
would seem to be represented just as well by primitive predicates as it is by semantically primitive quantifier
expressions.
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expression to count as a quantifier expression. There are two plausible criteria for quantification:
a semantic criterion, according to which an expression counts as a quantifier expression if it has
a certain kind of semantic value, and an inferential criterion, according to which an expression
counts as a quantifier expression if it plays a certain kind of inferential role.33
Let’s begin with the semantic criterion. The semantic value of the quantifier expression
‘’ of formal logic (and its closest English natural language equivalent ‘something’) is usually
taken to be the set of nonempty subsets of a domain M.34 The semantic value of the pluralist’s
semantically primitive restricted existential quantifiers would thus seem to be best understood as
sets of nonempty subsets of distinct domains. So, for example, the semantic value of the actualist
quantifier expression, @ would be the set of nonempty subsets of M@ (where M@ is the set of
actual entities), while the semantic value of the subsistentialist quantifier expression, a, would
be the set of nonempty subsets of Ma (where Ma is the set of abstract entities).35 If a quantifier

33

Turner (2010) appears to be indifferent between these two criteria, while McDaniel (2017: 34-5) expresses a

marked preference for the latter.
34

Or, at least, this is how it is understood on the theory of generalized quantifiers developed by Mostowski (1957)

and Lindström (1966). See Glanzberg (2006) and Westerståhl (2011) for helpful introductions, and Peters and
Westerståhl (2006) for a comprehensive survey.
35

I am here assuming, for convenience, that the pluralist’s quantifiers are unary (or type 〈1〉) rather than binary (or

type 〈1, 1〉). If the pluralist were to take the fundamental existential quantifiers to be binary, then the semantic values
of these quantifiers would be best understood as sets of ordered pairs of non-empty intersecting subsets of distinct
domains. So, for example, the semantic value of the binary actualist quantifier, some @, would be the set of ordered
pairs of subsets of M@ with non-empty intersections. To illustrate: consider ‘Some @ dragons horde treasure’. This
will be true if and only if the intersection of the set of dragons (from M @) and the set of things that horde treasure
(also from M@) is non-empty. (For were the intersection of these sets to be non-empty, the ordered pair of the set of
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expression just is its semantic value, then the naturalness of the pluralist’s restricted existential
quantifiers would seem to be determined by the naturalness of their corresponding domains. For,
in general, any difference in naturalness between the semantic values of two quantifier
expressions must, it seems, be due to a difference in (i) the naturalness of the domains of those
quantifiers, or (ii) the naturalness of the relevant sets of subsets (of their domains). But when
comparing the semantic values of two existential quantifier expressions, it seems fair to assume
that the set of nonempty subsets (of the domain of the first) will be as natural as the set of
nonempty subsets (of the domain of the second).36 Any difference in naturalness between the

dragons and the set of things that horde treasure would be contained in the relevant set: namely, the set of ordered
pairs of subsets of M@ with non-empty intersections.) But given that the set of dragons (from M@) is empty, the
intersection of this set with the set of treasure-hording things will also be empty. And so the sentence ‘Some @
dragons horde treasure’ will turn out to be false.
36

We might seek to question this assumption. But, as far as I can tell, the only reason why the set of nonempty

subsets of one domain would be more (or less) natural than the set of nonempty subsets of another domain would be
because the former domain is more (or less) natural than the latter. So, for example, we might want to say that the
set of nonempty subsets of the domain of abstract objects is more natural than the set of nonempty subsets of the
domain of abstract objects and the Eiffel Tower. But I can see no reason for why this would be so other than that the
domain of abstract objects is more natural than the domain of abstract objects and the Eiffel Tower.
The assumption strikes me as even more plausible if we interpret the semantic value of a quantifier not as a
set of sets, but as a property of—or a relation between—properties on a domain. Then any difference in the
naturalness between the semantic values of two quantifiers would need to be due to a difference in (i) the naturalness
of the domains of those quantifiers, or (ii) the naturalness of the relevant properties of—or relations between—
properties (on these domains). Existential quantifiers will then be understood not a sets of nonempty subsets of a
domain, but as the second-order property of being instantiated—or having at least one instance—on a domain. But
since there seems to be no reason to think that the property of being instantiated would be more natural when
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semantic values of two existential quantifier expressions must therefore be due to a difference in
the naturalness of their domains. This suggests that, in general, the naturalness of the domain of a
quantifier is prior to—or, at least, independent of—the naturalness of the quantifier ranging over
that domain. Thus, the most natural quantifiers will fail to be more natural than their
corresponding domains.
The quantificational pluralist will likely deny the force of this argument. For while the
standard semantics for quantification might provide us with a useful and systematic way to talk
about quantificational structure, it is not thereby guaranteed to be perspicuous.37 Thus, we cannot
assume that the naturalness of a quantifier is related to either (i) the naturalness of a domain, or
(ii) the naturalness of a set of sets (on the domain). A related criticism is that the standard
semantics assumes that quantifier expressions correspond to entities (namely, sets of sets), and is
thus not adequately metaphysically neutral.38
Let’s turn then to the inferential criterion, which provides the desired neutrality. The
inferential role of ‘’ is given by the standard natural deduction introduction and elimination

applied to one domain than to another, our assumption appears to be vindicated. Thanks to Kris McDaniel for
pushing me on this point.
37

It might be, as Theodore Sider (2011: 90) puts it, ‘appropriate in linguistic theory’, but it need not ‘ring true at a

metaphysical level’.
38

We should not, as Kris McDaniel (2017: 35) puts it, begrudge the semanticist’s ‘incursions into metaphysics’

since she is simply ‘providing models for the ways in which meaningful expressions in natural language combine
with each other to form larger meaningful units’. But ‘we are doing metaphysics now’, and since there are
‘metaphysical interlocutors’ among us ‘who do not think that there are entities that correspond to quantifierexpressions’, we need ‘a more neutral characterization of what it is to be a quantifier in order to accommodate
them’.
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rules. The pluralist’s semantically primitive restricted existential quantifier expressions permit
various similar inferences. So, for example, from ‘Smaug is a dragon’ or ‘The creature I’m
thinking about right now is a dragon’ I can presumably infer ‘px(x is a dragon)’ (where p is the
possibilist quantifier ranging over both actual and merely possible entities), but not ‘@x(x is
dragon)’.39 Turner (2010: 26) suggests that the we formulate the pluralist’s inference rules as
follows:
iI:

F(t) & ix(x = t) ⊢ ixF(x).

iE:

If Q, R, …, F(t), and ix(x = t) ⊢ P, and if t does not occur in P, Q, R, …, or F(x),
then Q, R, …, and ixF(x) ⊢ P.

I will assume that these rules tell us something important about the quantificational structure of
reality. But we can ask about the relationship between the patterns of inference licensed by these
inference rules and the domains associated with their corresponding quantifier expressions. The
different natural patterns of inference should, according to the quantificational pluralist, help to
explain the naturalness of the domains they carve out: Smaug will belong to the domain of p, on
this view, because we are licensed to infer ‘px(x is a dragon)’ from ‘Smaug is a dragon’, and not
the other way around. But this, I think, cannot be maintained. For it seems that the
quantificational pluralist needs to presuppose these very domains in order to formulate adequate
inference rules. So, for example, we need to assume ‘px(x = Smaug)’ in order to infer ‘px (x is
a dragon)’ from ‘Smaug is a dragon’. And since the claim that px(x = Smaug) is, I think, most

39

If the pluralist’s existential quantifiers were binary rather than unary, these inference patterns would need to be

modified accordingly. Once modified, they should, for example, allow me to infer ‘Some p dragons horde treasure’
from ‘Smaug is a dragon’ and ‘Smaug hordes treasure’, while continuing to prohibit me from inferring ‘Some@
dragons horde treasure’. I shall ignore these complications in what follows.
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intelligibly understood as the claim that Smaug is in the domain of p, this essentially ensures
that the patterns of inference allowed by the possibilist quantifier are determined by its domain.
But if the quantificational pluralist needs to presuppose these very domains in order to formulate
adequate inference rules, it seems that the naturalness—and not just the validity—of these rules
will depend upon the naturalness of the domains we must presuppose, and not the other way
around. So, for example, consider the following valid inference rules:
@I:

F(t) & @x(x = t) ⊢ @xF(x)

and
@\ETI: F(t) & @\ETx(x = t) ⊢ @\ETxF(x)
(where @\ET ranges over all and only those actual entities that are not themselves identical to—
or parts of—the Eiffel Tower). The reason why @I seems to captures a natural pattern of
inferences and @\ETI does not appears to be because the domain of @ is highly natural and the
domain of @\ET is not. But if that’s right, then it seems that we cannot grant that a domain is
explanatorily prior to a pattern of inference without also accepting that the naturalness of this
domain is prior to the naturalness of that pattern of inference. This would suggest that, in
general, the naturalness of the domain of a quantifier is prior to—or, at least, independent of—
the naturalness of any patterns of inference involving that quantifier. Thus, since the naturalness
of a quantifier appears to be due simply to the naturalness of the patterns of inference it licenses,
the most natural quantifier will fail to be more natural than their corresponding domains.40

40

There is a further problem for the quantificational pluralist given the inferential criterion. If a quantifier is prior to

its domain as quantificational pluralism predicts, then that domain should be carved out by the patterns of inference
allowed by that quantifier. And if the patterns of inference were prior to the domain in this way, then the fact that a
certain entity belongs to a given domain—and, more important, enjoys a certain way of being—would seem to be
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I have argued that the most natural quantifiers are not more natural than their
corresponding domains. The argument has taken the form of a dilemma, which we might put as
follows:
(1) Either the correct metaphysical account of the nature of a quantifier is given by the
semantic criterion, or else it is given by the inferential criterion.
(2) If, on the one hand, the correct metaphysical account of the nature of a quantifier is given
by the semantic criterion, then the most natural quantifiers will fail to be more natural
than their corresponding domains.
(3) If, on the other hand, the correct metaphysical account of the nature of a quantifier is
given by the inferential criterion, then the most natural quantifiers will again fail to be
more natural than their corresponding domains.
(4) Therefore, it is not the case that the most natural quantifiers are more natural than their
corresponding domains (from 1, 2, and 3).
The basic assumption behind the first premise is that a criterion of quantification will not only
provide a standard for what counts as a quantifier expression, but also a metaphysical theory
about the nature of a quantifier. We might seek to deny this assumption by denying that a
criterion of quantification tells us anything about the ‘essence’ of quantification. We could thus,
it seems, easily slip through the horns of the dilemma by simply denying that these criteria
capture anything important about the fundamental structure of reality.41

purely relational. But, I claim, the fact that I am actual is not merely relational: my being actual does not have
anything to do with my being related to something else. It is a way of being that I enjoy intrinsically. The same goes
for my being concrete.
41

Thanks to Nick Tourville and Jason Turner for pushing me on this point.
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I want to distinguish between two different versions of this strategy: on the first, the
quantificational pluralist holds that her preferred criterion provides an account of what it is for an
expression to be a quantifier, but insists that it does not thereby provide a metaphysical account
of that aspect of the structure of reality that these quantifier expressions are supposed to
represent; whereas, on the second version of this strategy, the quantificational pluralist holds that
while these criteria give us a reliable way of distinguishing those expressions that are quantifiers
from those expressions that are not, they neither provide us with an account of the nature of that
aspect of the structure of reality that these quantifier expressions are supposed to represent nor of
the nature of these quantifier expressions themselves.
The first version of this strategy leads, I think, to an untenable—and perhaps even
outright incoherent—position. For if the quantificational pluralist’s preferred criterion provides
an account of what it is for an expression to be a quantifier and if these quantifier expressions
are, as the quantificational pluralist believes, supposed to perspicuously represent—and thus best
reflect—the ontological structure of reality, then we should also take this criterion to provide us
with the best metaphysical theory about the nature of the meaning of these quantifier expressions
(that is, we should take it to provide the best metaphysical account of that aspect of the structure
of reality that these quantifiers expressions are supposed to represent). To insist otherwise is to
claim that these quantifier expressions have a distorting effect: that they do not perspicuously
represent the ontological structure of reality after all.
That leaves us with the second version of the strategy. The metaphysical nature of a
quantifier will be taken as primitive on this view, and so will the ‘essence’ of the quantifier
expression that perspicuously represents it. The quantificational pluralist will thus deny that the
‘essence’ of certain linguistic expressions is given by either the semantic or the inferential
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criteria. All these criteria are supposed to do, on this view, is give us true necessary and
sufficient conditions for an expression’s being a quantifier expression. The semantic criterion
just tells us that all and only quantifier expressions can be modeled as sets of subsets of a
domain, while the inferential criterion just tells us that all and only quantifier expressions play
certain inferential roles.
My inclination here is to say that while these criteria might not be part of the ‘essence’ of
a quantifier expression, they should still be thought to flow from—or somehow be explained
by—the ‘essence’ of these expressions. More important, I think, is the fact that these criteria will
be somehow reflected in reality. For, assuming that these quantifier expressions are maximally
perspicuous, anything that flows from their ‘essence’ should reflect something that flows from
the metaphysical nature of the quantifiers they represent. And this, I take it, should help to
capture and explain the basic intuitive phenomenon of objective, ontological difference.
But now, I fear, that I lose my grip on the nature of a quantifier. My problem is not
simply that we have to take the quantifier as metaphysically and conceptually primitive. It is that,
if we do, then I no longer have a good sense of how or why these criteria would flow from the
nature of the pluralist’s quantifiers. And, without this, I no longer have a sense of how the
quantificational pluralist would capture and explain the basic phenomenon of objective,
ontological difference.

1.4 Two approaches to quantificational pluralism
Let me say a bit more about my basic approach. I take, as my fundamental starting point, the
observation that there are—or would seem to be—various peculiarly ontological differences
between certain entities: so, for example, an actual dollar is ontologically different from a merely
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possible dollar; a number is ontologically different from a nightingale; and God, perhaps, is
ontologically different from His creation. This phenomenon of objective, ontological similarity
and difference is the basic phenomenon that, I think, any ontological pluralist should attempt to
capture and explain.
The significance of this phenomenon will vary depending upon our approach to
quantificational pluralism. The intuitive approach to—or motivation for—quantificational
pluralism, which I prefer, starts with the basic observation that there are objective, ontological
similarities and differences. It combines this basic observation with the orthodox view that being
is best represented in an ideal metaphysical language with existential quantifier expressions, and
thereby indirectly motivates the claim that the ideal metaphysical language contains multiple
fundamental existential quantifier expressions.42 An alternative approach might begin from
broader theoretical considerations about our best fundamental theories and the metaphysically
ideal languages in which they are couched. These theoretical considerations might themselves
directly motivate the claim that the ideal metaphysical language contains multiple fundamental
existential quantifier expressions. If we also accept the claim that being is what is represented by
existential quantifier expressions in an ideal metaphysical language, then these theoretical
considerations will provide an indirect motivation for the claim that there are objective,

42

I am here quite sympathetic to the following remark from Nick Stang (2019): ‘I was antecedently inclined to find

the idea of different modes of being coherent and attractive…, more attractive, in fact, than I find the idea of a
metaphysically ideal language’.
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ontological similarities and differences between certain entities. The basic phenomenon becomes
a discovery, not a datum.43
Here’s another way to put this. The quantificational pluralist is committed to the truth of
the following three theses:
The ontological pluralist’s thesis: there are different fundamental ways of being.
The neo-Quinean thesis: being is perspicuously expressed in an ideal metaphysical
language by (semantically primitive) particular—or existential—quantifier expressions.
The quantificational pluralist’s thesis: there are different fundamental particular—or
existential—quantifier expressions (ranging over different domains) in the ideal
metaphysical language.
But she might have two very different reasons for accepting these theses. I think that the
ontological pluralist’s thesis can be intuitively motivated. And if we combine this intuitively
motivated thesis with the orthodox neo-Quinean thesis, we get the quantificational pluralist’s
thesis. The alternative approach would instead take the quantificational pluralist’s thesis to be
motivated by various theoretical considerations about the language of our best fundamental
theories. But, then, if we combine this theoretically motivated thesis with a strong version of the
neo-Quinean thesis (which combines what I have above called the neo-Quinean thesis with what
I will call the converse neo-Quinean thesis according to which being is what is represented by
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Ross Cameron (2018: 793) draws a similar distinction between ‘[positing] that there are two fundamental

quantifiers…because [there are] independent reasons for thinking that [certain entities] exist in different ways’ and
being ‘driven to [say] that [certain entities] exist in different ways, because there are two fundamental quantifiers’.
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existential quantifier expressions in an ideal language), we will get the ontological pluralist’s
thesis.44
The above argument against quantificational pluralism gained traction because I was
attempting to capture and explain an independent phenomenon of objective, ontological
similarity and difference. I started with the observation that there are peculiarly, ontological
differences between certain entities and the claim that ontologically similar entities appear to
form natural classes. I had envisioned that the quantificational pluralist would have to tell us how
these classes were unified—and thereby made natural—by different fundamental quantifiers. It is
thus because I take the phenomenon of objective, ontological similarity and difference so
seriously that the problem of the priority of the domain arises.
But not everyone will profess to have such a firm grip on this phenomenon. We might
thus want to have another way to determine whether certain entities enjoy different ways of
being. This is exactly what the alternative, theoretical approach is supposed to provide. Indeed, if
we were to rely solely upon this approach, we would remove the main motivation for thinking
that ontologically similar entities—entities that enjoy a shared way of being—form highly
natural classes, and we would thus no longer need to show how the most natural quantifiers unify
these classes. I do not, however, think that we should adopt this purely theoretical approach. For
if we were to do so, we would have to say that certain views, which do not intuitively appear to
be versions of ontological pluralism, are committed to there being different fundamental ways of
being.

44

This is, I think, the approach that would be preferred by Jason Turner, who writes: ‘There’s a sort of vague

“feeling of ontological similarity” that I can kind of grok, but it all feels a bit fuzzy and slippery, and when we start
trying to…lean heavily on [it] I get uncomfortable’ (personal communication).
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Take, for example, the following view. Some philosophers have held that concrete
reality divides into things (such as ravens, rivers, and rocks), on the one hand, and stuff (such as
air, earth, and water), on the other. Things, on this view, are made up out of—or constituted by—
stuff. They can be counted: we can ask how many of them there are. Stuff, however, is distinct
from the things it constitutes. It cannot be counted. But, unlike things, stuff can be measured: we
can ask how much of it there is. So while it makes perfect sense to ask how many rivers there are
on Earth or how much water there is on Mars, it doesn’t really make sense to ask how many
water there are on Earth or how much river there is on Mars. We might take this to suggest that
quantification over things cannot be reduced to quantification over stuff, and vice versa. An ideal
metaphysical theory will, on this view, have to make use of both thing- and stuffquantification.45
If we take a purely theoretical approach to ontological pluralism, then we will have to say
that things and stuff enjoy different fundamental ways of being. But this strikes me as the
intuitively wrong thing to say.46 For we can—and, indeed, I think we should—distinguish

45

Ned Markosian (2004a: 413, 2004b: 334) appears to have once held something like this view. He now holds that

while ‘it would not be so bad if positing stuff meant that we had to introduce a new pair of quantifiers to our logical
toolkit’, it does not actually require us to do so since we can make the distinction between things and stuff ‘explicit
with the use of predicates rather than special quantifiers’ (2015: 685). But just because we can represent this
distinction with special predicates doesn’t mean that we should. This distinction might, after all, be more
perspicuously represented by quantifiers than by predicates. It thus seems open to Markosian to continue to endorse
this view.
46

I here agree with Cameron (2018: 792), who claims that ‘[t]he dual thing/stuff ontology seems to me like a

paradigm case of reality containing different kinds, it doesn’t seem to me like we should be forced to interpret it as a
view on which there are different ways of being’. Turner (forthcoming) grants that this case raises ‘several tricky
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between the being and the nature of a portion of reality. But while things have parts, stuff does
not. And while things have a determinate form or structure, stuff is amorphous. It is, I think,
because of what things are that they are countable, it is because of what stuff is that it is
measurable. The demand for different thing- and stuff-quantifiers thus appears to arise solely
from the nature of the different portions of reality that these quantifiers quantify over, not from
their being. It thus strikes me as a mistake to claim that being is what is represented by
existential quantifier expressions in an ideal language. But without this thesis, a purely
theoretical approach cannot get off the ground.

1.5 Conclusion
I have argued as follows:
(1) If quantificational pluralism is true, then the most natural quantifiers will be more natural
than their corresponding domains.

issues’ but does not think that it is obvious that by embracing both thing- and stuff-quantification, proponents of the
mixed thing/stuff ontology ‘aren’t thereby dabbling in ontological pluralism. It seems strange to say that they are;
but it also seems strange to say that they aren’t’. I must confess, however, that I do not see why it would be strange
to say that proponents of the mixed ontology aren’t thereby dabbling in ontological pluralism. We should not, I
think, appeal to the converse neo-Quinean thesis that being is what is represented by existential quantifier
expressions in an ideal language since this is exactly what we are here calling into question. The only other
motivation that I can see for thinking that proponents of the mixed ontology are dabbling in ontological pluralism
comes from the claim that for every ontological category there is a corresponding way of being. But this claim
cannot, I think, be plausibly maintained. For while simples and composites might plausibly be said to belong to
different ontological categories, they do not appear to thereby enjoy different ways of being.
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(2) But it is not the case that the most natural quantifiers are more natural than their
corresponding domains.
(3) Therefore, quantificational pluralism is not true (from 1 and 2).
This argument does not target the claim that there are different fundamental ways of being, it
merely targets the claim that these ways of being are most perspicuously represented by different
semantically primitive existential quantifiers ranging over distinct domains. Thus, it gives us
reason to reject quantificational pluralism, but not ontological pluralism.47 So if we are tempted
to believe that there are ontological differences between certain entities, we should not take these
differences to be underwritten by differences in quantification. But my conclusion is not entirely
negative, for I have also suggested that we would do much better to look at the domains of these
quantifiers, which appear to form perfectly natural classes. This leaves the pluralist with the
difficult—although I do not believe insurmountable—task of saying what it is that makes these
classes peculiarly ontological. It is this task that I shall take up in the chapters that follow. I shall
ultimately defend the view that a natural class is ontological if and only if its corresponding
property is sufficiently general, is non-qualitative, and does not admit of real definition.

47

Indeed, if we so much as take pluralism to be an intelligible position, we should also take this argument to give us

reason to reject the neo-Quinean thesis as well. For the neo-Quinean thesis, if true, should be compatible with every
intelligible position about the nature of being.
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Chapter 2: Impure Concepts and Non-Qualitative Properties

Abstract: Some properties such as having a beard and being a philosopher are intuitively
qualitative, while other properties such as being identical to Plato and being a student of
Socrates are intuitively non-qualitative. It is often assumed that, necessarily, a property is
qualitative if and only if it can be designated descriptively without the aid of directly referential
devices (such as demonstratives, indexicals, or proper names). I argue that this linguistic thesis
fails in both directions: there might be non-qualitative properties that can be designated
descriptively, and there appear to be qualitative properties that can only be designated directly. I
conclude that while the linguistic thesis is ultimately untenable as stated, it can be plausibly
recast as a thesis about our concepts rather than the properties they designate.

2.1 Introduction
The distinction between qualitative and non-qualitative properties plays an important role in
cashing out the intuitive notions of duplication and indiscernibility. Duplicates instantiate the
same intrinsic qualitative properties, while indiscernibles instantiate the same intrinsic as well as
the same extrinsic qualitative properties. Consider, for example, two drops of water—Agenor
and Belos—with exactly the same size, shape, weight, and chemical composition. They are
duplicates. But one has the property being identical to Agenor, the other does not. Next consider
an actual and a merely possible silver dollar, composed of exactly the same kinds of metals, with
exactly the same size, shape, and weight. They are perfect duplicates. But they nevertheless
appear to differ in an important respect: they belong to fundamentally different ontological kinds.
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One has the property being actual, the other does not.48 The aforementioned properties do not
appear to be concerned with how their objects are related to anything else. They would appear to
divide not only duplicates, but even indiscernible duplicates. They thus appear to be intrinsic
non-qualitative properties.
Many philosophers believe that, in addition to this connection to duplication and
indiscernibility, there is also an interesting connection between the qualitative/non-qualitative

48

These two examples are drawn from Kant ([1781/ 1787] 1998: A 263-4/ B 319, A 599/ B 627). The second

example might strike some as somewhat contentious for one of two reasons. First, it turns Kant’s example on its
head. I assume possibilism, the view that some things are non-actual, and take the example of an actual and a merely
possible dollar to highlight the peculiarly non-qualitative status of actuality. But Kant appears to use the example to
argue against possibilism itself. See Stang (2015) for a recent defense of this interpretation. I can, however, see no
real reason to object here provided that we are clear about what we are and what we are not attributing to Kant.
A second, more pressing, reason is that it assumes that there are concrete merely possible entities. But since
few will accept this assumption, the example might seem unfit to motivate the project at hand. This problem can, I
think, be (partially) remedied. For while the assumption that there are merely possible entities is highly contentious,
the assumption that there are past—and even future—entities is much less so. Suppose we accept an ontology that
contains past, present, and future entities. We might still wish to accommodate the basic A-theoretic intuition that
time ‘flows’ or ‘passes’. One way to do so is to think of the present as a spotlight moving through time, shining now
on these, now on those entities. But note that, on this view, the entities that currently bask in the light of the present
seem to enjoy a special ontological status. Yet they need not thereby differ qualitatively from any past—or future—
entities. A past and a present entity could, it seems, be perfect duplicates. But while one has the property being
present, the other does not. Thus, on this version of the moving spotlight theory of time, the property of being
present appears to be something like an intrinsic non-qualitative property. (The reason I take this to be only a partial
remedy is that I am not sure whether the ‘shiftiness’ of the present—the fact that one and the same thing can be
present at one time and past at another—is ultimately intelligible. Since I see no such problem in the case of
actuality, I take it to better serve as a motivating example.)
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distinction and various linguistic facts.49 It is commonly held that if we had a sufficiently rich
language (containing general—but not necessarily primitive—predicates for all the basic
qualitative properties and relations, and allowing for complex infinitary constructions), we could
describe the complete qualitative profile of every possible object. But it is also held that unless
this language were to contain demonstratives (such as ‘this cat’ and ‘that dog’), indexicals (such
as ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘now’, and ‘actual’), or proper names (such as ‘Socrates’ and ‘Plato’), it would lack
the resources to specify any of an object’s non-qualitative properties. The basic idea is captured
by the following thesis.
The Linguistic Thesis: necessarily, a property is qualitative if and only if it can be
designated descriptively without the aid of directly referential devices (such as
demonstratives, indexicals, or proper names).
This thesis appears to depend upon two assumptions concerning the descriptive, qualitative
predicates of any sufficiently rich language. The first assumption is that these predicates are
closed under even infinitely many applications of conjunction, disjunction, negation, and
quantification: every predicate that is defined up out of descriptive predicates is itself a
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See, for example, Carnap (1947b: 138), Adams (1979: 7), Lewis (1986: 221), Gallois (1998: 249), and Divers

(2002: 349 n 12). Each of these authors holds that qualitative properties can be expressed without the use of proper
names (or, as Carnap would have it, without the use of individual constants). Adams adds that they can be expressed
without the use of proper adjectives, proper verbs, indexical expressions, or referential uses of definite descriptions,
while Divers also mentions natural kind terms in this context. Gallois goes so far as to claim that the qualitative
properties are expressible by predicates that don’t themselves contain any rigid designators other than the ones used
to designate those properties.
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descriptive predicate.50 The second assumption is that a sufficiently rich language will contain
descriptive predicates for all the fundamental qualitative properties and relations (although these
predicates need not themselves be primitive). I shall call these the closure and fundamentality
assumptions.
A few brief comments are in order before we proceed. We can often designate a property
in a variety of different ways. Indeed some seemingly qualitative properties are most readily
designated with the aid of various directly referential devices. Consider, for example, the
determinate shape had by the Eiffel Tower. A perfect duplicate of the Eiffel Tower would, it
seems, have this very shape. We might designate the property of having this shape in a direct
fashion: namely, as having the shape of the Eiffel Tower. But we could also give a purely
descriptive specification of this property as having such and such a shape. The presence of a
direct route to a property need not impugn its qualitative status.51

50

Carnap (1947b: 138) would not have accepted this assumption since he held that complex predicates such as ‘red

or not red’ do not designate a qualitative property, but rather a trivial non-qualitative (or, as he would say,
positional) one. He would have thus rejected the linguistic thesis because he held that the necessary property can be
designated descriptively, but is not purely qualitative.
51

This is not entirely uncontroversial. So, for example, Hoffmann-Kolss (2019: 997-9) claims that having the shape

which the Eiffel Tower actually has and having such and such shape are different properties. For, she thinks, while
the former property is haecceitistic, the latter is not. She also claims that given an entity, call it Isengard, at a world
w1 that has the same shape that the Eiffel Tower actually has, having the shape which the Eiffel Tower actually has
and having the shape which Isengard has at w1 are intuitively different properties, and hence that neither should be
identified with having such and such a shape (2019: 998 n 1). I cannot see, however, why we should think that
having the shape which the Eiffel Tower actually has and having the shape which Isengard has at w1 are different
properties. Indeed, this strikes me as a clear case where there are simply different ways to pick out the same
property.
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The absence of a purely descriptive route is, however, an entirely different matter. We
can often come close to specifying some identity properties descriptively. So, for example,
consider Benjamin Franklin. He invented bifocals, and since no one else shares this distinction at
our world, we can pick him out indexically as the actual inventor of bifocals. We can then
specify his identity property as being identical to the actual inventor of bifocals. But, by
invoking an indexical, we will have failed to designate the property being identical to Benjamin
Franklin in a purely descriptive fashion. If, as seems plausible, this identity property is nonqualitative, then the linguistic thesis predicts that our search for a descriptive route will turn up
empty.
I should, next, distinguish between stronger and weaker versions of the linguistic thesis.
On a strong version of this thesis, a qualitative property can be designated in an infinitary
expansion of a language had by creatures like us, in epistemic situations similar to our own,
without the aid of directly referential devices; while on a weaker version, a qualitative property
can, at least in principle, be designated without such devices, but perhaps only in an infinitary
expansion of a language had by agents in much better epistemic situations than our own. These
different versions of the linguistic thesis might, in turn, yield different results about the
qualitative status of certain properties. I will focus my attention on the strong version of the
linguistic thesis (although my criticisms should carry over to weaker versions as well).52
I should, finally, be clear that the linguistic thesis is not here intended as an analysis, nor
should it be put forward as one.53 One problem is that the linguistic thesis, if true, is presumably
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Thanks to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to make this distinction.
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I assume here that an analysis does not simply tell us that the explanandum holds if and only if the explanans

holds, but also that the explanandum holds because the explanans holds and not the other way around. So, were we
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true due to the special nature of the qualitative properties. This should become clear by
considering the above-mentioned connection to duplication. It seems plausible that two objects
are duplicates because they share all their intrinsic qualitative properties. If, however, the
linguistic thesis were taken as an analysis, the reason these objects share all their intrinsic
qualitative properties would be due to various linguistic facts. It thus appears that they would be
duplicates because we can designate their intrinsic profiles descriptively. But, intuitively, their
being duplicates does not have anything to do with facts about our—or any—language.
Duplication seems to be a mind- and language-independent relation. If we think the linguistic
thesis is true, we should say that a property can be designated descriptively because it is
qualitative, not the other way around. If proposed as an analysis, the linguistic thesis would
appear to invert the proper direction of explanation.54
Another problem is that the linguistic thesis, if it is to be at all adequate, requires the
assumption that the primitive descriptive predicates of our language always designate purely
qualitative properties. This should become clear once we consider cases of inadmissible
predicates. Take, for example, the predicates ‘pegasizes’ and ‘socratizes’. Since I am not here
assuming a view on which all individuals have qualitative essences (that is, purely qualitative
properties that are their individual essences), these predicates will intuitively designate non-

to take the linguistic thesis as an analysis, it would tell us that a property is qualitative because it can be designated
without the use of directly referential devices and not the other way around; thus, it would tell us not only what the
qualitative properties are like, but what it is to be a qualitative property.
54

See Rosenkrantz (1979: 516, 1993: 69) and Cowling (2015: 287) for similar criticisms. Rosenkrantz objects to

explaining a non-linguistic distinction in linguistic terms, while Cowling objects to explaining a mind-independent
distinction in mind-dependent terms. I have tried to amplify these criticisms by focusing upon the connection to
duplication.
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qualitative properties. But if we took them on board as primitive and unanalyzable predicates,
they would not contain any directly referential devices. They are, however, inadmissible as
descriptive predicates because, as we just noted, they designate non-qualitative properties.55 If
the linguistic thesis were put forward as an analysis, a property would be qualitative because it
can be designated by an admissible predicate. But, as we have just seen, a predicate is only
admissible because it designates a qualitative property. If proposed as an analysis, the linguistic
thesis would appear to be circular.56
I will argue that the linguistic thesis fails in both directions. There might turn out to be,
on the one hand, non-qualitative properties that can be designated descriptively. So, for example,
depending upon the lay of logical space, we might be able to designate certain identity
properties—or, more problematically, the property of actuality—with infinite conjunctions,
disjunctions, and negations of purely descriptive predicates and without the use of directly
referential devices. This indicates a potential failure of the closure assumption. In such cases, the
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We might instead insist that proper verbs such as ‘pegasizes’ and ‘socratizes’ (along with proper adjectives such

as ‘solar’ or ‘lunar’) are themselves directly referential devices. But, again, the only reason for classifying them as
such appears to be that they designate non-qualitative properties.
56

See Adams (1979: 7) and Stalnaker (2012: 61-2) for this criticism. We might seek to avoid it by distinguishing

between the because of analysis and the because of explanation. The circularity is supposed to arise when the claim
that a property is qualitative because it can be designated by an admissible predicate is supplemented by the claim
that a predicate is admissible because it designates a qualitative property. There would only be a genuine circularity
involved here if the ‘because’ in both cases were the because of analysis. But an explanation need not be an analysis.
Thanks to André Gallois for suggesting this line of response. It is, however, not entirely clear to me how we could
adequately explain the difference between an admissible and an inadmissible predicate without providing an
analysis.
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right-hand side of the biconditional would be true, while the left-hand side would be false. There
appear to be, on the other hand, qualitative properties that can only be designated directly. So, for
example, we seem unable to designate certain fundamental physical properties without the use of
directly referential devices. This indicates a failure of the fundamentality assumption. In these
cases, the left-hand side of the biconditional will be true, and the right-hand side will be false.
In what follows, I will be working within a broadly modal realist framework
supplemented with absolute actuality (see Bricker 2001, 2006, 2008).57 I assume that our
world—the whole of our physical universe, the cosmos—is but one of a plurality of possible
worlds. These worlds are very much like our own. They are concrete, fully determinate
individuals. Each world is an internally unified whole, and is absolutely isolated from every
other world. I also assume that possible individuals are world-bound: that is, that they are wholly
part of at most one world.58 The property of being identical to a particular individual will thus
correspond to the unit class containing that individual. But I won’t assume that all worlds are
ontologically on a par. Our world, at least, appears to be special. It is actual, while others are
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Some will, no doubt, find this framework too much to be believed and worthy only of an incredulous stare. I

would advise such readers to treat it as a useful heuristic, enabling us to identify a property’s intension with its
extension across all possible worlds. My arguments, except where they concern co-actual worlds, could then easily
be recast with only slight modification. The only real points of substance that would be lost concern the basis for my
antipathy toward biting the bullet concerning the qualitative status of the property of actuality in section 2.2, and my
objection to global structuralism in section 2.3.
58

I do not say, as Lewis (1986: 214) does, that possible individuals are wholly part of exactly one world. Trans-

world individuals are composed of parts of different worlds; they are not wholly part of even one world. But I would
not thereby call them impossible. For I accept a non-standard possible worlds analysis, according to which
something is possible iff it is true at some world or worlds (see Bricker 2001: 40-5, 2006: 53, 2008: 117).
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merely possible. This marks a genuine, objective difference between these worlds. They belong
to fundamentally different ontological kinds. Nor will I assume that our world alone is actual. I
hold instead that it is possible for many worlds to be co-actual.59 The mereological sum of these
co-actual worlds would not, however, itself constitute a further world, nor would there be a
world that duplicates this sum. For worlds are internally unified and anything made up of
absolutely isolated parts is not. I am thus forced to adopt Bricker’s non-standard possible worlds
analysis, according to which something is possible iff it is true at some world or worlds.60
A possible object’s status as actual is not a mere matter of its being a part of our world—
there is a genuine objective difference between the actual and the merely possible—and yet,
given the peculiarly ontological nature of this difference, any attempt to capture it requires
making reference to ourselves, our world, etc. For admissible descriptive predicates are plausibly
assumed to designate properties that are observable or detectable in some way or another.61 But
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The possibility of multiple actual worlds is left open, for example, by the pre-critical Kant. See Kant ([1770]

1992: Ak 2:408).
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In order to capture the contingency of actuality, we must distinguish between what is true at a world—what a

world represents to be the case—and what is true of a world—what that world is really like. Every world (and every
plurality of worlds) represents itself as being actual whether or not it really is actual. It is thus true at every world
that it is actual. But since the truth conditions of modal statements are cashed out in terms of what is true at a world
(and not in terms of what is true of that world), it will turn out that other worlds could have been actual. The
distinction between what is true of and what is true at a world is not ad hoc. The modal realist already needs it to
provide adequate truth conditions for de re modality. For discussion, see Bricker (2008: 50-3).
61

Carnap (1947a: 84, 1947b: 138, 1950: 74), for example, appears to assume that admissible predicates must

designate properties that are somehow observable or otherwise detectable (for he believes that all observable
differences should be expressible in terms of the admissible predicates). Leibniz ([1717] 1956: 38) also appears to
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the property of actuality does not appear to be observable or detectable in any way. We can, for
example, observe a coin’s size, shape, and weight, we can detect its chemical composition, but
we can neither observe nor detect its actuality. Indeed nothing could, even in principle, affect us
in such a way that we would be able to tell that it is actual rather than merely possible.62 For the

assume, at least implicitly, that the qualitative properties must be observable or detectable when he claims in his
fourth letter to Clarke that:
To say that God can cause the whole universe to move forward in a right line, or in any other line, without
making otherwise any alteration in it; is another chimerical supposition. For, two states indiscernible from
each other, are the same state; and consequently, ‘tis a change without any change.
This passage is often interpreted as putting forward something like the following argument: if spacetime exists, then
a world at rest and a boosted world (where everything moves at an absolute velocity of 5 kilometers per hour to the
west) would be distinct; but since these worlds are exactly alike observationally, they are qualitatively indiscernible,
and hence identical; therefore, spacetime does not exist. This argument has come to be known as the ‘boost’ (or
‘kinematic shift’) argument against substantivalism. See Maudlin (1993: 188-92) and Dasgupta (2015) for helpful
discussion. Earman (1989: 118-20) complains, in effect, that Leibniz’s combination of the claim that the qualitative
properties are observable with the principle of the identity of qualitative indiscernibles leads to an objectionable
form of positivism where ‘[a] difference, to be a real difference, must be a verifiable difference’. But note that it is
the addition of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles that leads to this result, not the claim that the qualitative
properties are observable. I deny this principle, and so avoid the charge of positivism.
62

We should distinguish between contrastive and non-contrastive conceptions of detectability. A non-contrastive

conception merely requires the ability to detect the presence of a property. But a contrastive conception requires the
ability to detect the presence rather than the absence of a property. It is the latter conception that I have in mind here.
Note that since there seems to be no way to detect the presence rather than the absence of non-qualitative properties
like being identical to Pegasus or being identical to Socrates, the assumption that admissible predicates must
designate properties that are somehow observable or otherwise detectable nicely explains why predicates like
‘pegasizes’ and ‘socratizes’ are inadmissible.
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property of actuality is simply too thin, too empty, and too diaphanous to be detected at all. So if
we have a conception of our status as absolutely actual, as I believe we do, we could not have
acquired it by means of observation and so, it seems, cannot designate the corresponding
property of actuality descriptively.63 We can only hope to successfully designate this property by
means of directly referential devices: the thought that a thing is actual (in this robust ontological
sense) is the thought that it is of the same ontological kind as me and everything else at my
world.

2.2 The possibility of non-qualitative properties that can be designated descriptively
If we assume both that there are no indiscernible worlds and that necessarily coextensive (or
cointensive) properties are identical, then it will turn out that some intuitively non-qualitative
properties can be specified without the use of directly referential devices. I’ll focus my attention
on two examples. Suppose, first, that the complete qualitative profile of some possible person,
call him Arturo, is unique. Arturo is part of exactly one world, he is discernible from all of his
worldmates, and no other world is a duplicate of his own. The property being identical to Arturo,
which corresponds to Arturo’s unit class, will thus be necessarily coextensive with—and hence
identical to—the property having such and such a qualitative profile.64 Suppose, next, that the
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See Williams (1962: 751) for an argument along these lines. It is the unobservability of absolute actuality—or

‘existence’ as Williams puts it—that ultimately leads to the skeptical problem of how I can know that I am ‘a
member of the existing world and not a mere possible monad on the shelf of essence’ (1962: 752). See Lewis (1970:
19, 1986: 93-4) and Bricker (2006) for further discussion of this problem.
64

See Eddon (2011: 320-1) and Cowling (2015: 297) for similar examples. Eddon’s example focuses on arbitrary

individuals at non-symmetrical worlds (where a world is non-symmetrical iff the only one-one function that both
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complete qualitative profile of the actual world is unique. The actual world is discernible from
every merely possible world, and so any indiscernible duplicate of an actual object must itself be
actual. The property being actual will thus be cointensive with—and hence identical to—the
property having such and such, or so and so, or some other qualitative profile (where this is
shorthand for the disjunction of the complete qualitative profile of every actual object).
What should we say about these cases? There are three straightforward responses
available: (1) we could claim that every world has an indiscernible duplicate and thus reject the
first assumption; (2) we could adopt a hyperintensional conception of properties and thus reject
the second assumption; or (3) we could simply deny that the properties in question are nonqualitative after all.
Let’s start with the first response. Should we believe in indiscernible worlds? David
Lewis (1973, 1986) is officially agnostic. There are, on the one hand, pragmatic reasons to favor
the hypothesis that there are no indiscernible worlds. It is more quantitatively parsimonious—
that is, it posits fewer entities—than its competitors. But, on the other hand, these worlds are
supposed to be independent of us. And, in the face of this independence, we should admit to a
certain amount of humility. We should confess that there might be much about these entities that
we do not—and perhaps cannot—know (see Lewis 1973: 87-8). And so, it seems, there are no
theoretical benefits to be gained by accepting or rejecting the hypothesis that there are
indiscernible worlds (see Lewis 1986: 157, 224).

maps the domain of that world onto itself and preserves all its qualitative properties and relations is the identity
map). Cowling’s example focuses on individuals that are themselves worlds. If the worlds in their examples fail to
have indiscernible duplicates, then the individuals in question will fail to have indiscernible duplicates as well.
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Phillip Bricker (2001: 49) is more enthusiastic. We need indiscernible worlds to account
for the possibility of duplicate island universes. We arrive at this possibility in two steps. First,
we need to show that island universes are possible. It seems like we can robustly imagine them;
that is, we can imagine reality—or actuality—dividing up into two or more parts that are casually
and spatiotemporally isolated from each other. To accommodate this, we need to amend the
standard analysis of possibility. Rather than saying that something is possible iff it is true at a
world, we should instead say that it is possible iff it is true at some (class, aggregate, or) plurality
of worlds (see Bricker 2001:40-5, 2006: 53, 2008: 117). But we also need a way to distinguish
our simply being able to think about a plurality of worlds and our being able to think about those
worlds as island universes. We do this by allowing more than one world to be actual. If multiple
worlds were actual, then reality—or actuality—would appear to divide into absolutely isolated
parts, it would be made up of island universes. The possibility of island universes is best
represented by pluralities of co-actual worlds. Next, we need to show that duplicate island
universes are possible. It seems there could be island universes that are all very similar to each
other. But if they could all be very similar, then it seems that they could all be exactly alike as
well. Thus, it seems that there could be any number of duplicate island universes (see Bricker
2001: 49). Belief in indiscernible worlds allows us to capture possibilities that we wouldn’t be
able to capture otherwise. There are theoretical benefits to be had after all.
Suppose we’re convinced that every world is infinitely reduplicated. This guarantees that
Arturo is not unique. He will have hoards of indiscernible duplicates littered throughout logical
space. Any description of Arturo will pick out these doppelgängers as well. We can only specify
the property being identical to Arturo by making use of directly referential devices. But that only
solves half the problem. For suppose, first, that there are infinitely many indiscernible duplicates
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of our world; and, second, that all and only these worlds are actual. The property being actual
will then be cointensive with the infinitely disjunctive property being identical to this, that, or
some other possible object (where we here directly designate every one of the objects at the
plurality of these actual worlds), which will in turn be cointensive with the infinitely disjunctive
and intuitively qualitative property having such and such, or so and so, or some other qualitative
profile (where we here descriptively designate every actual object by disjoining descriptions of
their qualitative profiles).65 So, even if we allow that every world has infinitely many
indiscernible duplicates, we might still be able to describe the property being actual without
making use of directly referential devices.66 The first response seems to leave open the
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Note that the mereological sum of any of these actual worlds will itself be actual as well. So we will need to be

able to directly designate these sums in order to include them in the intension of the property being identical to this,
that, or some other possible object. Note also that these sums will have qualitative profiles that are distinct from the
qualitative profiles of the worlds from which they are fused. So we will also need to be able to descriptively
designate these sums in order to include them in the intension of the property having such and such, or so and so, or
some other qualitative profile. We might do this by first describing the qualitative profile of our world, and by then
describing, for instance, pairs of sums of distinct duplicates of our world as those things that are composed of
exactly two distinct worlds with such and such a qualitative profile.
66

We might seek to close off this possibility in one of two ways. We might, first, deny that every indiscernible

duplicate of our world could be actualized. For if there are infinitely many indiscernible duplicates of our world,
then the possibility realized by all of these worlds being actualized would be no different in kind from the possibility
realized by all but one of these worlds being actualized. So there seems to be a way to can get all the intuitive
possibilities we want without being saddled with the possible cointensivity of being actual and having such and
such, or so and so, or some other qualitative profile. The problem with this line of response is that, in order to
maintain it, we would need to say that the ontological status of some worlds might depend upon the ontological
status of some other worlds, and this claim strikes me as implausible.
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possibility that there be at least one non-qualitative property which can be designated without the
use of directly referential devices.
Let’s turn to the second response. Should we break with philosophical orthodoxy and
adopt a hyperintensional conception of properties? Let’s say that hyperintensional distinctions
are distinctions that cut finer than necessary equivalence. Take, for example, the distinction
between the property being a trilateral figure and the property being a triangular figure. These
properties have the same intension; they apply to the same things across all possible worlds. But
they seem to be different somehow. One is concerned with the number of a figure’s sides. The
other is concerned with the number of a figure’s angles. Or take the property being identical to
Arturo and the property having such and such a qualitative profile. These properties, given our
assumptions, have the same intension; they apply to only one possible object: namely, Arturo.
But he doesn’t seem to have them in the same way. He has the property having such and such a
qualitative profile partly in virtue of his surroundings, while he has the property being identical
to Arturo solely in virtue of himself alone. One is extrinsic. The other is intrinsic. We might take

We might, next, adopt a creation rather than a transformation version of modal realism with absolute
actuality. The difference between these versions lies with the entities to which the property of actuality applies:
according the transformation version, the property of actuality applies directly to the realm of possibilia, but,
according to the creation version, it applies to a separate realm of entities. See Bricker (2001: 30, 2006: 48). I have
been assuming the transformation version. If, however, we assume the creation version instead, then our world will
be guaranteed to have a merely possible duplicate no matter how many times over it is duplicated in actuality. The
property being actual will thus divide the property having such and such, or some other qualitative profile, that is,
only some of the objects that have the latter property will have the former property; they will not be cointensive.
This appears to be a point in favor of the creation version, but I still think we should on balance prefer the
transformation version. See Bricker (2006: 48-9) for considerations in its favor.
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these kinds of considerations to motivate a hyperintensional conception of properties (see Eddon
2011).
I grant that there are differences here. But I think they’re differences in our concepts, not
in the properties they designate. I thus take hyperintensional distinctions to be conceptual, not
metaphysical. How should we cash this out? Let’s distinguish between concepts and properties.67
A concept is what we grasp in virtue of our understanding of a predicate in our language; it is
associated with that predicate’s meaning. A property is what gets designated by the use of a
predicate in our language. The basic idea is that there are different ways to represent the same
parts or aspects of reality. We must, on this view, distinguish between concepts and properties so
as not to confuse representation with reality. Take the predicates ‘is trilateral’ and ‘is triangular’.
We can think about the class of triangles by fixing upon their having three sides. But we can also
think about them by fixing upon their having three angles. Either way we fix upon the class of
triangles, we’re thinking about the same property. We’re just thinking about it using different
concepts: namely, the concept being a trilateral figure and the concept being a triangular
figure.68
I think we should say the same thing about Arturo’s unit class. I can think about it in
different ways. I can think about it in a way that is primarily descriptive: as containing a person
of a certain size and shape, who is related to a variety of external objects. When I do this, I think
about it by a route that involves descriptive elements, which situate Arturo in his environment.
But I can also think about this class in a way that is more direct: namely, as containing Arturo.
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I here follow Bricker (2006: 60).

68

See Bealer (1982) for a worked-out version of a view along these lines. Also see Lewis (1986: 55-9) on the

difference between structured and unstructured properties.
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When I do that, I think about it by a route that is directly referential and bypasses Arturo’s
environment. Either way I think about this class, I think about the same property. I’m just
thinking about it using different concepts: namely, the concept having such and such a
qualitative profile and the concept being identical to Arturo. One is relational. The other is not.69
Our concepts provide different routes by which our thoughts can hit the same targets. We can, as
we observed in section 2.1, designate the very same property in a variety of different ways. The
second response requires a proliferation of properties where a proliferation of concepts will
suffice.
Let’s turn now to the third response. Should we just bite the bullet? Suppose that Arturo
really doesn’t have any indiscernible duplicates. I don’t think it would be all that bad to deny that
being identical to Arturo is non-qualitative. Suppose we were agnostic about the existence of
indiscernible worlds. We wouldn’t know that Arturo is special. And while we would know that
we can pick the property being identical to Arturo out directly, we wouldn’t know that we can
also pick it out descriptively (because we wouldn’t know that it is necessarily coextensive with
the property having such and such a qualitative profile). We should then be agnostic about
whether or not this property can only be indicated directly. But we’re not. Why not? I suspect we
give too much weight to the structure of our concepts. We know that the identity properties of
indiscernible worldmates are non-qualitative. Consider, for example, a world containing nothing
but two duplicate iron spheres—Castor and Pollux—located a mile apart.70 These spheres are
qualitatively indiscernible. But they do not share all their properties: one has the property being
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See Humberstone (1996: 209-27) for a defense of the claim that the relational/non-relational distinction applies to

concepts rather than properties.
70

This example is due to Black (1952: 156).
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identical to Castor, the other does not. Some identity properties are clearly non-qualitative. We
also know that the concepts by means of which we can think about these properties have the
same form as the concept by means of which we usually think about the property being identical
to Arturo. But we make one or another mistaken assumption: either we assume that concepts
with the same form always fix upon properties with the same qualitative status; or we assume
that concepts containing non-qualitative components always fix upon properties that are nonqualitative.71 We can, it seems, plausibly deflate our intuitions concerning the qualitative status
of the property being identical to Arturo.
I do not, however, think that a similar story will be plausible in the case of actuality.
Suppose that no actual worlds have any merely possible, indiscernible duplicates. We should, of
course, be agnostic about this because—given what has been suggested above—we should be
agnostic about whether the property being actual is cointensive with the property having such
and such, or so and so, or some other qualitative profile. And since we know—or should
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To see that the first assumption is mistaken, just pick some qualitative property with denumerably many instances,

say, being such and such a big, purple hippopotamus in a world of two-way eternal recurrence. We can fix upon
this property with the infinitely disjunctive concept being identical to Albert, or Beatrice, or Candice, or…. Now
suppose we had a different concept that left out every other disjunct: namely, the concept being identical to Albert,
or Candice, or Ester, or…. This concept would have exactly the same form as the first. But—given how we’ve
selected its disjuncts—it will fix upon a non-qualitative property. Thus, concepts of the same form do not always fix
upon properties of the same qualitative status.
To see that the second assumption is mistaken, recall the concept having the same shape as the Eiffel Tower
from section 2.1 above. This concept contains a non-qualitative component. But the property indicated by our use of
this concept is the qualitative property having such and such shape. Thus, concepts containing non-qualitative
components do not always fix upon properties that are themselves non-qualitative.
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believe—that cointensive properties are identical, we should also be agnostic about whether the
property being actual can be designated descriptively. But if we accept the linguistic thesis, an
agnosticism about whether a property can be designated descriptively should carry over to an
agnosticism about its qualitative status. We are not, however, agnostic about the qualitative
status of the property of actuality. Why not? Perhaps because our concept of actuality is, as
Bricker (2006: 64, 2008: 125) suggests, that of being of the same ontological kind as all the
things at my world.72 Our intuitions about the non-qualitative status of the property designated by
our use of these concepts do not appear to be based upon judgments about the form of these
concepts, but about their content. We think the ontological kind indicated by these concepts
carves reality at the joints: the objects belonging to it are all objectively similar, and yet they are
otherwise too qualitatively heterogeneous for this similarity to spring from anything other than a
basic source. Our intuitions about the non-qualitative status of actuality rest upon the judgment
that the source of this similarity must itself be non-qualitative. The third response fails because
we cannot plausibly deflate our intuitions concerning the non-qualitative status of the property
being actual.
What we have just seen is that unless we are prepared to take on board a hyperintensional
conception of properties, we should admit that there might be at least one non-qualitative
property that can be designated without the use of directly referential devices. I do not believe
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Bricker’s main motivation for this suggestion appears to be that it offers us a way out of a skeptical problem:

namely, the problem of how we can know that we’re actual if actuality is absolute. The idea is that I know that I’m
actual simply by knowing that I belong to the same ontological category as myself. I find the suggestion that our
concept of absolute actuality is indexical to be independently plausible because, as I argued in section 2.1, we cannot
acquire it by means of observation.
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that such a conception of properties can be independently motivated enough to justify a break
with current orthodoxy. I thus prefer not to go hyperintensionalist about properties, and so
believe that there might be a non-qualitative property that can be designated descriptively.

2.3 The existence of qualitative properties that can only be designated directly
We have just seen that there is reason to be skeptical about the closure assumption: depending
upon the lay of logical space, certain infinitary descriptive predicates might turn out to designate
some intuitively non-qualitative properties. We now turn to the fundamentality assumption,
which says that a sufficiently rich language will contain descriptive—albeit not necessarily
primitive—predicates for all the fundamental qualitative properties.
If we assume both that the fundamental roles given to us by our best scientific theories
could have been realized by fundamentally different properties and that we can only pick out the
properties that actually realize these roles by specifying the roles which they in fact play, then it
will turn out that some intuitively qualitative properties can only be designated with the aid of
directly referential devices. I’ll focus my attention on the following examples. Suppose, first, that
there are worlds structurally just like our own, but where unit positive and negative charge
switch their causal and nomic roles.73 The fundamental property that here occupies the positive
charge role, there occupies the negative charge role and vice versa. These worlds differ from our
own by a permutation of fundamental qualitative properties (see Lewis 2009: 205-12). Suppose,
next, that there are worlds structurally just like our own, but where the properties realizing the
unit positive and negative charge roles are uniformly replaced by alien fundamental properties,
73

We’ll assume that the properties designated by the predicates ‘has unit positive charge’ and ‘has unit negative

charge’ are fundamental physical properties. If this turns out to be false, then our examples can simply be reworked.
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uninstantiated at our world. The unit positive and unit negative charge roles are there occupied
by alien fundamental properties. These worlds differ from our own by a uniform replacement of
fundamental qualitative properties (see Lewis 2009: 212-13). What these two examples seem to
show is that the unit positive and negative charge roles could have been realized by
fundamentally different properties. But then, given that there are worlds where other properties
fill these roles, we cannot designate the properties that actually play these roles by merely
describing the roles themselves (for each of these worlds satisfy the same Ramsey sentence). We
also need to add that these properties are the occupants of these roles in our world; that is, that
the fundamental kinds of things in question are the kinds of things that actually play the unit
positive and negative charge roles.74 And to do that—to pick out the properties these kinds of
things have indexically—we must rely upon directly referential devices.75

74

I am assuming, for example, that the fundamental qualitative property that in our world plays the unit positive

charge role, which we might call being F, is the property that we designate as being the kind of thing that actually
plays the unit positive charge role. The later designation specifies a class of objects which includes not only the
actual instances of the fundamental property in question, but all possible instances of the same kind—whether or not
those objects themselves play a similar role in their respective worlds. The properties being F and being the kind of
thing that actually plays the unit positive charge role will thus be cointensive.
75

We might worry, at this point, that the argument in this section cannot simply treat the modal realist framework in

which I am working as a useful heuristic, but must instead rely upon it as a substantive hypothesis. Suppose we were
to endorse some form of ersatzism and hold that possible worlds are abstract: they might be maximal possible states
of affairs, maximally consistent sets of sentences, or what have you. Suppose, further, that the actual world is among
these possible worlds. It has the distinction of obtaining in—or corresponding to—concrete reality (or actuality).
This concrete reality (or actuality) is absolute. Thus, on this view, ‘actual object’ and ‘concrete object’ would appear
to be cointensive; they pick out the same parts of concrete reality. If we were to accept this alternative account of the
metaphysics of modality, then it seems that we could designate the properties that actually play the fundamental
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roles in our best scientific theories by replacing occurrences of ‘actual’ (a directly referential device) with ‘concrete’
(a seemingly descriptive referential device). So, for example, the property being the kind of thing that plays the unit
positive charge role in the actual world will be cointensive with the property being the kind of thing that plays the
unit positive charge role in the concrete world. But, then, we could designate the qualitative properties that in fact
play the fundamental roles in our best scientific theories without relying upon any directly referential devices at all.
(Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this line of response.)
It should be clear that something has gone seriously wrong here. For if everything we have just said were
correct, then the intuitively non-qualitative identity property being identical to Benjamin Franklin would be
cointensive with the property being identical to the person who is the inventor of bifocals in the concrete world, and
that would mean that an intuitively non-qualitative property could be designated without the aid of directly
referential devices. The argument from section 2.2 would return with a vengeance. But what exactly has gone wrong
here? This, I think, is much less clear. The problem, as I see it, is that talk of the concrete world is ambiguous
between talk of the possible world that corresponds to concrete reality and talk of that concrete reality itself.
Understood the first way, ‘the concrete world’ is a name for the possible world that corresponds to concrete reality.
But since a name is a directly referential device, the designation being identical to the person who is the inventor of
bifocals in the concrete world will turn out to contain a directly referential device after all. Understood the second
way, talk of concrete reality seems to be talk of the ontological status that things like these (pointing at various
donkeys, puddles, protons, and stars or just waving all around) enjoy. The suggestion here is that the
abstract/concrete distinction is best explained by, what we might call, the Way of Demonstrative Example. This
seems plausible given that the difference between, say, a number and a nightingale does not seem to be exhausted by
their qualitative differences but instead appears to transcend them, which suggests that the abstract/concrete
distinction cannot be straightforwardly explained by the Way of Negation. See Cowling (2017a: 74-92) for a number
of arguments to this effect. It thus appears that the concept of concrete reality (or being concrete) should be
indexical for the ersatzist in the same way that the concept of absolute actuality (or being actual) is indexical for the
realist. But if that’s right, the designation being identical to the concrete inventor of bifocals will contain a directly
referential device after all.

60

What should we say about these cases? There are, once again, three straightforward
responses available: (1) we could deny quidditism—the thesis that there are quidditistically
different worlds; that is, worlds that have the same structure but differ over which qualitative
properties confer which causal powers76—and thus reject the first assumption; (2) we could
accept some weak form of quidditism but deny that it entails any kind of semantic humility and
thus reject the second assumption; or (3) we could simply deny that the properties in question are
qualitative after all.
Let’s start with the first response. Should we deny that there are quidditistically different
worlds? Suppose we were attracted to a causal theory of properties according to which properties
have their causal profiles essentially (see Shoemaker 1980, 1998, 2007: 142-4).77 If that’s right,
then the property that plays the unit positive charge role could not have played the unit negative
charge role. And so there isn’t a world where these properties switch roles. We also find that the
property that plays the unit positive charge role could not play this role in a world where a
different property plays the unit negative charge role. For their causal profiles are interdefined. A
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Quidditism is often defined as the view that there are primitive identities between fundamental qualitative

properties across possible worlds. It is, so construed, a view about property individuation. I prefer to define
quidditism—or what Tyler Hildebrand (2016) calls qualitative quidditism—as the thesis that there are qualitatively
discernible worlds with the same overall structure. This thesis might be entailed by various principles of plenitude
(which tell us that if something is possible, then something else is possible as well). But it is not itself in the business
of expressing the plenitude of possible worlds. We could, I think, coherently accept the quidditist thesis while
rejecting the more general principles of plenitude that might lead to it.
77

Bird (2005: 446-7) calls this view weak essentialism. It amounts to a kind of necessity claim. It should be

distinguished from strong essentialism which adds to this the corresponding sufficiency claim: namely, that if
properties F and G have the same causal features, then they are identical.
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world without unit positive charge is a world without unit negative charge, and vice versa. But
that’s not all. Their causal profiles are, as Jonathan Schaffer points out, holistically interdefined
in terms of a web of causal interrelations with all the other physical properties: ‘charge is defined
in terms of a disposition to exert force, force is defined in terms of its connection to charge and
its disposition to accelerate mass, etc.’ (Schaffer 2005: 11). A world without unit positive and
negative charge would be a world without any of the other actual physical properties as well.
And so there isn’t a world otherwise just like our own except that alien properties there play the
unit positive and negative charge roles.
So far, so good. But we haven’t yet shown that quidditism—understood as the thesis that
there are quidditistically different worlds—is false.78 For while it might be essential to charge
that it is structurally related to force and mass in a certain way, this doesn’t guarantee that there
aren’t worlds with wholly alien properties (schmarge, quorce, and schmass) that are structurally
related to each other in that very same way. The causal theory of properties is thus consistent
with there being worlds structurally just like our own, but otherwise wholly alien to it.79 If we
want to rule out such worlds, we need to take on board more than just a causal theory of
properties.
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This point is conceded by Bird (2005: 446, 450-1), who grants that weak essentialism is compatible with the thesis

that there are quiddistically distinct worlds.
79

This is, for example, a possibility left open by the modest causal structuralism canvassed in the appendix to

Hawthorne (2001: 226-7).
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Suppose we were instead attracted to some form of pure global structuralism according to
which two worlds are structurally isomorphic only if they are qualitative duplicates.80 We’ll say
that an individual (or world) is structurally isomorphic to another individual (or world) iff there
is a one-one correspondence between their parts that preserves the overall pattern of their
fundamental qualitative properties and relations.81 And we’ll say that an individual (or world) is
a qualitative duplicate of another individual (or world) iff there is a one-one correspondence
between their parts that preserves not just the overall pattern of fundamental qualitative
properties and relations, but the fundamental qualitative properties and relations themselves.82 A
global structuralist can allow for structurally isomorphic individuals that are not qualitative
duplicates provided that those individuals are worldmates. She can, for example, allow for
worlds populated by several differently colored spheres. She can even allow for a world
containing nothing but two differently colored spheres located a mile apart. This world is, after
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I assume that the structuralist at issue here will take the properties that realize the fundamental roles given to us by

our best scientific theories to be qualitative. This might be denied by a structuralist who accepts some form of what
Bricker (2017: 49 n 18) calls haecceitism about properties. The haecceitist about properties agrees with the global
structuralist that there cannot be qualitative differences between worlds without structural differences, but adds that
worlds can differ by a permutation or wholesale replacement of properties without differing qualitatively. For,
according to the haecceitist, the fundamental properties lack primitive qualitative suchnesses and have only bare
non-qualitative thisnesses. The haecceitist about properties thus breaks the link between the properties that play
various causal or nomic roles and the properties that make for qualitative similarity. I shall return to haecceitism
about properties when I turn to the third response to the argument in this section below.
81

See Leuenberger (2010: 331-2, 334-5) for the technical details. But note that what I call a structural isomorphism,

Leuenberger calls a fundamental isomorphism.
82

This is essentially the definition from Lewis (1986: 61), but the formulation is drawn from Bricker (1993: 274,

1996: 227). Note that, due to their isolation, worlds are duplicates iff they are indiscernibles.
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all, not structurally isomorphic to any world containing nothing but two identically colored
spheres located a mile apart, since these two worlds differ in their overall pattern of fundamental
qualitative properties. But these are possibilities that a local structuralist—who holds that two
individuals are structurally isomorphic only if they are qualitative duplicates—would be forced
to deny. It is for this reason that local structuralism seems much less plausible than its global
cousin.83
I don’t think we should accept global structuralism. For just as it seems possible for there
to be duplicate island universes, it also seems possible for there to be structurally isomorphic
alien island universes. We’ll say that an individual (or world) is qualitatively alien to another
individual (or world) iff no part of one is a duplicate of any part of the other.84 We can imagine
there being another part of reality out there, which is causally and spatiotemporally disconnected
from—as well as structurally isomorphic to—our own, and we seem to be able to make sense of
the thought that the objects in the other part of reality are totally alien to the objects in this part of
reality. But, as we observed in section 2.2 above, the best way to represent this possibility is in
terms of pluralities of co-actual worlds. Then, since worlds have the same contents when they are
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We might also distinguish between strong and weak forms of global structuralism. Weak global structuralism,

which I am here simply calling global structuralism, is the view that worlds are structurally isomorphic only if they
are qualitatively indiscernible. Strong global structuralism adds to this the claim that worlds are qualitatively
indiscernible only if they are numerically identical. Heller (1998) defends an ersatzist version of strong global
structuralism. But as we have already seen, in section 2.2 above, the possibility of island universes gives us reason to
reject its realist counterpart.
84

This is essentially the definition from Lewis (1986: 91-2), but the formulation is due to Bricker (forthcoming a:

sect. 3.2).
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considered plurally as they do when they are considered singularly, there must be structurally
isomorphic worlds that fail to be qualitative duplicates.
The global structuralist might object to this argument in one of two ways.85 She might,
first, object to our interpretation of the possibility of island universes, and instead seek to
accommodate this possibility within a single world. This world would be composed of causally
and spatiotemporally disconnected islands, which would nevertheless be unified by a primitive
worldmate relation. If, however, this were the right way to think about this possibility, then—
since worlds are internally unified wholes—the other part of reality that we’re imagining would
not be absolutely disconnected from our own. But, it seems, this was something we could indeed
imagine. So it seems that we would do better to think of the possibility of island universes as
represented not by a single world, but by pluralities of co-actual worlds. Worlds must be unified,
reality need not be.
The global structuralist might, instead, object to the very possibility of structurally
isomorphic alien island universes. She might simply deny that there could be such universes. But
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A third objection might come from the structuralist who accepts haecceitism about properties and thereby breaks

the link between the properties that play various causal or nomic roles and the properties that make for qualitative
similarity. This structuralist could say that two individuals (or worlds) are bare duplicates whenever there is a oneone correspondence between their parts that preserves not just the overall pattern of fundamental properties and
relations but the bare identities between them as well, and then add that two individuals (or worlds) are brutally
alien to each other iff no part of one is a bare duplicate of the other. This allows the structuralist to claim that
brutally alien island universes are possible even if qualitatively alien island universes are not, which might be
enough to satisfy our intuitions about the present case. But given that structuralist who accepts haecceitism about
properties denies that the properties that realize various causal or nomic roles are qualitative, the present objection
ultimately collapses into a version of the third response below.
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this denial appears to be difficult to maintain for two reasons. First, the global structuralist thinks
that it is possible for there to be nothing but two structurally isomorphic alien individuals. She
thinks, as we saw above, that there can be a world containing nothing but, say, a wholly red
sphere and a wholly blue sphere located a mile apart. But since every part of the red sphere is red
and every part of the blue sphere is blue, no part of one is a duplicate of the other. These two
spheres are both structurally isomorphic and alien to each other. Yet once the global structuralist
allows for complete possibilities that are represented not just by single worlds but also by
pluralities of worlds, she opens up the possibility that these structurally isomorphic individuals
be worlds in themselves. The second reason that it is difficult for the global structuralist to deny
the possibility of structurally isomorphic alien island universes is that she thinks that it is
possible for there to be alien island universes that have almost the same overall structure. There
might, for instance, be a pair of co-actual worlds where one contains nothing but a perfect red
sphere and the other contains nothing but a scratched blue sphere. These alien worlds are not
structurally isomorphic: one is perfectly spherical, the other is not. But they have almost the
same structure: they only differ by a small scratch. And yet it seems, however, that if we can
imagine there being island universes with almost the same overall structure, then we can also
imagine a sequence of island universes whose structures become more and more alike until they
eventually converge. We can imagine a sequence of pairs of worlds where each pair is just like
the last pair except that the scratch on the blue sphere is a little less pronounced.86 We have then,
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One might be tempted to insist, on the global structuralist’s behalf, that the color of the scratched blue sphere

turns to red as the scratch disappears. But this is only an artifact of the example. This response would not have been
open to us had I instead chosen two properties that were not obviously determinates of the same determinable. It
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at the limit of this sequence, the possibility of structurally isomorphic alien island universes: a
pair of co-actual worlds where one contains nothing but a perfect red sphere and the other
contains nothing but a perfect blue sphere. To deny this possibility, would be to accept an
arbitrary gap in logical space.87 The first response requires us to give up an intuitively plausible
possibility.
Let’s turn to the second response. Should we deny that quidditism carries with it a
commitment to some form of semantic humility, and thereby insist that the properties that play
the unit positive and negative charge roles can be designated both descriptively and
determinately even if quidditism is true? These properties could, it seems, be so designated in a
language which contained primitive predicates for all the fundamental qualitative properties.
These predicates would get their extension not from the role they play in describing our world,
but from the role they play in describing all of logical space. Suppose we had such a language.88
We could use this language to construct what Theodore Sider (2002) calls a pluriverse sentence,
which represents the totality of possible worlds—the whole of logical space—all at once. We
would seem to have a way to describe our world that would not at the same time describe any
inverted—or even structurally isomorphic alien—worlds. Indeed, with such a language, we

would not, for instance, have been so readily available had we started off with, say, a perfect wooden sphere and a
scratched iron sphere.
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This argument is adapted from Adams (1979) and Bricker (2001: 49).
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I suspect that we could not have such a language in anything like our current epistemic situation. If that’s right,

then the current suggestion could only be used to salvage what I called the weaker versions of the linguistic thesis in
section 2.1 above. It does not seem available to proponents of stronger versions of the thesis.
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would be able to describe all of logical space, we just wouldn’t be able to locate ourselves within
it. But this is, of course, exactly what we should expect of a purely descriptive language.
I don’t think this response can solve the problem without ultimately surrendering the
linguistic thesis. Suppose that the pluriverse sentence of the language in question both
descriptively and determinately (or uniquely) designates the totality of possible worlds. No two
fundamental qualitative properties could then be similarly distributed throughout logical space
(for otherwise there would be a structural isomorphism from the totality of possible worlds onto
itself that did not preserve the fundamental qualitative properties themselves, and thus the role
our primitive predicates play in describing the totality of possible worlds would not be unique;
the pluriverse sentence would map onto the totality of possible worlds in different ways). But,
given the plenitude of possible worlds, it seems quite plausible to think that some fundamental
qualitative properties are similarly distributed throughout logical space: that is, that there is a
structural isomorphism from the totality of possible worlds onto itself that does not preserve the
fundamental qualitative properties themselves. Thus, it seems that we either need to give up on
taking the primitive predicates of the language in question to be descriptive or we need to give
up on taking them to be determinate. They cannot be both. In order to avoid this indeterminacy
problem, we might make an exception for the primitive predicates of this language by allowing
them to designate the fundamental qualitative properties directly.89 But, as a defense of the
linguistic thesis, this exception appears to be completely ad hoc. We thus appear to be saddled
with a commitment to a form of semantic humility after all. The second response fails because it
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This is, in effect, what Gallois (1998: 249-50) does when he takes the qualitative properties to be those properties

that are expressible by predicates that do not themselves contain rigid designators other than the ones used to
designate them.
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requires us to smuggle directly referential devices into the very fabric of our basic descriptive
predicates themselves.
Let’s turn now to the third response. Should we just deny that the properties in question
are qualitative after all? Consider, for the moment, how things appear to us as conscious subjects.
We find ourselves in a world where everything looks, smells, sounds, tastes, and feels a certain
way. But different (centered) worlds might appear the same to certain subjects. We can, for
example, imagine people on Twin Earth, who—like the ancient Greeks—see a certain heavenly
body in the evening sky and call it ‘Hesperus’ and see a certain heavenly body in the morning
sky and call it ‘Phosphorus’. These Twin Greeks have, as Saul Kripke puts it, ‘exactly the same
evidence, qualitatively speaking’ as the ancient Greeks once did, but—unlike the ancient
Greeks—when they use the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ they happen to refer to two
different objects (Kripke 1980: 104). We can also imagine people on Twin Earth, who have ‘the
same sensory evidence’ about the watery stuff on their planet that we had prior to the discovery
that the watery stuff on our planet is composed of molecules of H2O. These Twin Earthlings are
‘in a situation qualitatively identical to [our own] with respect to all the evidence’ we once had,
but—unlike us—when they use the predicate ‘is water’, they manage to designate the property
being composed of molecules of XYZ (Kripke 1980: 142).
The epistemic situations of these Twin Earthlings were, for a while at least, qualitatively
similar to our own. But the similarity between our epistemic situations was quite fragile. There
were a lot of differences between our worlds that we weren’t seeing. As we both discovered
more about the worlds around us, our epistemic situations began to diverge and ceased to be
qualitatively similar. If, however, our worlds had been structurally isomorphic, then our
epistemic situations could not have diverged. This might lead us to say that such isomorphic
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situations are qualitatively indiscernible.90 The differences between them could then be said to be
non-qualitative. Worlds that differ from our own only by the permutation or wholesale
replacement of properties would be qualitatively no different from our own. The properties that
realize the fundamental roles given to us by our best scientific theories would be non-qualitative.
The plausibility of this response will depend upon how we understand the sensory
evidence had by the agents in these epistemic situations; it will depend, moreover, on whether
the fundamental properties could ever be given immediately in experience.91 For if there were
pairs of isomorphically situated epistemic agents that were directly acquainted with different
fundamental properties, then their epistemic situations would intuitively differ from the inside.92
If their worlds differed by the permutation of certain fundamental properties, these epistemic
agents, being directly acquainted with all the same fundamental properties, would be able to
clearly and distinctly conceive of what it would be like, qualitatively speaking, to inhabit each
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This is, in effect, to endorse a version of haecceitism about properties (see footnotes 80 and 85 above).

91

Russell ([1912] 1959) held that our knowledge of some properties is by acquaintance. I am here only assuming

that there are possible epistemic agents who are directly acquainted with some of the fundamental properties.
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To see how this might work, suppose that colors are given immediately in experience and consider a world

exactly like our own except that the qualitative color spectrum is systematically inverted. Our epistemic situation
would be structurally isomorphic to that of our spectrum inverted counterparts. But these epistemic situations would
not be qualitatively alike from the inside. For we can clearly and distinctly conceive of what it would be like to
occupy the epistemic situations of our spectrum inverted counterparts, and we seem to be in a position to know that
these isomorphic situations would be qualitatively unlike—and hence discernible from—our own. Yet we can, it
seems, only designate redness directly as the property that appears here and over there. No purely structural
qualitative description will do since the property of being red plays the very same structural role in our world that
the property of, say, being green plays in the inverted world. See Swinburne (1980: 317-19) and Hildebrand (2016:
518) for similar appeals to cases of inverted spectrums.
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other’s worlds. They could thus conceive of structurally isomorphic but qualitatively discernible
worlds. But given that their only access to the fundamental qualitative properties appears to be
direct, these epistemic agents would only be able to describe the differences between these
worlds with the use of directly referential devices.93
I believe that such pairs of epistemic agents are possible. It would, however, be a mistake
to think that because they cannot describe the differences between their worlds descriptively,
their experiences—and hence the (centered) worlds they directly represent—must be exactly
alike qualitatively speaking. It is their basic concepts that appear to be non-qualitative, not the
properties they designate. The third response fails because it mistakes a conceptual distinction
for a metaphysical one.94
What we have just seen is that unless we are prepared to accept some form of
structuralism, we should think that there are qualitative properties that can only be designated
with the use of directly referential devices. I prefer not to go structuralist, and so believe that
there are qualitative properties that can only be referred to directly.

93

These considerations appear to show that even the weak version of the linguistic thesis—according to which a

property is qualitative iff it can, in principle, be designated without the use of directly referential devices, but
perhaps only by agents in better epistemic situations than our own—fails in the ‘only if’ direction. But if the weak
version fails in this direction, the strong version should fail as well.
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This might not be the only problem with the third response. For, as noted in footnote 90 above, it is wedded to

some version of haecceitism about properties. And as Hildebrand (2016) argues, haecceitism about properties—or
what he calls bare quidditism—is the proper target of many of the objections that are standardly aimed at
quiddistism. But while these arguments might, as Hildebrand (2016: 526) rightly points out, ‘have some force
against’ the haecceitist about properties, ‘they are powerless against’ quidditism as I understand it.
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2.4 Conclusion
Let’s take stock. I have argued that the linguistic thesis fails in both directions: there might be
non-qualitative properties that can be designated descriptively, and there appear to be qualitative
properties that can only be designated directly. I have also suggested that the best way to avoid
these failures is to adopt a hyperintensional conception of properties along with some form of
global structuralism. But these proposed solutions—while perhaps not strictly speaking
incompatible—do not appear to sit particularly well with each other: for the hyperintensionalist
seeks to inflate, while the structuralist seeks to deflate our overall catalogue of properties.95 It
thus seems that we should look elsewhere if we wish to vindicate the initial appeal of the
linguistic thesis.
The suggestion that has begun to emerge is that while the linguistic thesis is ultimately
untenable as stated, it can be recast as a thesis about our concepts rather than the properties they
designate. We should have assumed the following thesis all along.
The Conceptual Thesis: a concept is pure (or qualitative) if and only if it does not
contain any directly referential concepts (such as demonstrative, indexical, or singular
concepts).
Our concepts are often built up from and thereby contain other concepts. Consider, for example,
the concept of being trilateral. It is built up from the concepts of being a closed plane figure and
having three sides. It will be pure if, upon analysis, its component concepts do not themselves
contain directly referential concepts. Consider, next, the concept of having the same shape as
the Eiffel Tower. Since a component of this concept—namely, the singular concept of being

95

See Shoemaker (1980: 213-14) for the related charge that the claim that properties are individuated by their causal

powers is incompatible with a hyperintensional conception of properties.
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identical to the Eiffel Tower—is directly referential, the concept of having the same shape as the
Eiffel Tower is thereby impure.96 Our concepts, unlike the properties they designate, are
structured. When the nodes in these structures serve as directly referential hooks, when, for
instance, our concepts contain demonstrative, indexical, or singular concepts, they latch
themselves onto the world. These concepts are somehow impure; they are intermixed with
something empirical.
Let’s consider the conceptual analogs of our earlier linguistic assumptions. We can retain
the spirit of the closure assumption. Concepts are closed under construction: concepts built up
from entirely pure concepts are guaranteed to themselves be pure. But there is no guarantee that
the properties they designate will themselves be qualitative. So, for example, if all and only
worlds structurally isomorphic to our own were actual, then the pure concept having such and
such, or so and so, or some other structural profile would designate the seemingly fundamental
non-qualitative property being actual. But we should give up on the fundamentality assumption.
Pure basic concepts are not always needed for a complete understanding of the world: our
conceptual scheme is in no way impoverished when we lack pure concepts for the fundamental
qualitative properties. I might, as a world-bound subject, need to employ the impure concept
being the kind of thing that plays the unit positive charge role in my world in order designate the
seemingly fundamental qualitative property having unit positive charge.
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Similarly, the concept of being water appears to be the concept of being the clear, potable, liquid substance of my

acquaintance that falls from the clouds; flows in the lakes, oceans, and rivers; is used for bathing, cooking, and
drinking; etc. But a component of this concept—namely, the indexical concept of being the substance of my
acquaintance—is directly referential, and so the concept of being water appears to be impure.
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We have seen that there might be non-qualitative properties that can be designated
descriptively and qualitative properties that can only be designated directly. We have thus
severed the link between qualitative properties and directly referential devices. I take this to be
particularly interesting because it opens up the possibility that there are other properties (such as
identity, parthood, and set-membership), which can apparently be designated descriptively, that
might turn out to be non-qualitative as well.
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Chapter 3: Fundamental Non-Qualitative Properties

Abstract: The distinction between qualitative and non-qualitative properties should be familiar
from discussions of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles: two otherwise exactly similar
individuals, Castor and Pollux, might share all their qualitative properties yet differ with respect
to their non-qualitative properties—for while Castor has the property being identical to Castor,
Pollux does not. But while this distinction is familiar, there has not been much critical attention
devoted to spelling out its precise nature. I argue that the class of non-qualitative properties is
broader than it is often taken to be. When properly construed, it will not only include properties
such as being identical to Castor, which somehow make reference to particular individuals, it
will also include more general properties such as identity, composition, set membership, as well
as various peculiarly ontological properties. Given that some of these more general properties
help to explain objective similarity, we have reason to believe that there are fundamental nonqualitative properties.

3.1 Introduction
Let’s begin with an example from Max Black (1952: 156). Imagine a world consisting of nothing
but two iron spheres—Castor and Pollux—located a small distance apart. Imagine, further, that
these two spheres are perfect qualitative duplicates of each other. Given that this world contains
nothing besides these two spheres and perhaps some empty space, Castor and Pollux are not just
qualitative duplicates, they are qualitative indiscernibles. They are, we might say, qualitatively
identical but numerically distinct. And yet they do not share all the same properties: one of them
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has the haecceitistic property being identical to Castor, the other does not.97 Some haecceitistic
properties appear to be non-qualitative.
Let’s turn next to an example drawn from Immanuel Kant ([1781/ 1787] 1998: A 599/ B
627).98 Consider a hundred actual and a hundred merely possible silver dollars. They are exactly
alike in all qualitative respects, but they nevertheless appear to differ in an important respect—
they are fundamentally different kinds of things, they belong to different ontological categories
(the former is actual, while the latter is merely possible). They are, we might say, qualitatively
identical but numerically as well as categorially distinct. The difference between them appears to
be absolute, not merely due to their relations to us. An actual and a merely possible dollar might
be perfect qualitative duplicates, but they do not thereby share all the same properties; they do
not even share all the same non-haecceitistic properties: one has the categorial property being
actual, the other does not.99 Some categorial properties appear to be non-qualitative.
Let’s turn finally to an example drawn from G. W. Leibniz ([1717] 1956: 38 / G VII 373).
Imagine two worlds otherwise exactly alike except that everything in one world is at absolute
rest and everything in the other moves at an absolute velocity of 5 kilometers per hour to the
west. There appears to be no discernible difference between these worlds: they have the same
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A haecceitistic property is a property—like being identical to Plato or being a student of Socrates, and unlike

having a beard or being a philosopher—which involves or makes essential reference to a particular individual in
some intuitive way. This rough gloss is not intended as a definition, but simply as an aid to understanding. It is
meant to be consistent with both an intensional and a hyperintensional conception of properties.
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The property of presentness, at least given something like the moving spotlight theory of time described in Broad

(1923: 59, 1938: 277), is another potential example of a non-qualitative property.
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A categorial property is ‘a property something has by virtue of being or having an item from one of the

categories’ (Wedin 2000: 194).
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fundamental laws and are observationally exactly alike. Consider some particle in the first world
and its boosted counterpart in the other. These particles are indiscernible, but they do not thereby
share all the same properties: one has the physical property being at absolute rest, the other does
not. Some physical properties appear to be non-qualitative.
We have here three different examples of seemingly non-qualitative properties. But the
qualitative/non-qualitative distinction, while somewhat familiar from discussions of the principle
of the identity of indiscernibles, does not admit of a canonical interpretation. The standard way
of drawing this distinction focuses on the non-qualitative side. The non-qualitative properties and
relations are positively characterized as those properties and relations that, in some intuitive way,
involve or make essential reference to particular individuals.100 They are, so characterized, just
the haecceitistic properties.101 The qualitative properties are then negatively characterized as
those properties that do not involve particular individuals, and thus are not haecceitistic. It should
be clear that this is a mistake. For, as we have just seen, at least one non-qualitative property is
not haecceitistic. An actual and a merely possible silver dollar might be composed of exactly the
same kinds of metals and have exactly the same size, shape, and weight. They might even be
qualitatively indiscernible. But they would still differ with respect to their actuality. This
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The nature of this involvement is often understood in non-linguistic terms. Fine (1977: 137) takes it to be a kind

of dependence: a property is non-qualitative when its identity depends upon the identity of a particular individual;
Rosenkrantz (1979: 517) takes it to be a kind of constitution: a property is non-qualitative when it has an individual
as a constituent; and Cowling (2015: 289-91) considers an account that takes it to be a kind of grounding: a property
is non-qualitative when it is grounded in a particular individual.
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I will generally take talk of ‘properties’ to cover both properties and relations.
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property is not, however, best thought of as involving particular individuals.102 The standard
characterization fails to categorize actuality as properly non-qualitative.
Another popular strategy focuses on the qualitative side. The qualitative properties are
positively characterized in terms of duplication and indiscernibility: intrinsic qualitative
properties are those properties that intrinsic duplicates must have in common, while extrinsic
qualitative properties are those additional properties that indiscernibly situated intrinsic
duplicates must have in common as well. Since haecceitistic properties like being identical to
Castor cannot be had by distinct individuals, they cannot be shared by indiscernibly situated
intrinsic duplicates, and thus get classified as non-qualitative. This lends an air of plausibility to
the proposed strategy. But, once again, the problem lies with actuality. For while an actual and a
merely possible dollar might be qualitative duplicates, they are not thereby duplicates without
qualification. They would, given the seemingly fundamental categorial difference between them,
appear to differ in an important intrinsic respect: one is actual, the other is not. But given that the
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I do not want to say we cannot think about it as somehow involving particular individuals. We might be able to

pick it out demonstratively as the property being identical to this, that, or some other possible individual (where we
somehow manage to point to all and only the actual individuals). But this doesn’t seem to be the most perspicuous
way to represent this property. For it obscures the fact that actual objects seem to have something in common as
actual. It doesn’t make it clear why these individuals—rather than some other individuals—are supposed to be
special.
The structured—and, thereby, hyperintensional—accounts of involvement that were mentioned in footnote
100 above fair no better in this respect. They do not identify the property of being grounded in actual individuals or
having exactly one of them as a constituent with the property of actuality. For, on these structured accounts, it is one
thing to say that some property cointensive with actuality contains exactly one of these individuals, and another
thing to say that the property of actuality does so as well.
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intrinsic categorial property being actual—unlike the intrinsic haeccietistic property being
identical to Castor—can be shared by distinct individuals, an actual and a merely possible dollar
aren’t really intrinsic duplicates after all.103 We might seek to revise this strategy by requiring the
duplicates involved to be qualitative duplicates. But unless we can give substance to the word
‘qualitative’, the revised strategy will be circular and empty.
I seek an alternative way of characterizing the qualitative/non-qualitative distinction,
which correctly classifies the property of actuality and, at the same time, provides substance to
the distinction itself. To this end, I will look to the various ways the distinction gets invoked.
This survey will generate a list of features that are typical—rather than definitive—of the
properties on either side of the distinction. I list them not with the intention of laying down strict
requirements, but with the hope of setting up mere desiderata. My overarching goal is to provide
a positive characterization for both sides of the distinction: to account not only for the unity of
the qualitative, but for the unity of the non-qualitative as well.
I shall proceed toward this goal as follows. In section 3.2, I distinguish the qualitative
from the non-qualitative properties by appealing to the role that some properties play in causal
processes. This provides us with a positive account of the qualitative side of the distinction: a
property is qualitative whenever it plays—or is grounded in properties that play—a fundamental
causal role at some world. In section 3.3, I argue that that class of non-qualitative properties is
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The property of actuality and the property of being Castor both appear to be intrinsic non-qualitative properties.

But since the latter unlike the former can only be had by a single individual, it must be excluded from any plausible
conception of intrinsic duplication. This strategy is bound to fail if there are intrinsic non-qualitative properties that
can be had by distinct individuals. For intrinsic duplication won’t then be equivalent to intrinsic qualitative
duplication.
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much broader than it is traditionally taken to be. In addition to the haecceitistic properties, there
are three interesting classes of properties that have claim—quite independent of the causal
account—to being non-qualitative: namely, the logical, mathematical, and ontological properties.
Yet while this gives us a sense of the range of the non-qualitative properties, it leaves us without
a positive account of their nature. In section 3.4, I will begin to develop just such an account. I
first argue that some logical, mathematical, and ontological properties are fundamental, where a
property is fundamental just in case it is an ultimate source of objective similarity. I then argue
that these properties are negatively unified in their failure to ground causal powers. In section
3.5, I offer a positive account of the non-qualitative side of the distinction: the fundamental nonqualitative properties are best understood as the source of various necessary connections and
exclusions. Thus, unlike the fundamental properties that play various causal roles, they fail to be
subject to principles of recombination. This Humean link allows us to capture the dual unity of
the qualitative/non-qualitative distinction. In section 3.6, I turn to three philosophical
applications of this way of construing the distinction.
Before moving on, I should pause to lay out some background assumptions. I’ll begin
with my preferred ontology.104 I assume modal realism with absolute actuality. Our world is but
one of a plurality of possible worlds. These worlds are very much like our own. They are
concrete, fully determinate individuals. Each world is an internally unified whole, and is
absolutely isolated from every other world. I assume that these worlds do not overlap, that no
individual is wholly part of more than one world. The plurality of these worlds is plenitudinous:
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I have taken this ontology wholesale from Bricker (2001, 2006, 2008, forthcoming b).
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whenever something is possible, there is a world (or a plurality of worlds) at which it is true.105
But these worlds are, presumably, not all on a par. Our world, at least, is special. It is actual,
while others are merely possible. This marks a genuine, objective difference between them. I
thus reject David Lewis’s indexical account of actuality. A possible object’s status as actual is
not a mere matter of its belonging to our world. Actuality is absolute.
I also assume a robust form of mathematical platonism. There is, beyond the realm of
concrete possible worlds, a realm of abstract mathematical entities. These entities are causally
inert. They are entirely lacking in intrinsic qualitative character. They have only a relational
character, and belong to isolated systems or structures. The ‘pure’ sets—namely, those sets that
have in the transitive closure of the membership relation only other sets—form but one of a
plurality of mathematical structures. The sui generis natural numbers—which are not themselves
set-theoretic constructions of any kind, and thus are not to be identified with either the ‘von
Neumann’ or the ‘Zermelo’ numbers—form another such structure. The plurality of these
structures is plenitudinous: whenever a structure is possible, there is some collection of sui
generis mathematical entities that matches and is isolated by that structure.106
I’ll turn next to my preferred conception of properties.107 I assume an abundant
conception of properties according to which, for any class of possible entities, there is a property

105

The parenthetical clause is included in order to accommodate the possibility of island universes. See Bricker

(2001).
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Let’s say following Bricker (forthcoming b) that a collection of entities matches a structure if it instantiates that

structure and no more inclusive structure; and that a structure isolates a collection that instantiates it if the structural
relations never hold between entities inside and outside of the collection.
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I mostly follow Lewis (1983a: 10-19, 1986: 59-69) and Bricker (1996: 227, 2001: 31) except that I have a

broader conception of naturalness according to which a property can be perfectly natural without being guaranteed
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had by all and only the members of that class. The entities that share such properties might be
nothing alike, the classes they form might be gruesomely gerrymandered. But some few of these
properties—presumably, a very small minority—will be fundamental or perfectly natural. The
entities that share fundamental properties are objectively similar, the classes they form are
internally unified. The fundamental properties correspond not only to universals or tropes, but
also to modes of being, haecceities, and whatever other sparse similarity makers are employed to
solve problems of one over many.108 I will mostly avoid talk of such things and will simply posit
a primitive inegalitarian distinction among the properties. This gives us a broad conception of
naturalness according to which a property is fundamental or perfectly natural if and only if it is
an ultimate bearer of objective similarity.

to be qualitative. Bricker (1996: 237 n 21) notes that Lewis (1983a: 49-55) himself relies upon this broader
conception of naturalness ‘to help resolve indeterminacy of the content of thought’. I also collapse the distinction
between structured and unstructured properties from Lewis (1986: 55-59) into a version of the distinction between
concepts and properties found in Bricker (2006: 60).
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Modes of being correspond to properties like being actual and being present, while haecceities correspond to

properties like being Socrates and being Plato. They appear to underwrite non-qualitative similarities among their
instances. (My claim that haecceities are a kind of one over many might seem strange given that haecceities are
usually taken to be shared only by individuals that are identical to each other, and these individuals are one, not
many. But haecceities have traditionally been taken to be responsible for the identity of the individuals that enjoy
them; they take what would have otherwise been many individuals and make them one. Haecceities are, in this
respect at least, a kind of one over many. There is, however, a stronger respect in which haecceities might be taken
to be a kind of one over many. For if worlds do not overlap and no individual is wholly part of more than one world,
then the non-fundamental property being identical to Socrates, had by a single individual at a single world, might be
distinguished from the potentially fundamental property being Socrates, had by many different individuals at many
different worlds. It is, on this non-traditional view, the latter property that would correspond to a haecceity.)
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I also assume an intensional conception of properties according to which two properties
are identical if they are necessarily coextensive. Take, for example, the properties being a
triangular figure and being a trilateral figure. These properties are necessarily coextensive: they
are shared by exactly the same possible entities. They have the same underlying reality. But
while I identify these properties, I distinguish the concepts we use to designate them. A concept
is what we grasp in virtue of our understanding of a predicate in our language and is associated
with that predicate’s meaning, while a property is what gets designated by the use of a concept.
When we apply the predicate ‘is triangular’ to some figure, we are primarily concerned with the
number of that figure’s angles; and when we apply the predicate ‘is trilateral’ to that very same
figure, we are primarily concerned with the number of its sides. These predicates—and the
concepts they express—allow us to represent the same underlying reality in different ways. But
this difference lies only in thought, not in what is thought about. Thus, while properties are
intensional, the concepts we use to designate them are hyperintensional.
I have assumed a vast plenitude of objects and a rich abundance of properties. These are
controversial assumptions. But given the project at hand, we should have no problem taking
them on board. We’re looking for positive accounts of both the qualitative and the nonqualitative properties. We should thus be fairly permissive about the entities we countenance—
especially when their properties have good claim to being non-qualitative. But we shouldn’t be
overly permissive about the properties we countenance—especially when those properties are
hyperintensional. For sometimes the easiest way to designate a qualitative property is with an
impure—and seemingly non-qualitative—concept. Consider, for example, the very specific mass
of Mars. This mass is something Mars shares with countless merely possible entities, and the
property of having this mass is clearly qualitative. But we can most readily designate this
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property with the impure concept having the mass of Mars at this world. We should not,
however, confuse our representation of this property with the property itself, and would do well
to adopt an intensional conception of properties, which avoids this confusion entirely. Whoever
does not believe in the entities we countenance or accepts a hyperintensional conception of
properties might disagree with us about the overall extension or existence of various allegedly
non-qualitative properties, but she need not disagree with our characterization of the
qualitative/non-qualitative distinction itself. Our understanding of this distinction will be
enriched by having more test cases available, and fortified by taking cointensive properties to be
identical.

3.2 The unity of the qualitative
There are three importantly different features that have typically been associated with the
qualitative/non-qualitative distinction. The first is metaphysical: the qualitative properties are
often taken to be those properties that make for qualitative discernibility and give an object a
certain qualitative character, while the non-qualitative properties are taken to be those properties
that divide qualitative indiscernibles.109 To ensure that this characterization is neither empty nor
circular, let’s start by saying that two things are indiscernible with respect to a class of intrinsic
and extrinsic properties when they do not differ (and when their parts do not differ) with respect
to (the arrangement of) any of the properties in that class. If one of these things has (or fails to
have some arrangement of) a property in that class, the other has (or fails to have) it as well.
Let’s then say that a property divides a pair of objects when one item in the pair has that property
(or when some arrangement of its parts has a particular distribution of that property) and the
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See, for example, Lewis (1983a: 25, 2001: 382 n 6), Eddon (2009: 15-19), and Cowling (2015: 279, 285).
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other does not. And let’s next say that a metaphysically unified class of properties is a class of
properties that, in some way or another, can be reduced to some metaphysically interesting class
of properties. To give substance to the notion of qualitative indiscernibility, we can now say, at
least provisionally, that the qualitative properties form a metaphysically unified class of
properties, which, among other things, does not divide the following pairs: Castor and Pollux, an
actual and a merely possible dollar, and a ‘resting’ world where everything is at absolute rest and
a ‘boosted’ world where everything moves at an absolute velocity of 5 kilometers per hour to the
west. If we can find an underlying unifying notion, we will be able to say, without fear of vicious
circularity, that two things are qualitatively indiscernible when they (and their parts) do not
differ with respect to (the arrangement of) any of their intrinsic or extrinsic qualitative properties.
The second feature is epistemic: the qualitative properties are sometimes taken to be
those properties that can be observed or otherwise detected and provide markers of an object’s
qualitative character, while the non-qualitative properties are taken to be those properties that are
not, even in principle, detectable.110 Let’s say that we are receptive to differences in a property
when our sensory receptors are sensitive to an object’s having or lacking that property: if the
object has that property, our sensory receptors will be affected in one way; if it lacks that
property, they will be affected in another way. Let’s stipulate that we can detect a property when
we are receptive to differences in that property. And let’s stipulate further that a property is, in
principle, observable or detectable when some possible observer or instrument is receptive to
differences in that property: that is, when it is possible for something both to be capable of
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See, for example, Carnap (1947a: 84, 1947b: 138, 1950: 74), Ismael (2001: 186-93), Ismael and van Fraassen

(2003: 375-8), and Rickles (2006: 152-3, 159, 2008: 7-9).
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reacting in one way to the presence and in another way to the absence of that property.111 There
seems to be a tight connection between the ability to observe or detect various properties and the
ability to discriminate between objects based on their having or lacking those properties. For
qualitative similarities and differences appear to be epistemically more robust than nonqualitative similarities and differences. We can, on the basis of our experience, recognize that
one object is red and that another object is blue. The seemingly intrinsic qualitative difference
between a red ball and a blue ball is robust in a way that the intrinsic non-qualitative difference
between two red balls is not. It is on the basis of this qualitative robustness that we have the
ability to observe or detect various properties. The qualitative properties are thus presumed to be
observable—although, due to our limitations, we humans might not always be in a position to
observe them.112 The basic idea here is that the qualitative properties are those that can, at least
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We should distinguish between contrastive and non-contrastive notions of detectability. A non-contrastive notion

will only require the ability to detect the presence of some property. A property will be non-contrastively detectable
provided to is experienceable. But there is no reason to think that we could not have the (non-contrastive) ability to
detect the presence of the non-qualitative property being identical to Castor while lacking the (contrastive) ability to
distinguish Castor from Pollux. This suggests that the relevant notion of detectability must, therefore, be contrastive:
for a property to count as detectable, an observer must be able detect the presence as opposed to the absence of that
property. A property will be contrastively detectable provided its presence or absence could make a difference to
one’s experience. Thanks to André Gallois for helpful discussion on this point.
112

I have a broad conception of observability where a property is observable if there is a possible observer with the

resources to observe that property. We humans might not be in a position to observe all the observable properties.
We might not even be in a position to detect them with various instruments. But I think the properties that we can
neither observe nor detect should still count as observable since they have what it takes to be observed by a possible
observer. This broad conception contrasts with a narrower one where only those things that we humans could
observe, count as observable.
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in principle, be detected by the senses, while the non-qualitative properties are those that require
the additional workings of the intellect.
The third feature is linguistic: the qualitative properties are taken to be those properties
that we can designate descriptively without the aid of directly referential devices (such as
demonstratives, pure indexicals, or proper names), while the non-qualitative properties are taken
to be those properties that can only be expressed with the aid of such devices.113 Suppose we had
a mighty language that contained general predicates for all the fundamental discernibility
makers, allowed for complex infinitary constructions, but was completely lacking in directly
referential devices. We could, with such a language, describe the qualitative characters of various
objects, but we would lack the resources to pick out or describe one but not another of two
indiscernible objects. To do that, we would also require the use of directly referential devices.
Some of the properties that we could thereby pick out would be highly specific haecceitistic
properties such as being identical to Plato, while others such as being a student of Socrates or
being exactly ontologically like me and everything else at my world might be more general.
There are, as we have just seen, at least three features that have typically been associated
with the qualitative/non-qualitative distinction. I will use the general thrust of these features to
construct a list of desiderata for a positive account of the qualitative properties. But before I do
that, I should explain how I think these features are related and which I believe should take
priority.
It is a working assumption of the approach taken here that the qualitative/non-qualitative
distinction is primarily metaphysical in nature and can be accounted for in more basic terms. The
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qualitative properties should thus be taken to reduce to—or otherwise depend upon—some class
of fundamental (or broadly perfectly natural) properties. I will take the relevant notion of
dependence to be one of grounding (where the relevant grounding relation is understood in terms
of global supervenience and comparative naturalness).114 This, however, limits the extent to
which the qualitative properties can be plausibly taken to be observable or detectable. For
assuming that being an electron is a fundamental qualitative property, both being a non-electron
and being an electron or a non-electron would appear to be grounded in it. But since everything
in every possible world has the property being an electron or a non-electron, it won’t be possible
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I will say that the B-properties ground the A-properties iff the A-properties globally supervene on the B-

properties, and the A-properties are all broadly less natural than the B-properties. I thus take the relevant grounding
relation to be a relation between properties. It is intended to be irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive. It is not
intended to be hyperintensional.
I take the relevant relation here to be one of grounding as opposed to mere supervenience because I want to
leave open the possibility that the property being actual is cointensive with—and hence identical to—the property
designated by the concept having such and such, or so and so, or some other qualitative character (where this is
shorthand for the disjunction of the qualitative characters of every actual object). Suppose, for example, that all and
only worlds that are duplicates of our own were actual. Individuals that are parts of these worlds and individuals
wholly composed of parts of these worlds would be actual as well. But the qualitative characters of these individuals
supervene upon the fundamental qualitative properties. Thus, given that all and only these individuals are actual, the
property of actuality would appear to supervene upon the fundamental qualitative properties as well. Yet it would
not, I believe, thereby be qualitative. For, as we shall see in section 3.4 below, the property of actuality is a
fundamental non-qualitative property, and is thereby broadly as natural as any of the fundamental qualitative
properties.
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to detect its presence as opposed to its absence. The property being an electron or a non-electron
thus appears to be both qualitative and undetectable.115
But even supposing that a property’s qualitative robustness can become diffuse enough to
be undetectable, there might still be a principled connection between the qualitative and the
detectable properties. For fundamental properties are the ultimate bearers of similarity, and
assuming that qualitative similarity is epistemically more robust than non-qualitative similarity,
the fundamental qualitative properties should be detectable in principle. We might not be in a
position to detect them: our sensory receptors are certainly not fine-tuned enough to observe
differences at the sub-atomic level or beyond, and our best instruments might be too crude to
devise suitable experiments to detect them. But an epistemic agent better acquainted with these
properties should be able to detect them on the basis of their qualitative robustness. The desired
connection between the qualitative and the detectable properties can thus be secured at the
fundamental level.
The primitive predicates of a mighty language should be taken to correspond only to
properties that are epistemically qualitatively robust, whose instances can be recognized given
prior acquaintance. But a property’s expressibility in such a language should not be taken as an
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The negation employed here is not strict negation. I am assuming that the intension of being a non-electron is

properly contained in the intension of being strictly a non-electron. The latter, unlike the former, is a non-qualitative
property that is had by abstract mathematical entities. For more details, see footnote 129 below. I am assuming,
moreover, that the property being an electron or a non-electron is cointensive with—and hence identical to—the
property being concrete, which I believe to correspond to a fundamental way of being and, hence, to be nonqualitative (see chapter 5 below). I cannot, for this reason, officially accept the example given in the text above. But
I believe there will be other properties such as being a part of a world with such and such qualitative character that
are both qualitative and undetectable.
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infallible guide to its qualitative status. For thought, I believe, is prior to language, and if we
allow, as I think we should, that an impure—and seemingly non-qualitative—concept such as
having the same mass as Mars at this world can designate a qualitative property, we should also
allow for the possibility that a pure—and seemingly qualitative—concept can designate a nonqualitative property.116 We should not, as Sam Cowling (2015: 287) points out, take thought or
language, which are plainly mind-dependent, to determine the scope of the qualitative/nonqualitative distinction, which is plainly mind-independent.
I hereby propose the following desiderata for a positive account of the qualitative
properties: such an account should reduce these properties to some metaphysically interesting
notion, it should rule the three examples with which we began our investigation as nonqualitative, it should secure a connection to what is observable or detectable, and it should
supply primitive predicates for a mighty language.
I believe that these desiderata can be satisfied by a causal account which takes the
relevant metaphysical notion to be that of playing a fundamental causal (or nomic) role.117 This
account has two components which together capture the desired reduction and satisfies the first
desideratum:
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I believe this to be a live possibility. For depending upon the lay of logical space, the property of absolute

actuality, which we designate with the impure, directly referential concept being exactly ontologically like me and
everything else at my world, might also be designatable with a purely descriptive, infinitely disjunctive concept. But
absolute actuality should I think, nevertheless, be taken to be non-qualitative. I argued for this in section 2.2 above.
117

Teller (1984: 148) plausibly attributes something like this account to Lewis (1983a). It is similar to the

supervenience view discussed in Cowling (2015: 295-8).
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The Causal Thesis: a fundamental property is qualitative if and only if it plays a
fundamental causal (or nomic) role at some world.
The Grounding Thesis: a property is qualitative if and only if (i) it is a fundamental
qualitative property, or (ii) it is grounded in the fundamental qualitative properties.
A complete defense of this account would need to provide an explanation of what it is to play a
fundamental causal (or nomic) role. I will settle for some brief elucidatory remarks. A
fundamental causal (or nomic) role is importantly connected to the fundamental laws of nature.
These laws, it is often said, can be written in purely fundamental terms. The fundamental causal
facts are, in effect, instances of these laws. 118 Thus, the properties that play active roles in the
fundamental laws of nature will be the properties that play fundamental causal (and nomic) roles.
Let’s turn next to the second desideratum. The proposed account properly classifies each
of the three examples as non-qualitative. It rules being identical to Castor as non-qualitative,
since this property does not itself play a fundamental causal role, and does not supervene upon—
and, hence, is not grounded in—the fundamental qualitative properties shared by Castor and
Pollux. It rules being actual as non-qualitative, since this property is, as I will argue in section
3.4, fundamental and does not ground causal powers. And it rules being at absolute rest as nonqualitative, since this property does not itself play a fundamental causal role, and does not
supervene upon the fundamental qualitative properties shared by a ‘resting’ world and its
‘boosted’ counterpart.
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Fundamental laws should be distinguished from derived laws which cannot be written in purely fundamental

terms, but which can be somehow derived from fundamental laws. Similarly, fundamental causal facts should be
distinguished from facts that merely underwrite true causal statements.
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Let’s turn now to the third desideratum. The causal account ensures that the fundamental
qualitative properties are detectable. For in order to have causal powers, a property must be
capable of affecting various objects. But if a property can affect various objects, there should be
possible objects that are left differently affected by its presence than by its absence.119 And if
there are such objects, that property must be detectable. Thus, a fundamental property can have
causal powers only if it is detectable in principle.
The causal account does not, however, ensure that the fundamental non-qualitative
properties are undetectable. For the causal thesis only prohibits fundamental non-qualitative
properties from featuring in fundamental laws of nature, it doesn’t prevent them from featuring
in derived laws.120 Indeed, if there were fundamental haecceitistic properties, this would appear
to be possible. For, to borrow an example from Michael Tooley (1977: 686), suppose that some
world contains a garden—call it Hesperides—where all the fruit are apples. Different things
happen to different fruits when people try to take them into Hesperides: some turn into apples,
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One might object that it seems possible for there to be a property that, as part of its essential causal role, always

covers its tracks. Whenever this property affects an object, it also causes a complete and total coverup of that
affection. Thus, while this property might be able to affect various objects, there won’t be any possible objects that
are left differently affected by its presence than by its absence. I question, however, the ultimately intelligibility of
this example. I have no problem conceiving of a world where two distinct properties—one which affects something,
another which reverses that affection—are always coinstantiated. I can make sense of the success of the latter
property’s coverup, in part, because I can also imagine its failure. But the property I am being asked to imagine is
nothing like this. It is individuated by the dual power both to affect something and to simultaneously reverse that
affection; it is necessarily self-masking. It cannot fail. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me on this point.
120

The related view that fundamental laws must be expressible without impure, non-qualitative predicates is a

popular position, but is not without controversy. See Lange (1995: 430-6, 2000: 34-9) for critical discussion.
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some turn into elephants, others are repelled by a mysterious force. It appears to be a de re law in
this world that all the fruit in Hesperides are apples. But if so, the seemingly fundamental nonqualitative property being Hesperides will play a non-fundamental nomic role and should thus be
detectable.121
Let’s turn finally to the fourth desideratum. The causal account can supply primitive
predicates for a mighty language by taking these predicates to designate the properties that play
the fundamental causal roles. A language containing these predicates which also allowed for
complex infinitary constructions would appear to have the resources to designate all the nonfundamental qualitative properties as well. The causal account thus appears to provide us with
everything we want from a positive account of the qualitative properties.
I should add a few brief remarks before moving on. The causal account takes the
fundamental qualitative properties to play various fundamental causal roles. But it does not
require these properties to play a causal role at every world in which they are instantiated.
Consider, for example, a world without a source of light that contains nothing but two objects
exactly alike except that one is red and the other is blue. The properties being red and being blue
do not play an active causal role in this world, but they might do so in other worlds. They are
what David Lewis (2009: 205) calls idlers at the world in question, but only contingently so.122

121

That the nomic role played by being Hesperides is non-fundamental can be established by considering another

world—qualitatively indiscernible from the one described above—where Hesperides has been ‘replaced’ by Eden. It
would seem to be a de re law in this other world that all the fruit in Eden are apples. But these two worlds would
appear to have the same fundamental causal facts. Thus, while being Eden and being Hesperides play causal and
nomic roles at their respective worlds, the roles they play are not fundamental.
122

The causal account does require the fundamental qualitative properties to play a causal role at some of the worlds

in which they are instantiated. A fundamental property that was essentially an idler would be classed as non-
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Nor does this account require these roles to be played by the same properties at every
world. It is, in this respect, intended to be neutral between quidditism and structuralism.
Quidditists hold that worlds can differ qualitatively without differing structurally.123 They claim
that distinct qualitative properties can play the same causal roles at different worlds.
Structuralists deny this.124 They claim not only that qualitative properties have their causal roles

qualitative. The causal account is thus incompatible with the view that qualia are both fundamental and essentially
epiphenomenal. Thanks to Sam Cowling and an anonymous referee for pushing me on this point.
123

To be somewhat more precise, let’s say that two worlds are structurally isomorphic iff there is a one-one

correspondence between their parts that preserves the overall pattern of their fundamental qualitative properties and
relations; and let’s say that two worlds are qualitatively indiscernible iff there is a one-one correspondence between
their parts that preserves not just the overall pattern of their fundamental qualitative properties and relations, but the
fundamental properties and relations themselves. We can then define quidditism about worlds as the view that some
qualitatively discernible worlds are structurally isomorphic. The quidditist will likely hold that the fundamental
qualitative properties are individuated by basic qualitative suchnesses.
Quidditism should not be confused with haecceitism about properties, which holds that worlds can differ
by a permutation or wholesale replacement of properties without differing qualitatively. The haecceitist believes that
the properties that play the fundamental causal roles lack basic qualitative suchnesses and have only bare nonqualitative thisnesses. She must therefore deny the causal thesis. I don’t take this to be a problem since I take
quidditism to be far more plausible than haecceitism about properties. See Hildebrand (2016) for discussion. Note
that Hildebrand calls these views qualitative quidditism and bare quidditism. I’ve adopted the terminology from
Bricker (2017: 39, 49 n 18).
124

We can define structuralism about worlds as the view that no qualitatively discernible worlds are structurally

isomorphic (or, alternatively, as the view that two worlds are structurally isomorphic only if they are qualitatively
indiscernible). It is, so understood, simply the denial of quidditism. There are, as I see it, two views about properties
that motivate structuralism: strong causal essentialism about properties—a view that Hawthorne (2001) calls causal
structuralism and Hildebrand (2016) simply calls structuralism—which holds that the fundamental qualitative
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essentially, but that they are individuated by them. Since the causal thesis only requires that the
fundamental qualitative properties play a causal role at some world, it can be endorsed by
quidditists and structuralists alike.125

properties are individuated by their causal roles, and haecceitism about properties which holds that the fundamental
properties are individuated by bare non-qualitative thisnesses. Both views tie a world’s qualitative character to its
overall structure, and both views hold that the most natural qualitative properties are individuated by their causal
roles. But while the strong essentialist believes that these properties are perfectly natural, the haecceitist does not. It
is because the haecceitist denies that there are fundamental qualitative properties that she must deny the causal
thesis.
125

The quidditist and the strong causal essentialist agree that the properties that play the fundamental causal roles

have qualitative suchnesses. But they disagree about the connection between a property’s playing a causal role and
its having a suchness: the strong causal essentialist thinks that a property has a suchness because it plays a
fundamental causal role, whereas the quidditist thinks that a property’s qualitative suchness is independent of the
causal roles it plays. This might suggest that while both the quidditist and the strong causal essentialist can accept
the truth of the causal thesis, only the strong causal essentialist can take it to provide us with an explanation for why
the properties that play the fundamental causal roles are qualitative.
I deny, however, that quidditists cannot take the casual thesis to be adequately informative. So while I am
inclined to agree that the thesis that a fundamental property is qualitative because it has a basic qualitative suchness
might provide a deeper metaphysical explanation of the nature of a fundamental qualitative property than the causal
thesis, I don’t think the concept of a basic suchness is terribly informative. I can gesture at it by giving various
analogies, but I can’t really help you acquire it if you lack it. I think the concept of playing a fundamental causal role
is more informative. It is one that I could potentially help you to acquire. The causal thesis thus provides a kind of
insight into the nature of the fundamental qualitative properties that the basic suchness thesis does not. The
quidditist can, I think, accept the causal thesis, deny that it gets to the metaphysical heart of the matter, but still take
it to be informative. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me on this point.
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The account is also intended to be neutral between Humean and anti-Humean theories of
laws and causation. The Humean takes the fundamental qualitative properties to be occurrent or
categorical (that is, to be neither primitive propensities, brute causal powers, nor fundamentally
modal properties). The Humean then attempts to reduce laws and causation to the overall
distribution of these fundamental occurrent properties. The anti-Humean does not think the laws
can be so reduced. She thinks more is needed, and will either deny that the fundamental
qualitative properties are occurrent or else insist that there must be additional primitive
connections between them.

3.3 The range of the non-qualitative
Let’s turn now to the range of properties that should be classified as non-qualitative. The
standard account classes as non-qualitative all those properties that somehow make direct
reference to particular individuals. Our alternative account classes as qualitative all those
properties that somehow enter into causal processes. There are, however, at least three important
classes of properties that fall into neither of these camps, and have claim—independent of the
causal account—to being non-qualitative.126

126

My primary aim in this section is to expand our intuitive, pre-theoretical conception of the non-qualitative as far

as possible. It might be that some of my claims in this section do not hold up to intuitive scrutiny. But the general
argument will be successful, I believe, to the extent that it expands our intuitive conception of the non-qualitative
beyond the haecceitistic.
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There are, first, the logical properties such as identity and composition.127 A
characteristic feature of such properties is their ‘formality’. There are, as John MacFarlane
(2000) points out, three main ways to understand this formality. We might take it to be a kind of
generality: the logical properties apply, without qualification, to any domain.128 There would
seem to be entities that not only lack intrinsic qualitative character, but extrinsic qualitative
character as well (the pure sets, the sui generis numbers, and other abstracta are plausible
examples of such things).129 But, given that the logical properties apply to these entities, they
cannot be qualitative.130 We might instead take this formality as a kind of topic neutrality: the

127

Bricker (1996: 233-4, 2006: 49) and Hawley (2009: 102) take both identity and composition to be non-

qualitative. Fine (1977: 138) appears to take identity as non-qualitative.
128

MacFarlane (2000) calls this ‘1-formality’.

129

In order to maintain that some entities determinately lack all qualitative character, I must deny the commonly

held assumption that the qualitative properties are closed under (strict) negation. For while the sui generis natural
numbers lie outside the intension of, say, being an electron, they nevertheless instantiate its strict negation, namely,
being strictly a non-electron. But although I must deny the letter of this assumption, I can still capture some of its
spirit. For the property being concrete and strictly a non-electron is, I believe, appropriately grounded in the
property being an electron. This is because, as I suggested in footnote 114 above, grounding should be understood in
terms of global supervenience and comparative naturalness. But since global supervenience is defined on concrete
possible worlds, being concrete and strictly a non-electron will be grounded in being an electron. This gives
negation a kind of closure in the realm of the concrete: the anti-intension of being an electron defined on the
concrete possible worlds, which we might call being a non-electron, would seem to be a qualitative property.
130

The qualitative status of parthood leads to an antinomy. The thesis of this antinomy is that parthood is qualitative;

the antithesis is that it is not. The alleged proof of the thesis is that a property is qualitative if it is preserved by
duplication, and since parthood is preserved by duplication, it must be qualitative. The proof of the antithesis is that
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logical properties are indifferent to their subject matter and treat all individuals the same.131 They
don’t introduce a special subject matter. But this suggests that they aren’t qualitative, else they
would usher in a qualitative subject matter. We might finally take this formality as a kind of
abstraction: the logical properties take their objects in abstraction from their relations to the
world.132 But these properties, being detached from the world, should be free of its qualitative
character. Thus, on any way of understanding their formality, the logical properties appear to be
non-qualitative.133

it is possible for there to be things that determinately fail to instantiate any qualitative properties or stand in any
qualitative relations, but given that the parthood relation would apply to such things, it must be non-qualitative.
This antinomy can be resolved in favor of its antithesis. Consider the ‘proof’ of the thesis. The best
motivation for the premise that parthood is preserved by duplication is that it must be included in the definition of
duplication itself: to say that two objects are qualitative duplicates is to say that there is a one-one correspondence
between their parts that preserves all the fundamental qualitative (as well as all the mereological) properties had by
their parts and all the fundamental qualitative (as well as all the mereological) relations between their parts. But,
given this definition, the plausibility of the premise that a property is preserved by duplication only if it is qualitative
turns on the plausibility of the auxiliary assumption that the mereological properties and relations are themselves all
qualitative. This assumption is not, however, particularly plausible: the proof of the antithesis gives us good reason
to think it false. Thus, a property or relation can be preserved by duplication—and can thereby contribute to the
qualitative character of an object whose parts have that property or stand in that relation—without itself being
qualitative. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me on this point.
131

MacFarlane (2000) calls this ‘2-formality’.

132

MacFarlane (2000) calls this ‘3-formality’.

133

The argument in this paragraph turns on the plausibility of the claim that there are entities that have no intrinsic

or extrinsic qualitative character whatsoever. This claim strikes me as intuitively quite plausible.
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There are, second, the mathematical properties such as the membership and successor
relations.134 The membership relation is not topic neutral.135 It introduces a special subject
matter: it always relates things to sets. If the membership relation were qualitative, it would
contribute to the qualitative character of the pure sets. But the pure sets do not seem to have any
qualitative character: they do not seem to instantiate any qualitative properties or stand in any
qualitative relations. The membership relation does not appear to be qualitative. Purely structural
mathematical properties such as the successor relation hold between the sui generis natural
numbers. But since these numbers appear to determinately lack all qualitative character, the
successor relation does not appear to be qualitative. Thus, the mathematical properties appear to
be non-qualitative.136

134

Bricker (2008: 117-18, forthcoming b) takes the mathematical properties to be non-qualitative. Carnap (1947a:

84) and Fine (1977: 138, 177) appear to do so as well.
135

I am here working with an absolute notion of topic neutrality according to which a relation is absolutely topic

neutral whenever each of its relata is indifferent to its subject matter. The membership relation is not absolutely
topic neutral because, as we just observed, one of its relata must be a set. But this is not to say that the membership
relation’s other relatum will introduce a special subject matter. For if there are impure sets, it seems plausible to
think that there can be impure sets of objects belonging to any subject matter whatsoever. We might take this to
motivate the need for a relativized notion of topic neutrality according to which a relation is topic neutral relative to
one of its relata whenever that relatum is indifferent to its subject matter. I owe this distinction to Kris McDaniel.
136

My argument turns on the plausibility of the claim that purely mathematical entities have no qualitative character

whatsoever. I’ll consider two challenges to this claim. The first concerns a pure set’s cardinality. Two sets have the
same cardinality when there is a one-to-one correspondence between them. There are pure sets that have the same
cardinality. For example, the singleton of the empty set, {∅}, and the singleton of the singleton of the empty set,
{{∅}}, both have exactly one member. They are similar in this respect. If we thought that similarity must always be
qualitative, we should say that these pure sets have qualitative character in virtue of their cardinality. But this strikes
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me as the wrong thing to say. For a set’s cardinality appears to be a purely quantitative, non-qualitative property.
Two sets with the same cardinality thus appear to enjoy a kind of non-qualitative similarity. It is a mistake to think
that similarity must always be qualitative. (Note that I am not here claiming that quantitative properties can never be
qualitative. Some properties such as having exactly 5 kg mass strike me as both quantitative as well as qualitative,
while other properties such as having exactly 5 members strike me as purely quantitative.)
The second challenge concerns an abstract sui generis geometrical object’s shape. An abstract geometrical
object can have the same shape as a concrete possible object. But since the qualitative character of a solid gold cube
is different from that of a solid gold dodecahedron, their shape properties would appear to be qualitative. I must, it
seems, either give up on the claim that abstract geometrical objects lack qualitative character or else deny that the
shape properties had by concrete possible objects are qualitative after all. If forced to choose, I would take the latter
option. But maybe I don’t have to. A concretely possible object such as solid gold cube will have a property that
might plausibly be thought of as a shape property in virtue of some pattern of the spatiotemporal relations between
its parts. And, assuming that these relations are qualitative, this shape property will be qualitative as well. An
abstract geometrical object will have a property that might also be thought of as a shape property in virtue of some
pattern of the relations between its parts. And, assuming that these relations are non-qualitative, this shape property
will be non-qualitative as well. Two objects, whether concrete or purely geometrical, can then be said to have the
same shape when there is a mapping between them that preserves the relevant patterns of relations between their
parts, call this mapping a shape isomorphism. Given these assumptions, I now have the resources to say everything I
want to say: namely, that the shape properties of concrete objects are qualitative, and that the shape properties of
abstract geometrical objects are non-qualitative. But what should I say about the properties that are preserved by
shape isomorphism? Are they some third somewhat less natural kind of non-qualitative shape properties? Or are
they just the non-qualitative shape properties had by purely geometrical objects? To put this another way: are the
qualitative relations that underwrite qualitative shape properties themselves reinforced by non-qualitative purely
geometrical relations or not? If not, there would seem to be three distinct kinds of shape properties here: the
qualitative shape properties had only by concrete objects, the non-qualitative shape properties had only by abstract
geometrical objects, and the somewhat less natural non-qualitative shape properties shared by both concrete and
abstract geometrical objects. But if the qualitative relations that underwrite the qualitative shape properties are

100

There are, third, the ontological properties such as actuality and presentness.137 A
characteristic feature of such properties is that they are absolute: they do not appear to be
concerned with how their objects are related to anything else, they carry a special non-relative
metaphysical status. We tend to think, for example, that actual objects are importantly different
from merely possible ones. We do not, as Robert Adams (1974: 215) puts it, tend to think that
‘the difference in respect of actuality between Henry Kissinger and the Wizard of Oz is just a
difference in their relations to us’. Indeed, the difference between them seems to be intrinsic. But
it is not thereby a qualitative difference. For a qualitative duplicate of Henry Kissinger—even an
indiscernible such duplicate—might fail to be actual. The property of actuality does not appear to
be qualitative. We also tend to think, perhaps somewhat naively, that present objects are
importantly different from both past and future objects. The present is like a spotlight that moves
through time—endowing now this and now that object with a special ontological status. We
don’t, however, tend to think of this status as constituted by relations of cotemporality. For while
Plato still bears relations of cotemporality to all the objects of his day, he no longer enjoys

indeed reinforced by non-qualitative purely geometrical relations, there would seem to be only two distinct kinds of
shape properties: the qualitative shape properties had only by concrete objects, and the non-qualitative shape
properties shared by both concrete and abstract geometrical objects. I prefer to say that there are only two shape
properties here: one qualitative and had only by concrete possible objects, the other non-qualitative and had both by
concretely possible and purely geometrical objects. (Note that if spatiotemporal relations are non-qualitative, there
will only be one, non-qualitative, shape property here.) Thanks to two anonymous referees for pushing me on these
matters.
137

Bricker (2001: 29-31, 2006: 49-50, 2008: 122-5, forthcoming b) takes actuality to be non-qualitative. I take the

ontological properties to correspond to modes of being. They are, in this way, unlike other categorial properties such
as being simple or being complex.
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present existence. Nor should we think of the difference between present objects and past (or
future) objects as qualitative. For imagine that we live in a two-way eternal recurrence world
where history repeats itself every 10 trillion years. There will then be infinitely many past (and
infinitely many future) duplicates for every presently existing thing. But since these past (and
future) duplicates seem to be qualitatively indiscernible from their present counterparts, the
property of presentness does not appear to be qualitative. Thus, the ontological properties appear
to be non-qualitative.138
My aim in this section has been to expand our intuitive, pre-theoretical conception of the
non-qualitative as far as possible. A property, I have argued, might fail to be qualitative for a
variety of positive reasons that are independent of the causal account: the logical properties fail
due to their formality, the mathematical properties fail due to the special nature of their subject
matter, and the ontological properties fail due to a combination of their non-relative status and
their ability to divide even indiscernible duplicates. These properties are all negatively unified in
this failure. But do they have anything in common beyond that? They might, for all I’ve said, just
be a rag-tag band of properties without genuine unity.

3.4 Fundamentality and naturalness
The fundamental properties are sometimes said to be perfectly natural; they carve reality at the
joints. These properties are supposed to play various roles. They are supposed to ground

138

The argument in this paragraph turns on the plausibility of the claim that the ontological properties do not

contribute to the nature of the entities that enjoy them. This claim strikes me as fairly plausible. If the ontological
properties correspond to modes of being—as I believe they do—then to accept this claim is to accept a ‘thin’
conception of being (see chapter 5 below).
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objective similarity, they are supposed to ground causal powers, and—more controversially—
there are only supposed to be ‘enough of them to characterize things completely and without
redundancy’ (Lewis 1986: 60). But we also learn that the perfectly natural properties are all
supposed to be qualitative.139 I don’t take this narrow conception of naturalness to characterize
the fundamental properties in general, but only the fundamental qualitative properties. The
fundamental non-qualitative properties do not seem to ground—and they do not seem to be
needed to ground—causal powers, and, as I hope to show, they can allow for some redundancy.
They do, however, help to ground non-qualitative similarities. I shall take up each of these
components in turn.
Let’s start with the first component. Are there objective non-qualitative similarities? The
haecceitist about individuals who denies overlap certainly seems to think so. She believes that
there is a world with a qualitative history no different from our own where Socrates and Plato
‘swap’ their qualitative roles. At this world, Plato lives a life-history that is qualitatively
indiscernible from Socrates’ actual life-history, and Socrates lives a life-history that is
qualitatively indiscernible from Plato’s actual life-history. There is, on this view, an individual at
our world and a numerically distinct individual at some other possible world who are nonqualitatively alike because they both enjoy the fundamental haecceitistic property being
Socrates. This property corresponds to something like a haecceitity: it is a kind of one over

139

For Lewis, objective similarity is always qualitative. He thinks that the problem with unnatural properties is that

‘[t]hey pay no heed to the qualitative joints, but carve things up every which way’ (1986: 59, emphasis added), and
that the ‘[s]haring of [the perfectly natural, or sparse, properties] makes for qualitative similarity’ (1986: 60,
emphasis added). They help to give us ‘a complete qualitative characterization of things’ (1986: 60, emphasis
added).
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many, the enjoyment of which is both necessary and sufficient for being Socrates. Thus, given
haecceitism without overlap, the fundamental haecceitistic properties appear to underwrite a kind
of objective non-qualitative similarity.
I am no haecceitist. But I believe there are objective non-qualitative similarities, and will
argue that they are underwritten by many of the properties mentioned in the previous section. I
think, for instance, that actual objects are not only importantly different from merely possible
ones, but importantly similar to each other as well. But actual objects are too qualitatively
heterogeneous for their similarity not to spring from a basic source. This source cannot, however,
be qualitative. For then an actual and a merely possible dollar would be guaranteed to differ in a
basic qualitative respect and could never be qualitative duplicates. Actuality thus appears to
underwrite a kind of non-qualitative similarity.
I also believe that there are non-qualitative similarities between ordered pairs of entities.
Take, for example, the pair of the sui generis natural number two and itself, on the one hand, and
the pair of my left arm and itself, on the other. I think these pairs resemble each other in an
important respect: the number two is identical to the number two, and my left arm is identical to
my left arm. The identity relation seems to be an important source of similarity between these
pairs. But, as we observed above, the sui generis natural numbers do not appear to have
qualitative properties, nor do they seem to bear qualitative relations to anything at all. So, if there
is some kind of similarity here, it cannot be qualitative. The identity relation appears to
underwrite a kind of non-qualitative similarity.
We can run a similar argument for parthood. Take the pair of the fusion of the sui generis
natural numbers and the number two, on the one hand, and the pair of my body and my left arm,
on the other. These pairs appear to resemble each other in an important respect: the fusion of the
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natural numbers has the number two as a part, and my body has my left arm as a part. The
(proper) parthood relation seems to be an important source of similarity between these pairs. But
the natural numbers do not appear to instantiate qualitative properties or bear qualitative
relations. So the similarity between these pairs cannot be qualitative. The (proper) parthood
relation appears to underwrite a kind of non-qualitative similarity.
We can extend this argument to composition by considering pairs that include pluralities.
Take the plurality of sui generis natural numbers and their fusion, on the one hand, and the
plurality of my body’s atomic parts and their fusion, on the other. These pairs resemble each
other in an important respect: the plurality of the natural numbers compose the natural number
structure, and my body’s atomic parts compose my body. But, again, the similarity between them
cannot be qualitative. Composition appears to underwrite a kind of non-qualitative similarity.140
We might run arguments for the singleton and set membership relations as well. Suppose
we believe in impure sets. Take the pair of the number two and its singleton, on the one hand,
and the pair of my left arm and its singleton, on the other. These pairs resemble each other in an
important respect. The singleton relation is an important source of similarity between them. Or
take the pair of the plurality of sui generis natural numbers and the set of natural numbers, on the
one hand, and the plurality of my body’s atomic parts and the set of its atomic parts, on the other.
These pairs also resemble each other in an important respect. The membership relation is an
important source of similarity between them. But since the sui generis natural numbers do not

140

Note that since everything composes itself, the pair of my body’s parts and their fusion (namely, my body), on

the one hand, and the pair of my body and itself, on the other, should also enjoy a kind of non-qualitative similarity.
I think this is exactly what we should say.
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themselves appear to stand in any qualitative relations, the singleton and membership relations
appear to be sources of non-qualitative similarity.
I take these examples to show that there are objective non-qualitative similarities. Indeed,
the properties in these examples have good claim to being among the ultimate grounds of
similarity. And since it seems plausible to assume that a property is an ultimate source of
similarity only if it is fundamental, there would thus appear to be fundamental non-qualitative
properties. This result is intended to be independent of the causal thesis. It depends on only two
things: first, a popular account of fundamentality according to which a property is fundamental
iff it is among the properties that ground objective similarity; and, second, the observation that
the properties in question are, as argued in section 3.3 above, non-qualitative. Does this show
that Lewis’s characterization of naturalness is too narrow? Not quite. We also need to show that
these fundamental non-qualitative properties are not apt to ground causal powers, and that they
may admit of some redundancy.
Let’s turn then to the second component. Are there fundamental properties that do not
enter into any causal processes? I shall assume that a fundamental property can ground causal
powers only if it is detectable in principle. For if a fundamental property plays a causal role—
and thereby grounds a causal power—at some world, then it would appear to be detectable at that
world: an observer or instrument should be capable of being affected in one way by the presence
and in another way by the absence of that property. Indeed if we think, as David Lewis does, of
physics as aspiring ‘to give an inventory of natural properties’ (1983a: 27), then this project only
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makes sense if we take these properties to be detectable.141 It should thus suffice to show that the
proposed fundamental non-qualitative properties are undetectable.
It should be clear that actuality is undetectable. For actuality is plausibly pervasive: if any
part of a world is actual, then every part of that world is actual. It is, as Phillip Bricker (2001: 445) observes, unintelligible to suppose that we might find something non-actual if we just traveled
to a remote enough corner of the world. But given the pervasiveness of actuality, nothing could
be affected in one way by the presence of actuality and affected in another way by its absence.
Actuality is thus undetectable.142
It should also be clear that identity is undetectable. Let’s focus on identity over time. I’ll
assume for the moment that material objects persist by enduring, that they are wholly present at
every time at which they exist. Imagine that there are two molecule-for-molecule duplicate
coffee mugs on my desk at all times from noon until one. But suppose that while one mug is the
same throughout, the other is not. It is really just a continuous succession of distinct mugs. I
contend that there would be no way to detect which mug persists for the entire hour and which
does not. I could keep an eye or a hand constantly upon them, I could even monitor them with
the most sensitive of instruments, but the results would be the same in each case. Nothing, it
seems, could be sensitive to the presence or absence of identity from one moment to the next.143

141

But what about idlers: namely, ‘those fundamental properties, if any, that are instantiated within the actual world,

but play no active role in the workings of nature’ (Lewis 2009: 205)? Are they qualitative? I guess it depends upon
whether they could play an active causal role in the workings of nature. If they could but don’t, that is no threat to
their status as qualitative. But if they couldn’t ground causal powers, it seems that they wouldn’t count as
qualitative.
142

See Williams (1962: 751) for a similar argument.

143

See Hume ([1739] 1888: 253-4) for an argument along these lines.
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There would thus seem to be no way to detect identity over time. The real takeaway here is not
that endurantism is false, but rather that our perceptual experience would be the same regardless
of whether or not it were true. If we have reason to accept or reject endurantism, it would seem
to have nothing to do with anything we could observe or detect even in principle. But given that
endurantism is a view about strict numerical identity, the identity relation appears to be
undetectable.
It should be equally clear that parthood and composition are both undetectable (at least
assuming, as we have, that they are fundamental logical relations).144 I will focus on
composition. The Special Composition Question asks for the conditions under which some
objects, the xs, compose something, y (see van Inwagen 1990b). The only plausible, nondisjunctive answers to this question, given our assumptions, are nihilism (the view that the xs
compose y whenever the xs are exactly one) and universalism (the view that the xs compose y
whenever the xs exist). For assuming that composition is a logical relation, it must apply to any
domain. But since composition applies to any domain, whatever informative, necessary, and
sufficient conditions we might hope to give for when some objects compose something cannot
themselves be qualitative (for these conditions are supposed to apply to objects that have no
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This claim might seem surprising if we reject this assumption. It might seem as if we can, for example, simply

see that the handle of a coffee mug is a part of the mug itself. Here I grant that we can observe that the handle is in
contact with—or, at least, in close proximity to—the rest of the mug; that we can observe that the handle is fastened
to the mug; that we can observe that the handle cannot be pulled apart from the rest of the mug without breaking it;
and that we might even be able to detect that the handle is joined to the rest of the mug in such a way that there is no
boundary. But I deny that what we observe or detect in these cases is anything like composition or parthood. The
tendency to think that we can observe mereological relations between things comes, I think, along with a tendency
to presuppose various moderate answers to the Special Composition Question.
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qualitative character whatsoever). And assuming that composition is also a fundamental relation,
we cannot hope to grasp it merely by grasping the qualitative conditions under which concrete
material objects compose something. For composition applies not only to concrete material
objects, but to abstract mathematical objects as well, and anything we might plausibly say to
account for when material objects compose a further object—such as when they are in contact,
when they are fastened together, or when they constitute a life—is not also going to apply to
mathematical objects such as the pure sets or the sui generis numbers. This would seem to rule
out any plausible sounding moderate answers to the Special Composition Question. We are left,
then, with either nihilism or universalism. I have been implicitly assuming that universalism is
true. But whatever reason we have to decide between these views has, once again, nothing to do
with anything we could observe or detect. For our perceptual experience would seem to be the
same regardless of whether nihilism or universalism were true.145 But if we cannot detect that,
say, some particles arranged mugwise compose a mug rather than not, we cannot detect the
presence rather than the absence of the composition relation. (Indeed assuming universalism, we
can mirror the argument that actuality is undetectable. For any plurality of objects that we come
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See Merricks (2001: 8-9), Dorr (2002: sect. 1.4.1), and Rosen and Dorr (2002: 155) for arguments along these

lines. Thomas Hofweber (2016: 191-6) appears to grant that the phenomenology of our perceptual experience would
be the same whether or not some particles compose a mug, but insists that the relevant question is whether or not
perception entitles us to believe that there is a mug. He argues that the contents of our perceptual beliefs distinguish
between cases where composition occurs and cases where it never occurs. This might well be correct. It might show
that I am entitled to believe that there is a mug in front of me, but it doesn’t show that composition is contrastively
detectable: that is, it doesn’t show that I can detect the presence rather than the absence of the composition relation.
Thanks to Sam Cowling for pushing me on this point.

109

across will compose something. But since composition always occurs, we cannot be differently
affected by the presence or absence of the composition relation. It is undetectable.)
I also think that the singleton and set-membership relations are undetectable. Our
perceptual experience would, I think, be the same whether or not there were impure sets. But if
so, then we seem incapable of detecting the presence or absence of the singleton or setmembership relations. These relations thus appear to be undetectable.146 (Indeed assuming that
there are no impure sets whatsoever, these relations will again appear to be undetectable. For in
this case, no part of any world will bear the singleton relation to anything at all. We would be
incapable of detecting its absence rather than its presence. It would thus be undetectable in the
relevant sense.)
Let’s turn finally to the third component. Are there fundamental properties that allow for
redundancy? The mereological relations of parthood, proper parthood, and overlap are all
candidate sources of objective similarity. They are also interdefinable. But, as Theodore Sider
(2011: 217-22) argues, a non-redundancy requirement on the fundamental would force us to
make an arbitrary choice here. This would be an undesirable result. For objective similarity is not
up to us in this—or, indeed, in any—way. The fundamental non-qualitative properties appear to
allow for redundancy. But Sider’s argument also extends to properties that appear to be
qualitative. The temporal relation earlier than and its converse later than both appear to be
fundamental. They are also interdefinable. But taking only one to be fundamental is arbitrary,
taking both is redundant.147 Our choice of spatial distance relations is also caught between
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certain impure sets.
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See also Sider (1993: sect. 3.2.1).
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arbitrariness and redundancy: should we measure distances in meters, feet, or something else?
Choosing only one is arbitrary, choosing them all is redundant. The fundamental qualitative
properties appear to allow for redundancy as well.148 Redundancy appears to be unavoidable. Yet
even if these properties allow for logical or modal redundancies, they might resist other forms of
redundancy. If, for example, our catalog of fundamental qualitative properties were essentially
causally redundant (and overdetermining), we would lack even defeasible reason to believe that
only one property plays any given causal role. But whatever pressure there might be to say that
the fundamental qualitative properties ground causal powers and hence form a causally minimal
basis does not extend to the fundamental non-qualitative properties, since they are not
themselves causally efficacious.
I think that the only thing it takes for a property to be fundamental is for that property to
be an ultimate bearer of objective similarity. Objects that share these properties form broadly
natural classes, which would appear to have a high degree of internal unity. This gives us a broad
conception of naturalness. But there is a narrower one as well. Some fundamental properties not
only make for objective similarity, but are also fit to play various causal roles. These are the
fundamental qualitative properties. They correspond to the properties that Lewis often refers to
as perfectly natural.
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I am assuming here that spatial, temporal, and spatiotemporal relations are all qualitative. I am, however,

somewhat skeptical of this assumption. Spatial and temporal relations do not appear to play an active role in the
workings of nature. And while the view that matter and spacetime causally interact (and hence that spatiotemporal
relations play fundamental causal roles in general relativistic spacetime theories) might enjoy ‘common acceptance’,
there are ‘reasons to regard [it] as questionable’ (Hoefer 2009: 701-4).
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3.5 The unity of the non-qualitative
The picture developed in the previous section provides additional support for the causal thesis.
But my aim is not just to unify the fundamental non-qualitative properties in their failure to
ground causal powers, I also seek a positive characterization of their unity. This can be found in
the source of their resistance to recombination.
The basic combinatorial idea is that ‘[a]ny pattern of instantiation of any fundamental
properties and relations is metaphysically possible’ (Wang 2013: 52). The fundamental
qualitative properties and relations appear to be subject to recombination. They are, by the causal
thesis, apt to ground causal powers. But causation does not, by Humean assumption, involve
necessary connections or exclusions. There might, however, be non-causal necessary
connections and exclusions between fundamental qualitative properties and relations that are
determinates of the same determinable. Two problems arise for the basic combinatorial idea: the
first involves exclusions of determinate properties, the second involves necessitations of
determinate relations.
Let’s start with the exclusion problem.149 The instantiation of a determinate property
appears to necessarily exclude the instantiation of other determinates of the same determinable.
So, for example, nothing could instantiate both the property having exactly 5 kg mass and the
property having exactly 1 kg mass. But these properties appear to be fundamental: they appear to
underwrite objective similarities. Any pattern of instantiation that admits coinstantiations of
distinct determinate properties of the same determinable does not seem to be metaphysically
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See Wang (2013: 542-4) and Bricker (2017) for discussion of the exclusion problem. Wang argues that the

principles of recombination should either be amended or else abandoned. Bricker attempts to tackle the problem
head on by arguing that determinables rather than determinates are fundamental.
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possible. We can, however, maintain that possibility is preserved across patterns of instantiation
that differ only by wholesale permutations, wholesale replacements, and wholesale eliminations
of fundamental determinate monadic properties.
Let’s turn next to the necessitation problem.150 The instantiation of certain determinate
relations appears to necessitate the instantiation of further determinate relations. So, for example,
the determinate relations of spatial distance are symmetric and obey the triangle inequality.151
But these relations appear to be fundamental: they appear to underwrite objective similarities.
Any pattern of instantiation of fundamental relations of determinates of the same determinable
that violates certain formal constraints does not seem to be metaphysically possible. We can,
however, maintain that possibility is preserved by a pattern of instantiation that removes all
fundamental determinates of the same determinable relation from an individual.
A fully worked-out theory of recombination would need to address these problems. It
would provide us with the true principles of recombination. I shall not attempt to formulate such
principles here. But such principles should be consistent with the claim that any pattern of
instantiation of determinably-distinct fundamental qualitative properties and relations is
metaphysically possible.152 For there are no necessary connections or exclusions between
determinably-distinct fundamental qualitative properties.

150

See Wang (2013: 539-41) for discussion of the necessitation problem.

151

The triangle inequality tells us that, for any points x, y, and z, the distance between x and z is less than or equal to

the sum of the distance between x and y and the distance between y and z; or, more formally, that d(x, z) ≤ d(x, y) +
d(y, z).
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We can say, roughly, that properties are determinably-distinct when they are not determinates of the same

determinable. See Saucedo (2011: 246) for a more precise definition.
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The fundamental non-qualitative properties are a different story. They appear to involve
necessary connections and exclusions that have nothing to do with determinates or
determinables. The fundamental haeccceitistic properties don’t appear to be determinates of any
determinable. But they don’t appear to be recombinable either. If they were, then, as Cowling
(forthcoming: sect. 1.3) points out, there would be worlds where being Socrates is enjoyed by
thirty-three distinct individuals. But there are no such worlds. The fundamental haecceitistic
properties are not alone in their resistance to recombination: actuality, identity, parthood,
composition, singleton and set-membership all resist it as well, and the source of their resistance
has nothing to do with determinates or determinables. Actuality is, as observed above, pervasive:
everything at a world is actual if anything is. It is simply unintelligible to suppose that there is a
world where some things are actual and other things are not. Identity obeys a principle of
indiscernibility: if objects x and y are identical, then x and y are (absolutely) indiscernible. It is
unintelligible to suppose that there is a world where a duplicate of my wallet is identical to a
duplicate of my cellphone.153 Parthood is transitive. It is unintelligible to suppose that there is a
world where a leg is part of a table and a particle is part of the leg, but the particle is not part of
the table. The singleton relation appears to be generative: whenever something exists, there is
singleton set of that thing. If that’s right, then it would be impossible to imagine a part of a world
that does not have a singleton.
These observations suggest that there is a unified phenomenon here. We can make good
sense of this phenomenon if we take the fundamental non-qualitative properties to be those
properties that impose especially strong constraints on their instantiation. They give rise to
necessary connections and exclusions that have nothing to do with determinates or
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determinables, and thus are not subject to even the true principles of recombination. This yields
the following:
The Necessary Connections Thesis: a fundamental property is non-qualitative if and
only if it is not subject to the true principles of recombination.154
The fundamental non-qualitative properties and relations appear to be the source of necessary
connections and exclusions between distinct instantiations of determinably-distinct fundamental
properties and relations. We can now explain when and why we should expect fundamental nonqualitative properties and relations to be redundant. If the patterns of instantiation of one set of
fundamental properties and relations necessitate patterns of instantiation of another set of
fundamental properties and relations and vice versa, then these properties and relations would
seem to globally supervene upon each other.155 But this mutual supervenience would be
indicative of a redundancy since we wouldn’t need both sets of properties and relations to
completely describe the world. We have arrived, then, at a positive characterization of the
fundamental non-qualitative properties.
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I am here relying upon what we might call a broad notion of global supervenience defined not on worlds, but on

maximally unified structures generally. Worlds are only one kind of maximally unified structure; their parts
instantiate fundamental qualitative properties. There are, I think, other maximally unified structures, namely, the
pure mathematical structures whose parts do not instantiate any fundamental qualitative properties. Let’s say then
that, roughly speaking, A-properties broadly globally supervene on the B-properties iff any two maximally unified
structures that are B-indiscernible are A-indiscernible. See footnote 129 above for the more standard and narrower
notion defined on worlds.
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A potential problem arises here.156 Suppose that worlds are unified by fundamental
qualitative external relations.157 But, as noted above, we should be able to completely server
these relations from an individual. If, however, we take away all the fundamental qualitative
external relations that connect my coffee mug to the rest of the world, the result should be a
world where a coffee mug is externally isolated from a coffee pot. But there are no worlds where
two things fail to stand in qualitative external relations (or chains of qualitative external
relations) to each other. For, by assumption, worlds are unified by fundamental qualitative
external relations. Recombination of the fundamental qualitative relations appears to take us
from a possibility to an impossibility. The necessary connections thesis thus appears to be false.
The problem depends upon the claim that if there is no world at which the fundamental
properties are arranged in a certain pattern, then it is not possible for the fundamental properties
to be arranged in that pattern. I think this claim is false. But something very much like it is true.
Instead, I accept the following: if there is no world or plurality of worlds at which the
fundamental properties are arranged in a certain pattern, then it is not possible for the
fundamental properties to be arranged in that pattern.158 I grant that there is no world where a
coffee mug is externally isolated from a coffee pot. But I contend that there is a plurality of
worlds—namely, a world otherwise exactly like our own which removes (duplicates of)
everything except my coffee mug and a world otherwise exactly like our own which only
removes (a duplicate of) my coffee mug—at which the fundamental properties are arranged in
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the desired pattern. So, when properly understood, the necessary connections thesis is not
violated.
We can capture the dual unity of the qualitative/non-qualitative distinction if we accept
both the causal and the necessary connections theses: the fundamental qualitative properties are
unified by their aptitude to play various causal roles, while the fundamental non-qualitative
properties are unified by the source of their resistance to recombination. This dual unity appears
to be reinforced by the following:
The Humean Link: a fundamental property plays a fundamental causal (or nomic) role
at some world if and only if it is subject to the true principles of recombination.
We can use this link to explain why the properties that ground causal powers are non-redundant.
For if any of these properties were redundant, then they would globally supervene upon each
other. But since these properties are subject to principles of recombination, they are guaranteed
not supervene upon each other. Hence, the properties that ground causal powers should be
nonredundant.
The positive account of the fundamental non-qualitative properties developed here,
unlike the positive account of the qualitative properties developed above, is not intended to be
metaphysically neutral. It is committed to the existence of worlds that differ qualitatively but not
structurally. For assume that unit positive and unit negative charge are fundamental determinates
of the same determinable. We have, as noted above, seen no reason to prohibit patterns of
recombination whereby unit positive and unit negative charge switch their causal and nomic
roles. There would thus seem to be worlds that differ from our own by a permutation of
fundamental qualitative properties (see Lewis 2009: 205-12). It thus fails to be neutral between
quidditism and structuralism.
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Its relationship to the debate between Humeans and anti-Humeans about laws and
causation is more complicated. Some anti-Humeans will deny the Humean assumption that the
properties that ground causal powers can be recombined. A causal essentialist might claim that
what it is to be charge is to play various causal roles and that these roles are holistically
interdefined. Some of the properties that ground causal powers would, on this view, be
interdependent and thus not subject to recombination. The causal essentialist might thus deny the
necessary connections thesis.
Other anti-Humeans can accept everything we have said—provided that they take their
relation of necessitation to be non-qualitative. Suppose that, as things stand, there aren’t any
deep causal connections between any events. Our world is instead one where causal successions
are nothing more than accidental regularities. The causal connections at our world are thin and
non-oomphy. Now consider another world, otherwise just like our own, where these regularities
are underwritten by irreducible relations of causal or lawful connection. These oomphy causal
connections cannot be imposed upon the world wily-nilly. They must respect its regularities and
thus resist recombination. I think that it is plausible to say, in this example, that our Humean
world of accidental regularities is qualitatively indiscernible from the non-Humean world with
irreducible causal connections. For there would be no way for us to tell which world we were in,
these worlds look exactly the same from the inside: causal or lawful connections are no more
qualitatively robust than accidental regularities. We might take these necessary connections to
provide the best explanation of some observed phenomenon, but they would not thereby be
observable or detectable in any way. The fundamental qualitative properties thus appear to
provide a Humean base that may sometimes be augmented with a non-Humean superstructure.
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The necessary connections thesis plausibly predicts that the irreducible causal connections that
make up this non-Humean superstructure are non-qualitative relations.
Does this violate the Humean link? It will do so only if these irreducible causal
connections are themselves apt to play causal roles. But these fundamental non-Humean
relations between events do not seem to be causing—or even apt to cause—anything at all. For if
they were, then they should be detectable. But it does not seem possible for there to be a device
that would be differently affected by their presence or absence. The necessitation relation is not
subject to principles of recombination, but neither is it apt to play causal roles. The Humean link
has not been violated. I take this to be an interesting and potentially satisfying result.

3.6 Applications
Let’s turn now to three philosophical applications of the view put forward above. The first
concerns the best way to formulate an account of ontological categories in terms of generality.159
The basic idea is that ontological categories are highly general classes. It might appear, at first
glance, that a class A is more general than a class B only if A contains B. But, upon further
inspection, containment is clearly not sufficient for generality. For while the gerrymandered class
of abstract objects and the Eiffel Tower contains the class of abstract objects, it is not obviously
more general than it (see Norton 1976: 107 and Westerhoff 2005: 25-6). An account of
generality must, it seems, make some appeal to the notion of broad naturalness.160 We might say,
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Westerhoff (2005: 26) takes the notion of naturalness to be obscure. He appeals instead to a notion of

dependence, which he officially defines as follows: B depends on A iff necessarily, if A is empty, then B is empty as
well (see Westerhoff 2002: 338, 2005: 27). But, as McDaniel (2017: 120) points out, this does not avoid the problem
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for example, that a class A is more general than a class B if (i) A contains B, and (ii) A is at least
as broadly natural as B.161
The main problem with accounts of ontological categories along these lines is that they
are plagued by what Jan Westerhoff (2002: 338, 2005: 35-8) calls the cut-off point problem.
There is a partial ordering of broadly natural classes by their generality. But since some
ontological categories can be more general than others, we cannot simply define ontological
categories as the topmost nodes in this ordering. Enter the cut-off point problem: How far down
this ordering can we go before the broadly natural classes cease to be ontological categories? The
trick is to rule out, say, the class of bosons from counting as an ontological category.
I think that the ontological categories are best understood not just as highly general
classes, but as highly general non-qualitative classes. This gives us a clear answer to the question
why being simple is an ontologically relevant feature while being a boson is not. For the class of
bosons, being qualitative, will not appear in a partial ordering of broadly natural non-qualitative
classes. I don’t think that the distinction between qualitative and non-qualitative properties will
make the cut-off problem go away, but I do think it makes it much less troubling. We might need
to make arbitrary choices about which broadly natural non-qualitative classes to concern
ourselves with when pursuing ontology, but we will no longer need to worry that ‘we do not
know what we are talking about’ (Westerhoff 2005: 37).

of gerrymandered classes: for it is necessary that if the class of abstract objects and the Eiffel Tower is empty, then
so is the class of abstract objects.
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entities is a highly general class. It does not, however, appear to contain any natural classes. See section 5.5 below.
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The second application concerns the soundness of some recent combinatorial arguments.
Take, for example, the argument put forward by Kris McDaniel (2007b: 136-7) and Theodore
Sider (2007: 52-3) for the possibility of extended simples. This argument proceeds, roughly, as
follows: location is a fundamental relation between material objects and regions of space; the
mereological structures of material objects and regions of space are intrinsic; but, since any
pattern of instantiation of a fundamental relation on non-overlapping, intrinsically-typed entities
is possible, it follows that it is possible for the location relation to hold between a simple material
object and a complex region of space. A related argument is put forward by Kris McDaniel
(2007b: 135-6) and Bradford Skow (2007: 116-17) for the view that shape is extrinsic. It
proceeds, roughly, as follows: location is a fundamental relation between material objects and
regions of space; any pattern of instantiation of a fundamental relation on non-overlapping,
intrinsically-typed entities is possible; but, since there are necessary connections between the
shapes of material objects and the shapes of the regions they occupy, it follows that material
objects do not have their shapes intrinsically. Note that even further arguments are put forward
by Raul Saucedo (2011) for far more exotic conclusions.
I have placed a principled restriction on the recombination principle appealed to in these
arguments. I claim that they will only be sound if location (or occupation) is a fundamental
qualitative relation. But there are, I think, two reasons to think that location is not detectable and,
hence, not a fundamental qualitative relation. First, there does not appear to be any way to
observe or otherwise detect whether material objects are distinct from the spatiotemporal regions
they occupy rather than simply identical to them. In other words, there seems to be no way to
detect whether dualistic substantivalism rather than supersubstantivalism is true. For if we could
tell that a material object was located at a region of spacetime, then we could tell that a material
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object was distinct from a region of spacetime. But that would mean that we could detect
whether or not the relation of identity held between them. Identity is, however, a fundamental
non-qualitative relation. It is, as such, not a relation we can detect. The second reason to think
that location is non-qualitative comes from considerations about the empirically undetectability
of absolute velocity. Here we must distinguish between relative and absolute velocity. The
relative velocity of a material object is its velocity relative to another material object, while the
absolute velocity of that object is—on a dualistic substantivalist picture—how fast that object is
really moving relative to spacetime. If location were detectable, then we would be able to detect
whether or not everything was moving at an absolute velocity of 5 kilometers per hour to the
west. But this is something we cannot detect.
A final application concerns the soundness of an argument put forward by Shamik
Dasgupta (2009, 2017) that there aren’t any primitive individuals, that is, that individuals do not
figure into the fundamental facts about the material world. The argument proceeds, roughly, as
follows: we have reason to think that, other things being equal, the structure of the material
world does not contain anything that is physically redundant and empirically undetectable; but—
just like absolute velocity—primitive individuals are both physically redundant and empirically
undetectable; therefore, we have good reason to doubt their reality.
I readily grant that we have reason to think that the fundamental qualitative structure of
the world is both detectable and non-redundant. I contend that our scientific theories seek to
explain the world’s qualitative structure. Absolute velocity was once assumed to be part of that
structure. When it was found to be physically redundant and empirically undetectable, it lost the
ability to play an explanatory role. We no longer had reason to appeal to it in our scientific
theories. But things are not equal in the case of primitive individuals. They are not assumed to be
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part of the world’s qualitative structure. So, I claim, a demonstration that they are physically
redundant and empirically undetectable should give us no reason to doubt their reality.

3.7 Conclusion
Let us take stock. I have argued that the traditional understanding of the non-qualitative
properties as haecceitistic is far too narrow. I have also argued that the dual-unity of the
qualitative/non-qualitative distinction is nicely captured by the following Humean picture:
The Causal Thesis: a fundamental property is qualitative if and only if it plays a
fundamental causal (or nomic) role at some world.
The Necessary Connections Thesis: a fundamental property is non-qualitative if and
only if it is not subject to the true principles of recombination.
The Humean Link: a fundamental property plays a fundamental causal (or nomic) role
at some world if and only if it is subject to the true principles of recombination.
I have not argued that this is the only way to capture the dual-unity of the distinction. But this
Humean picture gains strong—albeit indirect—support given both the intuitive dual-unity of the
distinction and the overall plausibility of the causal thesis.
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Chapter 4: Are There Individualistic Ways of Being?

Abstract: Haecceitistic fragmentationalism is, roughly, the view that there are haecceitistic
ways of being. It combines a belief in fundamental haecceities such as being Plato and being
Aristotle with a belief in ways of being. A haecceity, on this view, is not a complex property that
somehow has an individual as a constituent; it is simply an individualistic way of being: roughly,
a way of being that can only be enjoyed by one thing. I provide a brief motivation for this view
about the nature of haecceities. I then present two arguments against haecceitistic
fragmentationalism. I argue, first, that it does not sit well with the claim that actual entities enjoy
a way of being that is not enjoyed by merely possible entities; and, second, that it conflicts with a
plausible claim about the relation between ways of being and ontological categories. I conclude
that we should not believe in individualistic ways of being.

4.1 Introduction
Consider a world with a qualitative history no different from our own. There is a person in this
world who was born when and where you were born, who has lived a life just like your own.
This person is, both intrinsically and extrinsically, exactly like you in every qualitative respect.
But must this person be you? Perhaps not. It seems plausible to claim that any purely objective,
purely qualitative description of a world must leave out something of subjective importance:
namely, whether and where you are to be found in that world. It thus seems possible for there to
be a world that is qualitatively no different from our own where you have been ‘replaced’ by
someone who does not actually exist.
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You and your doppelgänger replacement would be perfect indiscernible duplicates. Yet,
for all your qualitative similarities, there is a peculiarly non-qualitative difference between you:
you enjoy different fundamental haecceities. Your haecceity is, roughly, a kind of one over
many, the enjoyment of which is both necessary and sufficient for being you.162 But what exactly
are haecceities? An account of the nature of haecceities should, I think, be importantly neutral
with respect to the nature and metaphysics of modality.163 But if that’s right, then haecceities
cannot merely be, as David Lewis (1986: 229) points out, non-qualitative properties that cannot
be had by more than one individual.164 For assuming that there is a plurality of concrete possible
worlds populated by individuals that wholly belong to at most one world and that there is a
property for every set or class of these possible individuals, there will be an abundance of such
properties. Take, for example, the property corresponding to your unit set. This non-qualitative
property is had by exactly one individual at exactly one possible world. But while you have it,
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of the nature of haecceities—or, perhaps better, of the nature of fundamental haecceities—that is theoretically
neutral. If you are wholly present at different worlds, then we can say that an individual is you if and only if that
individual is identical to you. But if we take haecceities seriously and take your haecceity to be fundamental, then
we will probably want to say that it is because a possible individual enjoys your haecceity that that individual is—or
is identical to—you. A haecceity is, thus, a kind of particularized—or particularizing—universal, a one over many
where the many might themselves be one. (See footnote 176 below.)
163

Indeed, it is because I think that we should strive for a theoretically neutral account of the nature of haecceities

that I take Lewis’s (1986: 229) argument against combining an account of fundamental haecceities with modal
realism without overlap to threaten the intelligibility of the very notion of a haecceity itself.
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your doppelgänger does not. Or take, for another example, the property corresponding to the
gerrymandered class of you at this world and my counterparts at worlds where you have been
replaced by a doppelgänger. This non-qualitative property is never had by more than one
individual at any given world.165 But while you have it, your doppelgängers do not. The problem
with these properties is that they don’t seem to make for any kind of haecceitistic similarity
between their instances. Haecceities must, then, be special in some way. But, as Lewis goes on to
point out, they can’t be special in the way that the perfectly natural qualitative properties and
relations are special. For they don’t carve along the qualitative joints and they don’t seem to
ground causal powers.166 Indeed, they don’t even seem to be observable or detectable at all. We
thus appear to be left without a principled way to distinguish the allegedly special, sparse
haecceitistic properties from the merely abundant ones. But if that’s right, then we should be
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select a counterpart relation and a class of worlds such that I never have more than one counterpart at any of these
worlds. I am assuming that this can be done.
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ground objective similarity, they are supposed to ground causal powers, and there are only supposed to be ‘enough
of them to characterize things completely and without redundancy’ (1986: 60). This gives us a fairly narrow
conception of naturalness.
A broader conception would, I think, simply take a property to be perfectly natural (or fundamental)
whenever it is an ultimate bearer of objective similarity. The perfectly natural non-qualitative properties and
relations would then be whichever properties or relations, if any, that make for objective similarity but don’t ground
causal powers and might admit of various redundancies. I believe that actuality, composition, identity, parthood, set
membership, as well as various other mathematical properties and relations are all fundamental and non-qualitative.
I argued for this in chapter 3 above.
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forced to admit that the notion of a fundamental haecceity is completely and utterly
mysterious.167
Kris McDaniel (2017: 193-4) has recently put forward the intriguing suggestion that
haecceities are individualistic ways of being: roughly, ways of being that can only be enjoyed by
one thing. Haecceities will, on this view, be special in the same way that other ways of being are
special, not by carving along the qualitative joints or by grounding causal powers, but by
underwriting various ontological similarities and differences between things. My concept of my
own haecceity—of being exactly ontologically like me and me alone at my world—will be much
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at least two ways to interpret Lewis’s claim that fundamental haecceities are mysterious. The first is stipulative: talk
of ‘the joints in nature’ is simply talk of ‘the qualitative joints’. Thus talk of non-qualitative joints is a contradiction
in terms. Lewis does seem to suggest that objective similarity is qualitative in nature. He thinks, for example, that
the problem with unnatural properties is that ‘[t]hey pay no heed to the qualitative joints, but carve things up every
which way’ (1986: 59, emphasis added), and that the ‘[s]haring of [the perfectly natural, or sparse, properties] makes
for qualitative similarity’ (1986: 60, emphasis added). But the problem with this interpretation is that, as Russell
points out, ‘if this is how Lewis understands “qualitative”, then he has subtly changed the subject’ (2015: 419).
A second way to interpret Lewis, which Russell prefers, is based on an appeal to parsimony: the problem
with fundamental haecceities is not that they are contradictory, but that they are an unnecessary piece of
metaphysical machinery. Thus, given that we should only believe in enough fundamental notions to characterize
reality completely and without redundancy, we should not believe in fundamental haecceities. But the problem with
this interpretation is that it does not square well with Lewis’s claim that ‘[t]here is no way to make sense of a
[fundamental haecceity]’ (1986: 230).
I instead follow Cowling in taking the problem to be one of intelligibility: we have, on this interpretation,
no principled way of distinguishing the fundamental haecceities from the non-fundamental haecceities. Thus, it is
entirely mysterious what it could mean to say that there are fundamental haecceities.
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the same as my concept of actuality: namely of being exactly ontologically like me and
everything else at my world. Haecceities thus appear to be no more—or no less—mysterious than
other ways of being.168
McDaniel arrives at this account of the nature of haecceities by, first, assuming that there
are individualistic ways of being and, then, noting that given certain assumptions about their
modal profiles, they will play the role that haecceities are supposed to play and so might
plausibly be identified with them.169 But while he might have shown how we could take
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We do not, however, have access to the haecceity of every possible individual. For a way of being, given its

elusive and causally-inefficacious nature, is only intelligible to us insofar as it is the way of being enjoyed by all and
only the entities that are exactly ontologically like some specified collection of entities. We appear best suited to
grasp our own haecceities: I can, for example, pick out myself and myself alone at our world and then move to
conceive of entities that are ontologically just like me, that enjoy all the same fundamental ways of being. My
concept of my own haecceity is, thus, that of being exactly ontologically like me and me alone at my world. We can
also form, at least in principle, the concept of any of the haecceities enjoyed by any of the entities that are present at
our world: I can, for example, form the concept of Socrates’ haecceity as the concept of being exactly ontologically
like Socrates and Socrates alone at my world. But we lack, I think, any understanding of every haecceity that is not
enjoyed by any of individuals present at our world. Take, for example, being Gandalf which we can suppose is had
by some but not all of the possible individuals that play the Gandalf role described in J. R. R. Tolkien’s novels.
Given that worlds can differ haecceitistically without differing qualitatively, we appear to lack the conceptual
resources to pick Gandalf—rather than one of his doppelgängers—out descriptively. And, given that Gandalf enjoys
a haecceity that is not enjoyed by any of the individuals that are present at our world, we won’t be able to pick
him—or anyone exactly ontologically like him—out directly. These alien haecceities are, and must remain,
completely and utterly mysterious to us.
169

McDaniel here relies upon two assumptions about the modal relations between an individual and its

individualistic way of being: namely, that an individual which enjoys an individualistic way of being will, as a
matter of necessity, enjoy that way of being if it enjoys any way of being at all, and that, as a matter of necessity,
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individualistic ways of being to be haecceities, he didn’t provide any motivation for believing
that there are individualistic ways of being in the first place.170 I will attempt to provide this
motivation, in section 4.2, by proceeding in the opposite direction. I will begin by assuming that
there are fundamental haecceities and will then attempt to show how we might plausibly take
them to be individualistic ways of being. With this ontological account of the nature of
haecceities in place, we can motivate a belief in individualistic ways of being by motivating a
belief in fundamental non-qualitative haecceities. We can thus provide a plausible motivation for
the view that there are individualistic ways of being.171 I do not, however, believe that this view
can ultimately be maintained, and will present two arguments against it. I will argue, in section
4.3, that the existence of fundamental haecceities does not sit well with the possibility of there

anything which enjoys that way of being will be identical to that individual. These assumptions appear to require the
additional assumption of overlap: namely, that some individuals are wholly present at more than one world. For
without this assumption it is difficult to see how anything that enjoys my individualistic way of being could be
strictly speaking identical to me. McDaniel’s motivation for the identification of individualistic ways of being with
fundamental haecceities thus appears to require a substantive assumption about the metaphysics of modality and
thereby appears to lack theoretical neutrality. It can only be endorsed by someone who accepts overlap.
170

This is not intended as a criticism. For McDaniel’s remarks on individualistic ways of being are purely

exploratory. His intention is not to show that there are such ways of being, but simply to explore a variety of
proposals on which persons might turn out to enjoy a fundamental way of being. The view that each person enjoys a
fundamental individualistic way of being is both the most radical and the most tentative of these proposals.
171

I would have called this view ‘individualistic fragmentationalism’ if McDaniel had not already given that name

to the view that each person enjoys an individualistic way of being. For the view described by McDaniel is a species
of the more general view that there are individualistic ways of being, and it is this more general view which is, I
believe, better deserving of the title ‘individualistic fragmentationalism’, while the view to which McDaniel actually
gives that name might, I think, be more aptly described as ‘personalistic fragmentationalism’.
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being different parts of actuality which are importantly isolated from each other, so-called ‘island
universes’. For given that actual entities enjoy a way of being that is not enjoyed by merely
possible entities, the best way to capture the possibility of island universes is to hold that every
plurality of worlds represents a genuine possibility; but since there will be fundamental
haecceities only if some pluralities of worlds—namely, those pluralities of worlds which contain
different individuals sharing the same haecceity—do not represent genuine possibilities, we
should not believe in fundamental haecceities. I will then argue, in section 4.4, that the existence
of individualistic ways of being conflicts with a plausible claim about the relation between ways
of being and ontological categories: namely, that for every way of being, there is a corresponding
ontological category.172 For given this claim, there will be individualistic ways of being only if
there are individualistic ontological categories; but since we should not believe in individualistic
ontological categories, we should not believe in individualistic ways of being either. These
arguments, while independent of each other, together constitute a dilemma: the most plausible
response to the first argument is ruled out by the second, and vice versa. The collective force of
these arguments gives us strong reason to believe that we do not, in fact, enjoy individualistic
ways of being.
I should lay out some background assumptions before we proceed.173 I will assume
ontological pluralism—or pluralism about being—the view that there are different fundamental
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Note that while I believe this claim to be plausible, it is not entirely uncontroversial (see footnote 192 below).

173

These assumptions will play a significant role in the arguments to follow. They are admittedly controversial. Yet

they cannot be easily resisted by the proponent of individualistic ways of being. For no one should believe in
individualistic ways of being who does not already have reason to believe in some other ways of being. But, I think,
anyone who has reason to believe in ways of being should believe that there is an importantly ontological difference
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ways of being. The primary motivation for this view, as I see it, is the recognition of various
non-qualitative ontological differences between certain entities. The foremost such difference is,
I believe, the difference between the actual and the merely possible.174 For while an actual and a
merely possible dollar might be perfect—perhaps even indiscernible—qualitative duplicates,
there would still seem to be an importantly objective and peculiarly ontological difference
between them: one is actual, the other is merely possible. Ways of being thus appear to be a kind
of ontological one over many: the class of all and only the entities which enjoy a fundamental
way of being forms a highly natural class; it is unified by a fundamental way of being. These
fundamental ways of being carve at the ontological joints and ground objective, albeit nonqualitative, similarities between things. But, unlike universals (or the perfectly natural qualitative
properties that we might accept in their stead), they do not play any causal roles and are not
observable at all.
I shall work within a broadly modal realist framework supplemented with absolute
actuality (see Bricker 2001, 2006, 2008). I will assume that our world is but one of a vast
plurality of concrete possible worlds. These worlds each form internally unified wholes and are
importantly isolated from each other. They are, moreover, populated by various possible
individuals. I believe that none of these possible individuals are wholly present at more than one
world, but I will be officially neutral between modal realism with and modal realism without

between the actual and the merely possible; and, I claim, anyone who believes this should be a modal realist. Thus it
seems that anyone who believes in ways of being should also be a modal realist.
174

I thus wholeheartedly agree with Etienne Gilson (1949: 3), who claims that ‘the very first and the most universal

of all the distinctions in the realm of being is that which divides it into two classes, that of the real and that of the
possible’.
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overlap. I will also assume that there is a genuine, objective difference between those worlds and
individuals that are actual and those that are not: only actual entities enjoy actuality, which is a
fundamental way of being. Thus, an object’s status as actual is not, as David Lewis would have
it, a mere matter of its belonging to our world even if our concept of that object’s actuality is—
and cannot be other than—that of its being of the same ontological kind as our world and
everything in it. This framework should be quite congenial to anyone who holds that actual
entities enjoy a way of being that is not enjoyed by merely possible entities. Indeed, given that
the difference between the actual and the merely possible is one of the most widely recognized
ontological differences and given, as I think seems plausible, that the best way to make sense of
this difference is to accept modal realism with absolute actuality, the ontological pluralist should
be a modal realist.175

4.2 Haecceitistic fragmentationalism
Ontological pluralists believe in different ways of being. But what could motivate a pluralist to
believe in individualistic ways of being? For while it might seem as if there are fundamental nonqualitative, haecceitistic differences between certain individuals (such, perhaps, as the difference
between you and your doppelgänger) and thus fundamental haecceities which underwrite these
differences, they do not themselves immediately appear to be ontological. There are, however, at
least three reasons to think that haecceities are themselves ways of being. I will call these the
analogical, ideological, and Montagovian motivations.
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McDaniel (2017: 73-5) also seems to think that the best way to make sense of this ontological difference is to

accept some form of modal realism with absolute actuality.

132

Let’s begin with the analogical motivation. Haecceities appear to be interestingly similar
to ways of being. For just as being actual is a non-qualitative way of being a possible entity,
being Socrates is also a non-qualitative way of being a possible entity. Thus, insofar as we take
this to be a reason to think of being actual as a way of being, we should also take it as a reason to
think of being Socrates as a way of being. This analogy is suggestive, but it is by no means
decisive. Its strength will ultimately depend upon the strength and success of the following
motivations.
Let’s turn, next, to the ideological motivation. Haecceities—along with universals and
ways of being—appear to be a kind of one over many. But fundamental haecceities, like
fundamental ways of being and unlike universals, do not carve at the qualitative joints or ground
causal powers. They do, however, carve at the haecceitistic joints and, much like ways of being,
ground objective, albeit non-qualitative, similarities. So, for example, being Socrates appears to
underwrite a peculiarly haecceitistic similarity between individuals at different worlds. 176 This
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I take this claim to be available both to those who accept and to those who reject modal realism with overlap. If,

on the one hand, possible individuals are wholly present at multiple worlds, then it might turn out that the
individuals who enjoy Socrates’ haecceity are all identical to each other: that is, it might turn out that, for any two
individuals, those individuals enjoy the same haecceity iff those individuals are identical to each other. But, if we
take haecceities seriously, we won’t say that these individuals enjoy the same haecceities because they are identical,
rather we will say that they are identical because they enjoy the same haecceity. A haecceity, on this view, will be a
kind of particularizing universal, which somehow explains why certain individuals in different worlds are identical
to each other.
If, on the other hand, no possible individuals are wholly present at more than one world, then it might turn
out that two individuals can enjoy the same haecceity without being identical to each other. Different individuals at
different worlds will be non-qualitative counterparts of each other in virtue of their enjoying the same haecceity. A
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suggests the possibility of an ideological reduction: where there seemed to be two basic notions,
that of a haecceity and that of a way of being, there is really only one. We cannot, I think,
plausibly reduce the notion of a way of being to that of a haecceity. For we cannot plausibly take
actuality to be perspicuously expressed as the disjunction of the haecceities of all actual
individuals, since actuality appears to be unified and non-disjunctive. Nor can we take our status
as actual to be expressed as our being a part of an entity with a particular haecceity, since
actuality does not appear to be relational. But we might plausibly attempt to reduce the notion of
a haecceity to that of a way of being.177 A haecceity, on this account, would just be a special kind
of way of being: namely, an individualistic one. A theory that can explain similar phenomena—
in this case, haecceitistic and ontological differences—with a single basic notion is ideologically
leaner than, and thereby preferable to, one that would require two. Thus, if we already accept
ontological pluralism, we might take this as a reason to hold that haecceities are individualistic
ways of being.
Let’s turn, finally, to the Montagovian motivation. Haecceities appear to be importantly
connected to proper names, and proper names are sometimes taken to be quantifiers.178 So, if we
believe in fundamental haecceities, we might take the proper names connected to these

haecceity, on this view, will be a kind of particularized universal. It will be a universal since it will account for a
special kind of similarity between individuals. But, unlike other universals, it will be particularized: there will be no
possibility—no possible world or possible plurality of worlds—at which more than one individual enjoys the same
haecceity. But it won’t, on this account, be a particularizing universal: it won’t do anything to make otherwise
disparate individuals identical to each other.
177

I will challenge the plausibility of this reduction in section 4.4 below.

178

The suggestion that proper names are generalized quantifiers was first put forward by Richard Montague (1973).

See Barwise and Cooper (1981: 164-6) and Peters and Westerståhl (2006: 93-5) for helpful discussion.
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haecceities to themselves be fundamental quantifiers. But then, assuming that fundamental
quantifiers express fundamental ways of being, it will turn out that fundamental haecceities and
the proper names connected to them will correspond to fundamental, individualistic ways of
being. Thus, if we incline toward the quantificational pluralism of Kris McDaniel (2009, 2010b,
2017) and Jason Turner (2010, 2012, forthcoming), we might take this to give us strong reason to
believe that haecceities are individualistic ways of being.
There appears, then, to be sufficient motivation to take this ontological account of the
nature of haecceities seriously. If we do, we can motivate a belief in individualistic ways of
being by motivating the more familiar belief in fundamental non-qualitative haecceities.179 It
would thus seem to be advantageous to motivate the view that there are individualistic ways of
being by adopting and motivating the following:
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As I see it, the primary motivation for a belief in fundamental non-qualitative haecceities comes from the

intuition about subjectivity with which we began. For it seems that any purely objective, qualitative description of a
world must ultimately leave out all the fundamentally subjective facts about where and whether I am to be found in
that world. But if that’s right and there are qualitatively indiscernible worlds that differ with respect to where and
whether I am, then there would seem to need to be some kind of fundamental non-qualitative haecceities in order to
account for these differences. See McDaniel (2017: 186-9) for a discussion of this argument. Similar arguments can
be found in Nagel (1983: 223), Swinburne (1995: 396), Bricker (2008: 130), and Cowling (2017b: 4181-2).
McDaniel (2017: 189) ultimately sets this argument aside not because it doesn’t motivate a belief in
fundamental non-qualitative haecceities, but because it doesn’t ensure that persons are themselves the bearers of
these fundamental haecceities. For, as he points out, although my haecceity might fail to supervene on the
distribution of fundamental qualitative properties and relations, it might nevertheless supervene on the distribution
of the haecceities of my parts. But if my haecceity supervenes on the distribution of the haecceities of my parts, then
it is not guaranteed to be fundamental. Thus, McDaniel seems to think that while the argument shows that there are
fundamental non-qualitative haecceities, it does not show that I am guaranteed to have one.
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Haecceitistic fragmentationalism is the view that
i.

there are fundamental non-qualitative haecceities, and

ii.

these haecceities are individualistic ways of being.

We have arrived, then, at what I take to be the best version of the view that there are
individualistic ways of being. There are, however, two serious problems that must be addressed
by any version of such a view. The first problem arises due to the nature of actuality. Let’s turn
to it now.

4.3 The argument from island universes
Our world and everything in it is actual. Yet it seems intelligible to suppose that this is not the
full extent of actuality. We can, I think, imagine there being another part of actuality out there,
importantly disconnected from our own. But if worlds are internally unified by various natural
relations as has more or less been traditionally maintained, this other part of actuality will not be
part of our world.180 It thus seems possible for actuality to be made up of isolated parts, so-called
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Leibniz ([1710] 1985: 128/ G VI 107) essentially defined ‘world’ twice over. His official definition focuses on

the idea of the totality of actual or existent entities:
I call ‘World’ the whole succession and the whole agglomeration of all existent things, lest it be said that
several worlds could have existed in different times and different places. For they must needs be reckoned
all together as one world or, if you will, as one Universe.
But Leibniz also thinks that the totality of existent entities forms an interconnected whole.
For it must be known that all things are connected in each one of the possible worlds: the universe,
whatever it may be, is all of one piece, like an ocean: the least movement extends its effect there to any
distance whatsoever, even though this effect become less perceptible in proportion to the distance.
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‘island universes’. But if we accept the possibility of island universes, as I think we should, we
cannot accept the standard analysis of possibility as truth at a world. For there is no world at
which it is true that there are island universes. There is, however, a simple and natural way to
accommodate this possibility within a modal realist framework. If we supplement that
framework with absolute actuality, then, as Phillip Bricker (2001) has shown, we don’t need to
modify the traditional definition of a world as a maximally unified whole. We only need to take
possibility to involve plural rather than singular quantification over worlds: something is
possible, on this revised analysis, iff it is true at a world or at some plurality of worlds.181 We

He thus provides the seeds to what would become the traditional definition of ‘world’ in the Leibnizian school. So,
for example, Wolff claims that ‘the world is a series of changeable things that are next to each other and follow upon
each other, but, in general, are connected to each other’ ([1719] 2009: §544) and that ‘[a] series of finite beings that
are simultaneous as well as successive and connected among themselves is called a world, or also a universe’ (1731:
§48, trans. Courtney D. Fugate and John Hymers); and Baumgarten defines a world as ‘a series (multitude, whole)
of actual and finite beings that is not part of another’ ([1739] 2013: §354). This definition was even taken up by
some of their Pietist opponents. So, for example, Crusius says that ‘a world is a real connection of finite things that
are not in turn themselves a part of another to which they belong by means of a real connection. Or: a world is a
system of finite and really connected things that is not in turn itself contained in another system’ ([1745] 2009:
§350).
These definitions can also be found in McTaggart (1921: 147-8), who calls the definition of a universe as ‘a
substance which contains all content’, the definition by content, and the definition of a universe as ‘a substance of
which all other substances are parts’, the definition by relation.
181

We cannot get the desired result simply by adopting the revised analysis. For suppose I assert: “Island universes

exist”. My utterance appears to have a determinate truth-value. But it is false when evaluated at our world alone and
true when evaluated at any plurality of worlds which includes our own. We need absolute actuality to resolve the
threat of indeterminacy. See Bricker (2001: 41-3) for further details.
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should, as pluralists who believe that actual entities enjoy a way of being that is not enjoyed by
merely possible entities, be happy to accept the possibility of island universes. For, as the preCritical Kant ([1770] 1992: Ak. 2:408) pointed out, there is nothing in the traditional concept of
a world which precludes multiple worlds from being actual. Nor, I would add, is there anything
in our concept of actuality—that is, our concept of something’s being of the same ontological
kind as everything at our world—which limits the potential extent of actuality to our world
alone. If we take these observations seriously and thereby take maximal possibilities to
correspond not simply to ways a world could be, but to ways actuality could be, then we had
better not restrict ourselves, in our analysis of possibility, to singular quantification over worlds.
We should reject the standard analysis. But if, in addition to believing that there is a special way
of being that actual entities enjoy, we also believe in fundamental haecceities or individualistic
ways of being, we cannot straightforwardly accept the revised analysis as it stands. For assuming
that I am wholly present at this world and this world alone, none of the other individuals at other
worlds who share my haecceity and, likewise, enjoy my individualistic way of being will be,
strictly speaking, identical to me. But if we consider any plurality of two or more worlds that
each contain someone who shares my haecceity, it will be true at this plurality of worlds that
there are distinct individuals who enjoy my haecceity. And then, by the revised analysis, it will
be possible for distinct individuals to enjoy the same haecceity. This would, however, appear to
be impossible. For haecceities, by their very nature, can only be enjoyed by one thing; there is no
possibility—no possible world and no possible plurality of worlds—at which more than one
individual enjoys the same haecceity. Thus, if we are to believe in fundamental haecceities or
individualistic ways of being, we had better insist that some pluralities of worlds fail to represent
genuine possibilities.
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We might, in an effort to accommodate a belief in fundamental haecceities, attempt to
restrict the revised analysis to pluralities of worlds that are haecceitistically distinct (where
worlds are haecceitistically distinct when none of the individuals that exist at those worlds share
a fundamental haecceity). But there does not seem to be a plausible way to do so. If, on the one
hand, we were to restrict the analysis directly by saying that something is possible iff it is true at
some world or some plurality of haecceitistically distinct worlds, the resulting analysis would
either be circular or else mired in primitive modality. For to say that a plurality of worlds is
haecceitistically distinct is to say that none of the individuals that exist at those worlds share a
fundamental haecceity, and to say that something is a fundamental haecceity is to say that it is a
fundamental non-qualitative property—or, as the haecceitistic fragmentationalist would have it, a
fundamental way of being—that cannot be had or enjoyed by more than one individual.182 If, on
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I take the concept of a haecceity to be inherently modal. There are, after all, clearly true modal claims about

haecceities: it is, for example, not possible for more than one individual to enjoy being Socrates. But it is one thing
to assert that there are true modal claims about haecceities and quite another to assert that our concept of a haecceity
is itself modal. So why should we accept the latter assertion? These true modal claims about haecceities must, I
think, be somehow grounded in or otherwise explained by the nature of a haecceity itself. This explanation needn’t
be modal if we understand haecceities in terms of identity. If, for example, we understand Socrates’ haecceity in
terms of his being identical to Socrates, then there seems to be an obviously non-modal explanation for why it is not
possible for more than one individual to enjoy Socrates’ haecceity: namely, that if another individual enjoys
Socrates’ haecceity, that individual will thereby be identical to Socrates, and thus it is not possible for distinct
individuals to share Socrates’ haecceity. But if we understand the nature of a haecceity in this way, we cannot
describe the intuitive phenomenon of haecceitistic similarity in a way that is properly theoretically and
metaphysically neutral. We would need to then assume either that the relevant individuals are wholly present at
more than one world or else that haecceities cannot be enjoyed by individuals at different worlds, that is, we would
either need to give up any hope of theoretical and metaphysical neutrality or else we would have to deny the
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the other hand, we were to restrict the analysis indirectly by assuming that there are qualitative
limits on fundamental haecceities and prohibiting pluralities of worlds that violate these limits,
the resulting analysis would be extensionally inadequate. For if I must have a certain qualitative
character and we were to exclude from our analysis pluralities of worlds which contain multiple
individuals that share this qualitative character, then we would be forced to say that, despite its
apparent plausibility, it is simply not possible for there to be another part of actuality which is
qualitatively very much like our own.183 The costs of placing haecceitistic restrictions on the
potential extent of actuality are just too high. Thus, unless we intend to deny the possibility of
island universes altogether, we should accept the revised analysis and hold that every plurality of
worlds represents a genuine possibility.
I have argued that there are fundamental non-qualitative haecceities only if some
pluralities of worlds do not represent genuine possibilities; but since we should believe that every
plurality of worlds represents a genuine possibility, we should not believe in fundamental
haecceities. We have seen that the only plausible way for the haecceitistic fragmentationalist to
reject the revised analysis of possibility, and thus the premise that every plurality of worlds
represents a genuine possibility, would be to deny that island universes are possible. But what
should we make of the premise that the revised analysis of possibility is incompatible with the

intuitive, pre-theoretical phenomenon of haecceitistic similarity. I think that the only way to avoid this problem is to
take our concept of a fundamental haecceity to irreducibly modal: to be a fundamental haecceity is to be a
fundamental non-qualitative property—or a fundamental way of being—that cannot be had or enjoyed by more than
one individual.
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I find, for example, the possibility of duplicate island universes to be fairly compelling. I think there could be

another part of reality out there that is exactly qualitatively like our own. But if we exclude pluralities of worlds
containing individuals that are qualitatively very much alike, then duplicate island universe will not be possible.
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existence of fundamental non-qualitative haecceities? The case for this incompatibility turned on
two assumptions: the assumption that no individual is wholly present at more than one world,
and the assumption that fundamental non-qualitative haecceities can only be had by one thing. If
we took the revised analysis to be compatible with the existence of fundamental non-qualitative
haecceities, we would need to challenge one of these assumptions.
Let’s start with the assumption that no individual is wholly present at more than one
world. We might combine the denial of this assumption with modal realism in order to arrive at
some form of modal realism with overlap. I will focus here on the substantivialist version of
modal realism with overlap defended in McDaniel (2004), but supplemented with absolute
actuality and modified in order to accommodate the possibility of island universes.184 Worlds, on
this view, are maximal spatiotemporally related regions of spacetime. They are distinct from
their material occupants, which belong to a fundamentally different ontological category. These
material occupants exist at a world (or at some plurality of worlds) by being wholly present at
some region which is part of that world (or of one of those worlds), but they are not strictly
speaking parts of the worlds they occupy. I am wholly present, on this view, at more than one
world. But then there will be pluralities of worlds where I am wholly present at each of the
worlds among that plurality. It will thus be possible for me to be wholly present in multiple
disconnected regions of spacetime, none of which bear any spatiotemporal, causal, or other
natural relations to each other. There will, however, only be one individual at this plurality of
worlds who enjoys my haecceity: namely, me. The modal realist who accepts overlap might
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The view I have in mind here is not discussed in McDaniel (2006). It is to the substantivialist view that he calls

MRO, what his MRO3 is to his trope-theoretic MRO2.
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therefore claim that pluralities of worlds that fail to be haecceitistically distinct represent
spatiotemporally disjointed careers for various individuals.185
A potential dilemma arises for modal realism with overlap when it is supplemented with
absolute actuality. For either we are directly actual or else we inherit our actuality from the
regions we occupy. If, on the one hand, we are directly actual, then our actuality will not be
world-relative. We will be absolutely actual. But since we are wholly present in non-actual
worlds, there would seem to be worlds where some things are actual and other things are merely
possible. Yet, as Phillip Bricker (2001: 44-5) observes, it is unintelligible to suppose that we
might find something nonactual if we just traveled to a remote enough corner of the world. For it
appears to be constitutive of the concept of actuality that is pervasive: if anything that is wholly
present at a world is absolutely actual, then everything that is wholly present at that world is
absolutely actual. And if, on the other hand, we are only indirectly actual in virtue of occupying a
region of spacetime that is itself directly actual, then our actuality will be world-relative. But if
our actuality is world-relative, then, insofar as actuality itself is ultimately absolute and nonrelative, we cannot be the primary bearers of actuality. We are actual, on this view, only
derivatively. That is a problem, in part, because I should not be able to coherently doubt my own
actuality. Yet if it is indeed alienated from me in this way and I am not a primary bearer of
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McDaniel (2006: 322) notes that this is a bizarre result, which he is prepared to grant if need be. But he also notes

that we could avoid this result, if we so desired, by claiming that:
A proposition is possibly true just in case it is true at some worlds, the ws, such that if there is more than
one of the ws, then there is no object, x, that is wholly present at more than one of the ws.
This would give the modal realist who accepts overlap a way to claim that pluralities of worlds which fail to be
haecceitistically distinct do not represent genuine possibilities, and thus to restrict the revised analysis without
invoking primitive modality.
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actuality, then it won’t be part of my concept of actuality that I am actual, and I will, therefore,
be able to coherently doubt this fact. Thus, when modal realism with overlap is supplemented
with absolute actuality it either lapses into incoherence or else becomes vulnerable to the threat
of skepticism. I leave it to the reader to determine whether—and to what extent—this should
count against the acceptance of overlap.
Let’s turn next to the assumption that fundamental non-qualitative haecceities can only be
had by one individual. Whether we accept this assumption will largely depend on how we think
objects persist through time (where something persists through time whenever it, somehow or
another, exists at various times). If we accept endurantism (or three-dimensionalism), the view
that objects persist by being wholly present at different times,186 or if we accept perdurantism (or
the worm view), the view that objects persist by having different temporal parts, or stages, at
different times,187 then we will likely accept this assumption. But if we accept exdurantism (or
the stage view), the view that objects persist by having temporal counterparts at different
times,188 then we will likely reject the assumption. For, on this view, it is most natural to say that
my stages—and not the worm composed of them—enjoy my haecceity, and that these stages are
my non-qualitative temporal counterparts in virtue of their enjoying my haecceity. But then it
will be possible, by the stage theorist’s lights, for multiple individuals to enjoy the same
haecceity. The stage theorist might thus claim that pluralities of worlds that fail to be
haecceitistically distinct represent radically disjointed careers for various individuals.
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Endurantists include Thomson (1965, 1983), Haslanger (1989, 2003), and van Inwagen (1990a, 1990b).

187

Perdurantists include Quine (1950), Heller (1984, 1990), and Lewis (1986: 202-4).
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Exdurantists include Sider (1996, 2001) and Hawley (2001). The term ‘exdurantism’ was coined by Sally

Haslanger (2003).
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The problem with this response is that it threatens the intelligibility of our notion of a
fundamental haecceity. We cannot say, on this view, that only one thing can have the same
fundamental haecceity. For lots of different person stages enjoy my haecceity. Nor can we say
that only one thing at any given time can have the same fundamental haecceity. For it seems that
I could travel back in time to meet my younger self. But if this is possible, then given this
combination of stage theory with fundamental haecceities, it is also possible for two distinct
individuals to share the same fundamental haecceity at the same time. If my future self has not
traveled back in time and is not currently living in the present, then I might be lucky enough to
form a conception of my haecceity as being exactly ontologically like me and me alone at the
present time. But we lose all sense of what it is that makes this way of being individualistic. It’s
not that only one thing can have it. It’s not that only one thing can have it at any given time. So
it’s not clear that we really understand it at all. But if that’s right, if haecceities are unintelligibly
individualistic, then they are not something we can rationally believe in. Thus, the haecceitistic
fragmentationalist won’t be able to avoid the initial charge that fundamental haecceities, and thus
individualistic ways of being, are completely and utterly mysterious after all.
The haecceitistic fragmentationalist’s best response to the problem of island universes is,
thus, to accept some version of modal realism with overlap. But, as I will argue in the next
section, if the haecceitistic fragmentationalist accepts overlap, then she will be unable to avoid a
second problem which arises for her view given a plausible claim about the relation between
ways of being and ontological categories.
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4.4 The argument from ontological categories
There is an old philosophical tradition of associating different ways of being with different
ontological categories.189 The seeds of this tradition can be found in some remarks from
Aristotle, and according to some commentators, is Aristotle’s own view.190 But how exactly
should we understand the nature of the connection between the different ways of being and the
various ontological categories?
I do not intend to suggest, as McDaniel (2010a: 634, 2017: 122-7) does, that entities
belong to the same ontological category just in case they enjoy the same way of being.191 For I
believe that two entities could enjoy all the same ways of being and yet still belong to different
ontological categories. So, for example, I see no reason to think that simples and composites
enjoy different ways of being even though they might plausibly be said to belong to different
ontological categories. I do, however, claim that in virtue of their peculiarly ontological
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See McDaniel (2017: 122-4) for references to—and a brief discussion of—some of the adherents of this tradition.
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See, for example, Aristotle’s Metaphysics Δ.7, 1017a22-31; E.2, 1026a33-b2; Z.1, 1028a10-15; Θ.10, 1051a34-

b2; and N.2, 1089a7-14. For discussion, see Brentano ([1862] 1975), Ross (1924: 306-8), Frede (1987: 41-4), Witt
(1989: 41-4), Kirwan (1993: 140-3) and Loux (2012: 23-4).
191

McDaniel (2017: 124) sometimes suggests that entities belonging to the same ontological category not only enjoy

all the same ways of being, but that ‘there are as many possible perfectly natural meanings for “being” as there are
ontological categories’. Thus, for every ontological category, there is a fundamental way of being enjoyed by all and
only the entities belonging to that category. But the resulting claim is too strong. For, as Bernard Bolzano ([1837]
2014a: 402/ WL 1: §118, 558) observed, there appear to be negative categories such as the non-actual (or the merely
possible). There need not, however, be a corresponding fundamental way of being enjoyed by all and only merely
possible entities. The realm of the merely possible might, unlike that of the actual or the possible, simply lack
positive unity.
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differences, entities that enjoy different ways of being belong to different ontological categories,
and assume that for every way of being, there is a corresponding ontological category.192 Thus, if
there are individualistic ways of being, there will also be individualistic ontological categories:
that is, fundamental ontological kinds that can only be had by one entity.
A system of ontological categories should not, intuitively, include absolutely every kind
there is, but only the most general of classifications. An ontological category must carve reality
at the joints. Yet not every joint-carving classification corresponds to an ontological category.
Some fundamental kinds—such, perhaps, as being a boson and being an electron—are too
specific to count as ontological categories. But an alleged category, no matter how fundamental,
which could only be had by one entity would be more specific still. Individualistic categories are,
thus, too fine-grained to count as properly ontological. A genuinely ontological category should
not, it seems, be this specific.193 A related, although perhaps less serious, problem for taking

192

This assumption is not entirely uncontroversial. For, as McDaniel (2017: 135) points out, while Aristotle’s

notions of actuality and potentiality appear to correspond to ways of being, they do not appear to correspond to any
ontological categories. But it is not clear to me that the difference marked out by actuality and potentiality is
properly ontological. If these notions are supposed to explain the difference between a lump of clay’s actually being
a statue as opposed to its potentially being a statue, then they do not, as McDaniel (2017: 123 n 32) somewhat
hesitantly suggests, appear to correspond to two fundamentally different quantificational/existential senses of
‘being’, but instead appear to correspond to two fundamentally different kinds of predication or instantiation. To
uphold the actuality/potentiality distinction would thus be to accept a version of what we might call ‘is’- or copulapluralism. But differences in predication or instantiation do not strike me as particularly ontological. The distinction
between actuality and potentiality should not to be confused with the distinction between the actual and the merely
possible, which does seem to be ontological.
193

This is a version of what Jan Westerhoff calls the problem of too specific categories. See Westerhoff (2002: 339,

2005: 50-1) for a brief presentation of this problem. It is, along with what he calls the cut-off point problem, one of
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individualistic categories to be ontological is that there would, if these individualistic categories
were abundant enough, then appear to be too many ontological categories. Thus, we should not
believe that there are any individualistic ontological categories.
I have argued that given the assumption that for every way of being there is a
corresponding ontological category, there will be individualistic ways of being only if there are
individualistic categories; but since we should not believe that there are individualistic
ontological categories, we should not believe in individualistic ways of being either. I will now
turn to two objections to this argument.
The first objection seeks to undermine the soundness of my argument by constructing a
parallel one. Historically, some pluralists were motivated by the following argument: God is so
radically different from His creation that univocal predication between God and His creatures is
impossible. But then, since being cannot be univocally predicated of both God and His creatures,
they cannot enjoy a shared way of being.194 So far, so good. But God, on this view, would seem
to enjoy an individualistic way of being: a way of being that He and He alone enjoys.195 And,

the two main problems that Westerhoff believes must be addressed by any account of the ontological categories.
McDaniel (2017: 125) notes that his account of ontological categories as fundamental ways of being does not suffer
from the cut-off point problem. But he does not address the problem of too specific categories. Indeed, he does not
appear to take the problem seriously at all. For he claims that the task of answering the question of whether being an
electron corresponds to an ontological category is not a meta-ontological question, but rather belongs to ontology
proper. The task of answering this question is, he thinks, simply a matter of determining whether there is a special
way of being that is unique to electrons.
194

See, for example, Aquinas’s Summa Contra Gentiles I.32 and Summa Theologiae I.13.5 co. This argument is a

species of what McDaniel (2010b: 693, 2017: 5-6) calls the theological motivation for ontological pluralism.
195

As God says to Moses: ‘I am who I am’ (Exodus 3:14).
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then, given our assumption that for every way of being there is a corresponding ontological
category, there would be at least one individualistic ontological category: namely, the
fundamental ontological kind to which God and God alone belongs.196 So either God, if He were
to exist, could not enjoy a way of being all to His own or else something has gone wrong with
my argument.197
I am willing to grant that God might be so radically different from everything else that He
enjoys His own way of being, but if so, then we can easily make an exception for Him. The need
for such an exception should, of course, come as no surprise given that God tends to pose all
kinds of problems for all sorts of metaphysical views. It is not enough, however, simply to say
that God is special, we also have to say why He—and He alone—might plausibly be thought to
belong to an individualistic ontological category. The pressure to admit such a category arises, I
think, from the combination of two claims: first, the claim that God is radically unlike absolutely
everything else; and, second, the claim that nothing is categorially homeless.198 God cannot,
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Indeed, McDaniel (2017: 122 n 30) suggests that, on Aquinas’s view, ‘God is the sole member of the ontological

category to which He belongs’.
197

Note that this problem will only arise if we think that there is a God. Since I deny this, the problem doesn’t really

arise for me. But out of deference to those pluralists who have thought otherwise, I will offer a more conciliatory
response.
198

McDaniel (2017: 126) ultimately denies the second claim. For he believes that cracks, holes, shadows, and other

almost nothings don’t belong to any ontological categories. But he would accept the related claim that nothing that is
fully real is categorially homeless.
The standard medieval view was, as Jeffrey Brower (2014: 45) notes, that the ten Aristotelian categories
only apply to created beings. But if that’s right, then God would be categorially homeless. Thus, on the standard
medieval view, there could be ways of being for which there is no corresponding ontological category. Yet we

148

given the first claim, belong to any of the same ontological categories as anything else. But,
given the second claim, God must belong to some primary (or top-most) ontological category.
Thus, He must belong to a category all His own. We face no such pressure, however, to admit
individualistic ontological subcategories. For whatever belongs to an ontological subcategory,
must already belong to a primary ontological category, and so will already have a home in our
catalog of entities. It should be clear, however, that if there were fundamental non-qualitative
haecceities such as being Socrates or being Plato, these would not be among the most extensive
natural classes of entities. For while Socrates might be haecceitistically unlike anything else, he
is not, as a concretely possible entity, categorially unlike everything else. But, then, since
Socrates already belongs in our catalog of entities, there is no systematic pressure to admit a
further individualistic category to which he belongs. We could, I think, plausibly insist that while
systematic considerations of completeness suggest that there might be individualistic primary
categories, there cannot be any individualistic subcategories. We could thus reformulate our
argument against the haecceitistic fragmentationalist as follows: if there are haecceitistic ways of
being, then there are individualistic ontological subcategories, but since we should not believe in
individualistic ontological subcategories, we should not believe in haecceitistic ways of being.
This response is, I believe, sufficient to show that an argument that Socrates cannot have an
individualistic way of being diverges in important respects from the argument that would seek to
show that God cannot have an individualistic way of being.199

could, as Brower (2014: 49) goes on to point out, plausibly interpret Aquinas, at least, as postulating a category to
which God and God alone belongs even though he never states his view in these terms.
199

The success of this reply will ultimately depend upon whether we can find any other, more plausible, examples of

individualistic subcategories aside from the alleged haecceitistic subcategories currently under consideration. I do
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The second objection seeks to undermine the claim that the resulting individualistic
categories are too specific in any problematic respect. For if we deny that individuals are wholly
present at every world at which they exist, then there will be an abundance of individuals that all
enjoy the same individualistic way of being. Indeed, if we accept the stage view and take objects
to persist by exduring, then these ways of being will seem less specific still. For the individuals
across logical space that enjoy Socrates’ way of being will, it seems, be fairly qualitatively
diverse, and so being Socrates will enjoy a kind of generality that being a boson and being an
electron do not. What this suggests is that we should distinguish between ways of being that are
strongly individualistic—that is, ways of being that are enjoyed by exactly one individual in all
of logical space—and ways of being that are only weakly individualistic. It is the former, and not
the latter, which threaten to constitute too specific categories. There is, on this way of thinking,
nothing wrong with ontological categories that are only weakly individualistic.
The haecceitistic fragmentationalist cannot avoid the problem of individualistic
ontological subcategories if she accepts modal realism with overlap. For if Socrates is present at
more than one world and if Socrates and Socrates alone enjoys his own way of being, then this
way of being will be strongly individualistic. The haecceitistic fragmentationalist must,

not think that we can. It is, however, important to note that the claim that there cannot be any individualistic
ontological subcategories is consistent with the claim that there could be species which only have a single member.
The phoenix might be taken to be an example of such a species. The angels have likewise been held to each belong
to their own single-membered species as well. But since we have only placed a ban on too specific subcategories
and not on too specific species, these examples do not seem to pose a problem for the present response. They would
only pose a problem if they were to constitute examples of non-haecceitistic, single-membered, ontological
subcategories, but, as far as I can tell, they do not.
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therefore, deny overlap. But if she denies overlap, then she will be left without a plausible
response to the problem of island universes from section 4.3 above.

4.5 Conclusion
I have argued that the haecceitistic fragmentationalist is faced with a dilemma. She should, as a
pluralist, be a modal realist. For an ontological pluralist should believe that there is an
importantly ontological difference between the actual and the merely possible, and anyone who
believes this should be a modal realist. But the haecceitistic fragmentationalist must, as a modal
realist, either accept or reject the claim that some possible individuals are wholly present at more
than one world. If she accepts this claim, she cannot avoid the argument from ontological
categories. And if she rejects this claim, she cannot avoid the argument from island universes.
There is, I think, no way out of this dilemma. I thus conclude that we should not believe in
individualistic ways of being.

151

Chapter 5: The Emptiness of Being
Abstract: A central tenant of the ‘thin’ conception of being is that an entity’s being does not at
all contribute to its nature. The canonical interpretation of this conception of being derives from
the neo-Quinean thesis that being is best represented by particular—or existential—quantifier
expressions. I will argue that the thin conception of being is not adequately captured by the neoQuinean thesis. For while every version of ontological pluralism—the view that there are
different fundamental ways of being—can be combined with the neo-Quinean thesis, not every
version of ontological pluralism is thereby committed to a thin conception of being. The
canonical interpretation must, it seems, be supplemented by some account of when an existential
quantifier expression corresponds to a fundamental way of being.

5.1 Introduction
There is a venerable tradition in the history of philosophy according to which being is the
emptiest of all concepts. Adherents of this tradition have been alleged to include Aristotle,
Scotus, Suárez, Wolff, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Frege, Russell, and Quine.200 An entity’s being or
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Heidegger ([1927] 1962: 22-3/ SZ 3) names Aristotle and Hegel as representatives of this tradition, while

Heidegger ([1975] 1982: 84/ GA 24: 118) adds Suárez; Caputo (1982: 112) mentions Scotus, Suárez, Wolff, and
Hegel; van Inwagen (2001: 4) lists Kant, Frege, and Quine, while van Inwagen (2009a: 51-2) adds Hegel and
Russel; Miller (2002: 2-13) discusses the views of Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Frege, Russell, and Quine; and Berto
(2013: 12, 17) cites Hume, Kant, Frege, Russell, and Quine. I shall not attempt to defend the inclusion of any of
these figures in this tradition as I suspect that our reasons for including someone in this tradition will vary depending
upon how we understand—and what we take to motivate—the claim that being is the emptiest of all concepts. But
the basis for the inclusion of these figures in this tradition would appear to come from the following texts: Aristotle,
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existence, on this traditional view, does not at all contribute to its nature or essence. Take, for
example, a particular silver dollar. It has a determinate size, shape, weight, and chemical
composition; it is located somewhere in space and time; it can be exchanged for various goods
and services; and so on. This tells us what this thing is. It tells us about its nature. But it does not,
it seems, tell us anything about its being. It is thus possible, on this view, to distinguish between
the being and the nature of a thing.
The now canonical interpretation of being’s emptiness stems from the neo-Quinean thesis
that being is best represented by particular—or existential—quantifier expressions in an ideal
metaphysical language. An entity’s being, on this view, is most perspicuously expressed in terms
of quantification, while its nature is best expressed with various predicates. We can, in this way,
avoid what Peter van Inwagen (2001: 4) calls ‘the mistake of transferring what properly belongs
to the nature of [an entity]…to the being of [that entity]’. For the concept of being will, on this
account, be ‘closely allied with the concept of number: to say that there are Xs is to say that the
number of Xs is 1 or more—and to say nothing more profound, nothing more interesting,
nothing more’. This, van Inwagen thinks, provides us with ‘the highest development of what
may be called the “thin” conception of being’.
But while this quantificational interpretation of being’s emptiness might provide the
canonical development of the thin conception of being, it does not constitute its central tenant,

Metaphysics B.3, 998b22-7 and Γ.2, 1003b26-9, Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1-2, nn. 27-29 (Vatican 3:18-19)
and Lectura I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1-2, n. 120 (Vatican 16:270), Suárez, Disputationes metaphysicae, disp. 2, sect. 4, nn. 1-5
([1597] 1861: 25:87-9), Wolff (1736: sect. 134), Hume ([1739] 1888: 66-8), Kant ([1763] 1992: Ak 2:70-7,
[1781/1787] 1998: A592-603/B620-31), Hegel ([1812/ 1832] 2010: 59/ GW 21: 68-9), Frege ([1884] 1980: 64-5),
Russell (1918-1919: 190-222), and Quine (1948).
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which I take to be the claim that an entity’s being does not at all contribute to its nature. For it is,
van Inwagen (2009a: 56) claims, because ‘Sartre and Heidegger and others in the existentialphenomenological tradition are…guilty of ascribing to the “being” of things features that should
properly be ascribed to their natures’ that they deny that being is the emptiest of all concepts;
and, van Inwagen continues, it is because they deny that being is the emptiest of all concepts that
‘they have, so to speak, a “thick” conception of being—as opposed to the “thin” conception of
being that I believe to be the correct conception of being’. It thus seems to follow, on van
Inwagen’s own account, that a person has a thick conception of being because that person denies
what I’m calling the central tenant of the thin conception. But if, as seems safe to assume, the
thick conception of being is simply the denial of the thin conception, a person will have a thin
conception of being simply because that person accepts the claim that an entity’s being does not
at all contribute to its nature. This, I think, is what captures the intuitive thinness of the thin
conception.201 It is what the alleged adherents of this tradition all seem to believe. It is something
that any attempted development of this tradition must explain.
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Other commentators have attempted to locate this thinness elsewhere. Francesco Berto (2013: 31), for example,

seems to think that to have a thin conception of being to accept what he calls the Parmenidean thesis that everything
exists. There are, I think, two problems with this interpretation. The first is that, as Berto himself notes, the thick
conception does not appear to entail the denial of the Parmenidean thesis. But if that’s right, then the thick
conception cannot simply be the denial of the thin conception. A second—and, I think, deeper—problem is that the
thick conception is actually compatible with the Parmenidean thesis. For, as D. C. Williams (1962: 753) points out,
the claim that existence is the most universal of all concepts is compatible with its also being the fullest of all
concepts ‘with more “content” than all the ordinary characters put together’. But if that’s right, then the acceptance
of the Parmenidean thesis does nothing to preclude the acceptance of a thick conception of being.
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I will argue that the canonical interpretation of being’s emptiness is ultimately untenable.
My argument will proceed in two steps. I will first show, in section 5.2, that some versions of
ontological pluralism—the view that there are different fundamental ways of being—are

William Vallicella (2014: 47-8) suggests a different interpretation of the thinness of the thin conception. He
thinks that to have a thin conception of being is ‘to ascribe no metaphysical depth to the topic of existence’. It is to
hold that existence does not have ‘any extralogical content’, that ‘it is a topic that belongs to logic rather than
metaphysics’. One problem with this suggestion is that it misclassifies, as adherents of a thick conception of being,
those who following Theodore Sider (2009, 2011) hold that some existential quantifiers do a better job of carving at
the ontological joints of reality. For, on this view, there is a non-logical difference between the compositional
nihilist’s quantifiers, which range over all and only entities that have no proper parts, and the compositional
universalist’s quantifiers, which range over arbitrary fusions of entities. The question of which quantifier to adopt is
a question for metaphysics, not logic. Thus, there appears to be a kind of metaphysical depth to the topic of
existence. But there is no reason to think that those who go in for joint carving quantifiers are thereby attributing to
the being of an entity a feature that properly belongs to its nature. Another problem is that it also seems to classify
those who accept the neo-Thomistic thesis that existence is an activity as adherents of a thick conception of being.
But since the activity of existing is no part of the nature of the entities that engage in it, there is no reason to think
that the neo-Thomist takes the being of an entity to contribute to its nature.
Kris McDaniel (2017: 215) thinks that to have a thin conception of being is to claim that being ‘admits no
hidden complexities and has no aspects’. Thus, he thinks that any quantificational account of being which holds that
the meaning of the existential quantifier that ranges over absolutely everything there is not fundamental but is
instead analogical will be a thick rather than a thin conception of being (2017: 31 n 43). This strikes me a mistake.
For if such a pluralist could maintain that the specific, fundamental ways of being do not themselves contribute to
the natures of the things that enjoy them, then she should also be able to maintain that the generic way of being,
which is unified by these more specific ways of being, contributes nothing to their natures as well. So while it might
be true on van Inwagen’s preferred monistic development of the thin conception that being does not admit of any
hidden complexities, it is not, I think, an essential part of the thin conception itself.
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compatible with a distinction between an entity’s being and its nature. I will then show, in
section 5.3, that the canonical interpretation of being’s emptiness cannot be combined with
pluralism as it stands. For although pluralism can be combined with the neo-Quinean thesis, not
every such version of pluralism can coherently maintain a distinction between the being and the
nature of a thing. This suggests that it is not sufficient for the pluralist to say that differences in
being are differences in quantification. The canonical interpretation must, it seems, be
supplemented by some account of when differences in quantification correspond to differences in
being.202 I will attempt to provide such an account in sections 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6.

5.2 Ontological pluralism and the thin conception of being
Ontological pluralism—or pluralism about being—is the view that there are different
fundamental ways of being. Two entities can differ, on this view, not only in their nature, but
also in their being. A narwhal, for instance, is vastly different from a number. It has a
determinate size, shape, and weight. These properties help to make up its nature. A number, on
the other hand, has a very different nature. It lacks a size, shape, and weight. It isn’t located at
any time or any place. Yet the true extent of the difference between these entities does not seem
to be captured solely by these differences in their natures. There also seems to be a peculiarly
ontological difference between them: the narwhal, we might say, actually exists, while the
number merely subsists. The pluralist thus holds that just as there is diversity in the nature of
what there is, there is also diversity in the being of what there is. This presupposes that there is
an intelligible distinction to be drawn between an entity’s being and its nature.

202

I am not here arguing for the falsity of the neo-Quinean thesis. I am simply arguing that the neo-Quinean thesis

does not—all on its own—provide an adequate account of being’s emptiness.
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Peter van Inwagen has, however, sought to question the pluralist’s allegiance to this
distinction. For the pluralist would seem to take the observation that there is a vast difference
between, say, a number and a narwhal to motivate the claim that there is an ontological
difference between such entities. But, van Inwagen insists, ‘a vast difference between [two
things] must consist in a vast difference in their natures’ (1998: 15, 2009a: 56). For once we have
described the vast difference in the nature of two things, we ‘have done everything that can be
done to describe [the difference between them]. That’s what describing a vast difference is’
(2014b: 23, cf. 2018: 216). The pluralist, van Inwagen thinks, mistakes a difference in the nature
of two things for a difference in the being of those things. It is for this reason that he claims that
‘the foundation of the idea that there are distinct and irreducible modes of being’ is based on ‘a
fundamental meta-ontological error’: namely, ‘the error of ascribing to the being of a thing a
feature that properly belongs to its nature’ (2014b: 21-2).203
I will grant that some avowedly pluralist positions commit this error. But I do not believe
that every version of pluralism is committed to a ‘thick’ conception of being; there are, I think,
some versions of pluralism which maintain that there aren’t any fundamental ways of being that
contribute to the nature of the things that enjoy them. So rather than focus on alleged cases of
ontological differences between entities that have vastly different natures, I will look instead to

203

See Williams (1962: 757) and Grossmann (1984: 169-70, 1992: 95-6) for similar criticisms. Merricks (2019:

602-3) attributes a slightly different argument to van Inwagen. The problem, as Merricks sees it, seems to lie with
the pluralist’s claim that certain differences between entities are peculiarly ontological. Yes, the argument goes, a
number and a narwhal are different, but that’s all there is to it. Once we say that one is abstract and the other
concrete, we have said all that needs to be said. We don’t need to—and we should not try to—express this difference
by adding that it is peculiarly ontological. I will discuss this argument in section 6.3 below.
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cases where the natures of the entities in question appear to be exactly the same. Take, for
example, an actual and a merely possible silver dollar. These entities might have exactly the
same size, shape, weight, and chemical composition. They might even be perfect indiscernible
duplicates. But for all their similarities, there still seems to be an important and, I think,
peculiarly ontological difference between them: one is actual, the other merely possible.
It won’t do to insist that this difference is due to a difference in the natures of these
entities. For if an entity’s actuality (or lack of actuality) were part of its nature, then nothing that
is actual could have exactly the same nature as anything that is merely possible. But then,
assuming that there aren’t any actual unicorns, nothing with exactly the same nature as a merely
possible unicorn could have been actual (since, by assumption, the addition of actuality would
alter the nature of a merely possible unicorn). It would thus be impossible for there to have been
an actual unicorn. Indeed, it would also follow that nothing with the same nature as a merely
possible entity could have been actual (since, again, the addition of actuality would alter the
nature of these entities). But this, I believe, is extremely implausible. We thus appear to have
good reason to think that an actual and a merely possible dollar can have the exact same
nature.204 Yet we also have reason to think that, for all we have just said, there is still a genuine,
objective difference between them. And, given the distinction between the being and the nature
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Fine (2005: 14) makes a related observation. He considers a view where actual objects are alleged to be concrete

and merely possible objects abstract. He then argues that if this is supposed to amount to a fundamental difference in
the natures of these objects and ‘it is of the nature of a possible object to be abstract, then this is presumably a
property that it must have in any possible circumstances in which it is actual. But in such circumstance, it is an
actual object and therefore also concrete’. This account is faced with a dilemma: it must either give up any hope of
capturing the intuitive depth of the difference between the actual and the merely possible, or it must maintain that,
despite what we might have thought, a merely possible object could not have been actual after all.
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of an entity, it seems plausible to claim that the difference between an actual and a merely
possible dollar lies not in their nature, but in their being. Thus, the pluralist who distinguishes
between the actual and the merely possible does not, I think, make the mistake of ascribing to the
being of an actual entity a feature that properly belongs to its nature.
Let’s return then to the pluralist who takes there to be an ontological difference between a
number and a narwhal. These entities have vastly different natures. But the same can presumably
be said about an actual boson and a merely possible fermion, which not only seem to have vastly
different natures, but appear to enjoy different ways of being as well. In order to show that
abstract entities and concrete entities differ in their being, we would do well to focus not on cases
where these entities have vastly different natures, but on cases where they have the exact same
nature. Take, for example, an incredibly uninteresting, abstract mathematical structure with
exactly one element. The abstract entity that makes up this mathematical structure does not have
any proper parts, and aside from its simple mereological structure, it does not appear to have
much of a nature at all. Now take a qualitatively bare, simple individual that alone constitutes a
concrete possible world.205 This concrete entity does not appear to instantiate any fundamental
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Why think that such an entity is possible? It seems possible for there to be a simple individual that does not

instantiate any fundamental qualitative properties, but which bears a fundamental qualitative relation to a concrete
entity. This suggests, I think, that our simple individual is itself concrete. For these two entities together appear to
compose a further concrete entity, and, I assume, concrete entities are composed entirely out of concrete parts. We
can then arrive at the possibility of a qualitatively bare, simple lonely individual by application of the principle of
solitude: roughly, the principle that anything can exist all by itself. But if the simple individual with which we
started was concrete, then the qualitatively bare, simple lonely individual with which we ended up should be
concrete as well. Thus, it seems possible for there to be a qualitatively bare, simple individual that alone constitutes
a concrete possible world.
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qualitative properties or relations. It does not have any proper parts, and aside from its
mereological structure (which is exactly the same as that of the abstract entity we just
considered), it does not appear to have much of a nature at all. These two entities thus appear to
have exactly the same nature: they are both simples and do not instantiate any fundamental
qualitative properties or stand in any fundamental qualitative relations. But, for all their
similarities, there is still an important and, I think, peculiarly ontological difference between
them: one is abstract, the other is concrete.206
Many, I suspect, will simply insist that this example is too exotic to be taken seriously.
But, given its apparent intelligibility, I can see no real reason to ignore it. Others will likely insist
that there must be some primitive difference in the natures of these things: they will likely claim
that the fact that one is abstract and the other concrete itself gives us reason to think that these
entities differ in their natures. But if we have already countenanced one difference in being,
namely, the difference between the actual and the merely possible, I can see no principled reason
to refuse to admit another. Thus, the pluralist who distinguishes between the abstract and the
concrete does not obviously make the mistake of ascribing to the being of an abstract entity a
feature that properly belongs to its nature.
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instantiate, a fundamental qualitative property. The existence of a qualitatively bare, simple, lonely, concrete entity
would, however, serve as a counterexample to this analysis. I suspect that Bricker would simply deny the
assumption that concrete entities are composed entirely out of concrete parts, which I used to argue for the existence
of such an entity in footnote 205 above. But unless we are already committed to Bricker’s reductive analysis, I can
see no reason to deny this assumption.
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I have argued that some versions of ontological pluralism are compatible with the
distinction between the being and the nature of a thing: the pluralist who takes there to be an
ontological difference between the actual and the merely possible—as well as between the
abstract and the concrete—can, I think, plausibly maintain that an entity’s being does not at all
contribute to its nature. If this is correct, then some pluralists can adopt an adequately thin
conception of being. But, as we shall see in the next section, this puts pressure on the canonical
interpretation of being’s emptiness in terms of quantification.

5.3 The thin conception of being and the neo-Quinean thesis
Quantificational pluralism is the view that there are different fundamental ways of being that are
best represented in an ideal metaphysical language by (semantically primitive) particular—or
existential—quantifier expressions.207 A difference between entities is peculiarly ontological, on
this account, when those entities are ranged over by different fundamental quantifiers. Take, for
example, the difference between an actual narwhal and a merely possible unicorn. The narwhal,
but not the unicorn, is ranged over by the actualist quantifier, @. In general, we can say that x is
actual (or enjoys actual existence) if and only if and because @ y (y = x). Or take, for another
example, the difference between a narwhal and a number. The number, but not the narwhal, is
ranged over by the pure subsistentialist quantifier, a (whereas the narwhal and the unicorn are
both ranged over by the quantifier, c, which ranges over all and only concretely possible
entities). In general, we can say that x is abstract (or enjoys pure subsistence) if and only if and
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161

because a y (y = x). The quantificational pluralist thus combines ontological pluralism with the
neo-Quinean thesis.
I will argue that the coherence of quantificational pluralism gives rise to a problem for
the canonical development of the thin conception of being in terms of quantification. For while
any version of ontological pluralism can be formulated as a version of quantificational pluralism,
not every version of ontological pluralism is committed to a thin conception of being. Thus, there
would seem to be versions of quantificational pluralism that ascribe to the being of a thing a
feature that properly belongs to its nature.
I will focus here on three potentially thick versions of quantificational pluralism.208 The
first holds that persons (or conscious subjects or Daseins) enjoy a way of being—namely,
Existenz—that is not enjoyed by anything else.209 You and I appear to be vastly different from
tables and chairs, rocks and trees. We are the kind of entity whose being is an issue for it. We are
the kind of entity that can sit around and think about the way of being we enjoy. Tables and
chairs can’t do that. Rocks and trees can’t do that. Only persons can do that. There thus appears
to be an important—and, on this view, fundamentally ontological—difference between a person
and a non-person: persons enjoy Existenz, non-persons do not.
This existentialist view can, I think, be formulated as a version of quantificational
pluralism. Our best metaphysical theories will, on this view, contain a special quantifier
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And we’ll say that to be committed to a thick conception of being is to be committed to the claim that there is at
least one fundamental way of being that contributes to the nature of the things that enjoy it.
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expression, ‘e’, which ranges over all and only persons, and which cannot be defined in terms of
an unrestricted quantifier expression and a restricting predicate (such as ‘is a person’). This
suggests that the predicate ‘is a person’ derives its naturalness from the quantifier expression
‘e’, and appears to commit the existentialist to the claim that: x is a person (or enjoys Existenz)
if and only if and because e y (y = x). But since the predicate ‘is a person’ carries qualitative
content about the nature of a person, and since this predicate appears to be defined in terms of
the quantifier expression ‘e’, this suggests that ‘e’ itself carries qualitative content about the
nature of a person. The existentialist thus appears to hold that an entity’s being can contribute to
its nature and is thereby committed to a thick conception of being.
To deflect the charge that the existentialist accepts a thick conception of being, we might
attempt to distinguish between the predicates ‘is a person’ and ‘enjoys Existenz’. These
predicates will be intensionally equivalent: they will necessarily designate the same class of
entities. But they will not thereby carry the same content. The predicate ‘is a person’ will be
defined up in terms of various other predicates so as to represent the nature of a person. It will
apply to various entities because those entities have that nature. But the predicate ‘enjoys
Existenz’ will not be defined up in terms of the predicates that capture the nature of a person. It
will instead be defined in terms of the quantifier expression ‘e’. It won’t carry any qualitative
content about the nature of a person.
We can now ask which of these intentionally equivalent predicates better captures the
unity of the class they designate. There is, on this existentialist view, a fundamental and
peculiarly ontological difference between persons and non-persons. This difference, being
fundamental, is not well represented by the predicate ‘is a person’, which itself admits of further
definition. It is better—albeit still not perfectly—represented by the predicate ‘enjoys Existenz’,
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which is defined in terms of the quantifier expression ‘e’. Thus, while we can explain the
difference between a person and a non-person by appealing to their natures, we cannot explain
the fundamentality of this difference. To explain the fact that a person and a non-person appear
to differ in a fundamental respect, we need to look not to the nature but to the being of these
entities.210
I doubt that this response will completely dispel the worry that the existentialist has
confused the nature of a person with the being of a person (especially given that, of necessity, all
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We seem to run into a similar situation in the case of actuality. For if we had what David Lewis (1986: 221) calls

a ‘mighty language’, which ‘lacked for nothing in the way of qualitative predicates, and lacked for nothing in its
resources for complex infinitary constructions’, then—depending upon the extent of actuality—the predicates ‘is
actual’ and ‘enjoys actual existence’ might be intensionally equivalent with some infinitely disjunctive predicate.
But while this infinite predicate would carry qualitative content about the nature of every actual entity, it would not
account for the unity of actuality, which seems to spring from a basic and non-qualitative source. I argued for this in
section 2.2 above.
The main difference between these two cases is that while the coincidence is merely accidental in the case
of actuality, it is essential in the case of Existenz. We can, at least, conceive of entities that have exactly the same
natures, but which do not both enjoy actuality. But we cannot, I think, conceive of entities that have exactly the
same nature, but which do not both enjoy Existenz. So we might still worry that the existentialist has ascribed to the
being of a person a feature that properly belongs to its nature. We might be able to dispel this worry if instead of
focusing upon the difference between conscious subjects and everything else, we focused instead on the difference
between a subject and a mere object. For it seems intelligible to suppose that a slumbering monad could have
exactly the same nature as a mere object. But while a slumbering monad is a subject, a mere object is not. If that’s
right, then we should be able to intelligibly distinguish the being of a subject—its subjective existence—from the
nature of a subject. The resulting view would not, of course, be a version of existentialism (since a subject need not
be the kind of entity whose being is an issue for it), but it would, I think, nevertheless be an attractive version of
ontological pluralism.
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and only persons enjoy Existenz). I am, however, willing to give the existentialist the benefit of
the doubt here. But, regardless of what we make of this response, it will not be available to other
versions of quantificational pluralism.
Let’s turn, next, to a second version of quantificational pluralism, one which is much
more clearly committed to a thick conception of being. This pluralist holds that every perfectly
natural physical property is really just a fundamental way of being in disguise.211 There is, on
this view, a way of being that, say, all and only photons enjoy. It is the enjoyment or nonenjoyment of this way of being that ultimately distinguishes a photon from a non-photon. So,
given the neo-Quinean thesis, our best metaphysical theories will not contain a primitive
predicate ‘is a photon’, but will instead contain a special, semantically primitive, restricted
quantifier expression ‘p’ which ranges over all and only photons.212 This extreme pluralist
would thus seem to hold that: x is a photon (or enjoys what we might call photonic existence) if
and only if and because p y (y = x). This will, however, load the quantifier expression ‘p’ with
whatever content is carried by the predicate ‘is a photon’. And since this predicate reflects the
nature of the entities to which it applies, ‘p’ would seem to tell us something about the nature of
the entities in its domain. This extreme pluralist thus appears to ascribe to the being of a photon a
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rejects ‘all properties (and relations) in favor of so many modes of existence’ and Barnes (ms), who explores the
view that there is a way of being for every intrinsic monadic predicate.
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I am assuming that being a photon is supposed to be a perfectly natural physical property. If it turns out not to be,

we could just pick a different example. I am also assuming that the predicate ‘is a photon’ does not express a
theoretical role that might be filled by a variety of different properties.
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feature that properly belongs to its nature, and is thereby committed to a thick conception of
being.
It should be clear that the existentialist’s response is not available to the extreme pluralist.
For one thing, this pluralist takes the difference between a photon and a non-photon to be
primarily ontological: to say that something is a photon is just to say that it enjoys a special way
of being, namely, photonic existence. There is thus no distinction to be drawn between the
predicates ‘is a photon’ and ‘enjoys photonic existence’. But there is a much deeper problem. For
were the extreme pluralist to claim that the predicate ‘is a photon’ captures the nature but not the
being of a photon, this predicate would—given the fundamental nature of a photon—have to be
taken as primitive. But then there would be nothing left for the quantifier expression ‘p’ to
capture: the fundamentality of the difference between photons and non-photons would already be
represented by the primitive predicate ‘is a photon’.
Let’s turn, at last, to a third potentially thick version of quantificational pluralism,
according to which simples (or objects without any proper parts) enjoy a way of being different
from that of composites. Our best metaphysical theories will, given the neo-Quinean thesis, have
to contain a special quantifier expression, ‘s’, which ranges over all and only simples, and
which cannot be defined in terms of an unrestricted quantifier expression and a restricting
predicate (such as ‘is a simple’).213 But since the difference between a simple and a non-simple
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this pluralist, something right and something wrong about these claims. It is true that there is a fundamental way of
being such that everything is simple and that nothing has proper parts. But there are other ways being as well. And it
is certainly not that case that absolutely everything is simple or that nothing at all has proper parts. The way of being
that all and only simples enjoy might be fundamental, but it is not the only fundamental way of being that there is.
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is, on this view, supposed to be somehow ontological, this pluralist would seem to hold that: x is
simple (or enjoys what we might call simple existence) if and only if and because s y (y = x).
This, once again, seems to load the quantifier expression ‘s’ with whatever content is carried by
the predicate ‘is simple’. But since this predicate reflects the mereological structure of the
entities to which it applies, and since an entity’s mereological structure appears to contribute to
its nature, ‘s’ would seem to tell us something about the nature of the entities in its domain. This
pluralist thus appears to ascribe to the being of a simple a feature that contributes to its nature,
and thereby seems to adopt a thick conception of being.
I do not believe that this pluralist can plausibly claim that while the predicate ‘is a
simple’ captures only a non-fundamental difference in nature between simples and non-simples,
we need the quantifier expression ‘s’ to capture the fundamentality of this difference. For, given
the interdefinability of various mereological properties and relations, they all appear to have
equal claim to fundamentality. But taking only some of these properties and relations to be
fundamental would, as Theodore Sider (2011: 217-22) argues, require making an arbitrary choice
with respect to what is fundamental. And this, I think, we should not do. The predicate ‘is a
simple’ should therefore be taken to express the fundamentality of the difference between
simples and non-simples. To insist that we need the quantifier expression ‘s’ to capture this
fundamentality would seem to ascribe to the being of a simple a feature that properly belongs to
its nature.
I have argued that given the assumption that some forms of ontological pluralism are
compatible with being’s emptiness, the neo-Quinean thesis provides us with the best
The nihilist, it seems, makes that same mistake as the actualist, who holds that everything is actual: namely, she
focuses on a single way of being at the expense of all others.
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interpretation of this emptiness only if every form of quantificational pluralism is committed to a
thin conception of being; but since, as we have just seen, not every form of quantificational
pluralism is committed to a thin conception of being, the neo-Quinean thesis alone does not
provide us with the best interpretation of being’s emptiness. It must, it seems, be supplemented
by some account of when an existential quantifier expression corresponds to a fundamental way
of being.

5.4 The nature of being
What is it, then, that accounts for the emptiness of a way of being? I will begin with the generic,
unrestricted way of being that absolutely everything enjoys. I will not only assume that there is
such a way of being, I will also assume that it is both empty and fundamental. But if this generic
way of being is indeed empty, why might that be? I will suggest that it contributes nothing to a
thing’s nature due to a combination of its generality, its non-qualitative status, and its failure to
admit of real definition.214
Let’s start with its generality. The generic way of being is enjoyed by absolutely
everything there is. It is, given this universality, highly general: it is enjoyed by entities with very
different natures. But while this generality appears to be necessary to ensure that the generic way
of being does not contribute to nature of the things that enjoy it, it is not sufficient. For the fact
that a concept is general—even absolutely general—does not ensure that it contributes nothing to
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‘presuppositions’ (or ‘prejudices’) about the nature of being: namely, that it is the most universal of all concepts,
that it is undefinable, and that it is self-evident.
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the nature of the things that enjoy it: there might, it seems, be some quite general nature that is
common to absolutely everything.215
Let’s turn next to its non-qualitative status. The generic way of being is, we assumed,
fundamental. But any fundamental notion that contributes to an entity’s qualitative character,
contributes to its nature. This ensures that, given its emptiness, the generic way of being cannot
contribute to an entity’s qualitative character: it must instead have some kind of non-qualitative
status. But while this is a necessary condition for the generic way of being’s emptiness, it is not
sufficient. For, as we saw above, mereological properties and relations contribute to an entity’s
nature, but these appear to be both fundamental and non-qualitative.216
Let’s turn at last to its failure to admit of real definition. The generic way of being is
fundamental. But even some fundamental concepts admit of real definitions: the mereological
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Aristotle would presumably have denied this. For, he argued, if being were a genus, then no differentia would

have being (for a genus cannot be predicated of a differentia taken apart from its species) and being would lack
universality; but since the differentia of any genus must have being, being cannot be a genus (Metaphysics B.3,
998b22-7). And if being is not a genus and the nature of a thing is given solely in terms of that thing’s genus,
species, and differentia, then the being of a thing will not contribute to the nature of a thing: a man and an existent
man are, as Aristotle says elsewhere, the same thing (Metaphysics Γ.2, 1003b26-9). Thus, on this view about what
constitutes the nature of a thing, being’s universality would appear to be sufficient for its emptiness.
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relation is qualitative if and only if it plays a causal (or nomic) role at some world. See chapter 3 above. But I also
believe that the mereological properties and relations are not even in principle observable or otherwise detectable in
any way and so cannot be the kinds of things that play causal (or nomic) roles. Thus, given their fundamentality, I
take the mereological properties and relations to be non-qualitative. Note that Phillip Bricker (1996: 233-4, 2006:
49) and Katherine Hawley (2009: 102) both take mereological relations such as composition to be non-qualitative as
well.

169

properties and relations can, as noted in sections 3.4 and 5.3 above, be defined in terms of each
other, and yet each of them appears to be fundamental. It thus seems that if we want to ensure
that the generic way of being does not contribute to the nature of the things that enjoy it, we must
assume that it cannot be properly defined in alternative terms (since these might contribute to its
nature). But while this indefinability might be necessary to ensure that the generic way of being
does not contribute to nature of the things that enjoy it, it is clearly not sufficient. For an entity’s
being a photon is, I will assume, a primitive and undefinable feature, and yet it clearly
contributes to the nature of the things that have it.
These three conditions appear to be necessary for the generic way of being’s emptiness. I
believe that they are also jointly sufficient. But I won’t argue for that just yet. I will first argue
that the specific, restricted ways of being which, as we saw in section 5.2, appear to be
intuitively empty are analogous to the generic, unrestricted way of being in all three of these
respects. I will then argue that the ways of being which, as we saw in section 5.3, do not appear
to be empty are not so analogous. This will lend credence to the claim that a fundamental way of
being is empty—that is, does not contribute to the nature of the entities that enjoy it—if and only
if it is sufficiently general, it is devoid of qualitative content, and it does not admit of real
definition.

5.5 The analogy of being
I will begin by showing that actual existence, concrete possible existence, and abstract possible
subsistence are importantly analogous to the generic way of being with respect to their
generality, their non-qualitative status, and their indefinability. I’ll start with their generality. A
way of being will be general, roughly, to the extent that it is—or can be—enjoyed by a variety of
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entities with a variety of natures.217 The greater the variety, the more general the way of being.
The generic, unrestricted way of being, given its universality, will be enjoyed by the greatest
possible variety of entities with the greatest possible variety of natures. It is absolutely general.
But actual existence, concrete possible existence, and abstract possible subsistence are not
themselves universal. How, then, might these specific, restricted ways of being be sufficiently
general?
One way to show that a way of being is highly general would be to show that it subsumes
a variety of different natures. Let’s say that entities with the same nature share natural kinds. We
can then say that a fundamental way of being subsumes a natural kind whenever the class of
entities that enjoy that way of being contains the class of entities that share that natural kind.
Note, however, that the mere fact that a class A contains a class B is not sufficient to show that A
is more general than B. For while the gerrymandered class of abstract objects and the Eiffel
Tower contains the class of abstract objects, it is not obviously more general than it.218 I will
assume that A is more general than B if (i) A contains B, and (ii) A is at least as broadly natural
as B.219 Then, assuming that a class of entities which enjoys a fundamental way of being will be
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might be enjoyed by entities with a variety of different natures. For the nature of the entity that enjoys an
individualistic way of being at this world might be very different from the nature of the entities that enjoy it at other
worlds. But since this way of being can only be enjoyed by one entity per world, it will lack generality. To say that a
way of being is general is not simply to say that it can be enjoyed by entities with a variety of different natures, but
also that it can be enjoyed by a variety of different entities.
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a perfectly natural class, a fundamental way of being’s subsumption of a wide variety of natural
kinds will ensure that it has a high degree of generality.
There are two problems with this understanding of generality. The first is that
subsumption is not necessary for emptiness. Take, for example, the way of being that all and
only actual entities enjoy. It is one of the clearest cases of a specific, restricted way of being that
does not at all contribute to the nature of the entities that enjoy it. It might, however, fail to
subsume any natural kinds at all. For while our world might well be unique in its actuality, there
don’t appear to be any natural kinds that are unique to our world. A second, much deeper,
problem lies not so much in the fact that actuality, which happens to be one of the clearest cases
of an empty way of being, does not appear to subsume any natural kinds, but in the fact that it is
only because the class of actual entities does not appear to contain—and instead only seems to
intersect—various classes of entities that share a natural kind that actuality is one of the clearest
cases of an empty way of being.
Another way to ensure that a way of being is highly general would be to show that it is
pervasive across highly general fundamental relations. We’ll say that a fundamental way of
being is pervasive across a fundamental relation whenever it spreads through logical space in
such a way that anything that bears that relation to something which enjoys that way of being
will enjoy that way of being as well.220 Actual existence, concrete possible existence, and

well (see Westerhoff 2002: 338, 2005: 27). But, as McDaniel (2017: 120) points out, this does not avoid the problem
of gerrymandered classes: for it is necessary that if the class of abstract objects and the Eiffel Tower is empty, then
so is the class of abstract objects.
220

This will ensure that the rough criterion of being enjoyed by a variety of entities with a variety of natures is met

provided that the relevant relation holds between a variety of different entities with a variety of different natures.
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abstract possible subsistence all appear to be pervasive across the relations that unify concrete
possible worlds and abstract possible structures. The way of being that all and only actual entities
enjoy appears to be pervasive across the relations that unify worlds. For, as Phillip Bricker
(2001: 44-5) observes, it is unintelligible to suppose that we might find something non-actual if
we just traveled far enough away. Actual existence is thus all or nothing: if any part of a world
enjoys it, then every other part of that world enjoys it as well. And since actuality contains—or
could contain—a variety of different entities with a variety of different natures, actual existence
will be highly general. The ways of being that all and only concrete possible entities and that all
and only abstract possible entities enjoy appear to be equally pervasive. For it seems
unintelligible to suppose that we might find the number two hiding in the cupboard, under the
sink, or anywhere else for that matter. Concrete existence and abstract subsistence thus appear to
be all or nothing: if any part of an externally unified whole is concrete, then every part of that
whole is concrete; if any part is abstract, then every part is abstract. It thus seems that actual
existence, concrete possible existence, and abstract possible subsistence are all highly general
ways of being.
I’ll turn then to their non-qualitative status. A way of being will have a non-qualitative
status when the property of enjoying that way of being fails to be a qualitative property. But what
does it take for a property to be—or fail to be—qualitative? The qualitative properties can be
intuitively characterized in terms of qualitative duplication and indiscernibility: intrinsic
qualitative properties are those properties that intrinsic qualitative duplicates must have in
common, while extrinsic qualitative properties are those additional properties that indiscernibly
situated intrinsic qualitative duplicates must have in common as well. This intuitive
characterization is, of course, circular. For to say that two objects are qualitative duplicates is
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just to say that there is a one-one correspondence between their parts that preserves all the
fundamental qualitative (as well as all the fundamental mereological) properties had by their
parts and all the fundamental qualitative (as well as all the fundamental mereological) relations
between their parts.221 But, provided that we can give substance to the notion of a fundamental
qualitative property, this characterization need not be empty. I will more or less follow David
Lewis (1983a) in taking a fundamental qualitative property to be a fundamental property that
grounds causal powers. A property or relation will thus be qualitative whenever it plays, or is
grounded in properties and relations that play, fundamental causal roles. The generic,
unrestricted way of being will, given both its universality and its fundamentality, have a nonqualitative status provided that there are entities such as the sui generis numbers or the pure sets
that do not themselves instantiate any fundamental causal properties or stand in any fundamental
causal relations. For while none of the properties or relations had by such entities would appear
to be qualitative, each of these entities have the property of enjoying the generic, unrestricted
way of being. But since actual existence, concrete possible existence, and abstract possible
subsistence are not themselves universal and needn’t be had by absolutely everything there is,
why think that these specific, restricted ways of being have a non-qualitative status as well? Or,
to put this another way, why think that the properties of enjoying these ways of being do not
play, and are not themselves grounded in properties that play, fundamental causal roles?
One way to show that a fundamental way has a non-qualitative status would be to show
that the property of enjoying a fundamental way of being is undetectable. For a property that
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See Lewis (1986: 61), Bricker (1993: 274, 1996: 227), Sider (1993: sect. 3.2.1, 2014: 216), and McDaniel

(2007a: 242-43, 253, 2008: 128).
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plays a fundamental causal role will, it seems, be detectable in principle.222 But an entity’s
actuality—or its concrete or abstract possibility—does not intuitively appear to be something that
we could, even in principle, observe or detect. These ways of being are not epistemically robust
in the way that paradigmatically qualitative properties such as being red or being blue would
seem to be. We can, for instance, no more see that an entity is actual rather than merely possible
than we can see that an individual is Socrates rather than someone who looks and acts just like
him. There is, I think, intuitive pressure to take these ways of being to be undetectable. But there
are more principled reasons to take them to be undetectable as well. For, as we just saw, these
ways of being appear to be all or nothing: they spread throughout concrete possible worlds and
abstract possible structures in such a way that if one part of a world or structure enjoys one of
these ways of being, then every part of that world or structure enjoys that way of being. But
anything that is pervasive in this respect cannot, it seems, be properly observed or detected (since
no possible observer could be differently affected by the presence than by the absence of such
things). It thus seems that the properties of enjoying actual existence, concrete possible
existence, and abstract possible subsistence do not play fundamental causal roles.
Another way to show that a fundamental way of being has a non-qualitative status would
be to show that that property of enjoying that way of being is tied up in various necessary

222

I argued for this claim in section 3.2 above. The argument went roughly as follows: A property will play a

fundamental causal role and thus have causal powers only if that property is capable of affecting various objects. But
if a property is capable of affecting various objects, then there must be possible objects that are left differently
affected by that property’s presence than by its absence. And if there are such possible objects, then the property in
question will be detectable in principle. Thus, if a property plays a fundamental causal role, it must be detectable in
principle.
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connections and is not freely recombinable. For a property that is involved in various necessary
connections is not, by Humean assumption, fit to ground causal powers. But the properties of
enjoying actual existence, concrete possible existence, and abstract possible subsistence cannot,
due to their pervasiveness, be freely recombined. They are thus unfit to ground causal powers. It
thus seems that actual existence, concrete possible existence, and abstract possible subsistence all
have a non-qualitative status.
I’ll turn finally to their failure to admit of real definition. A way of being will be
fundamental when it makes for objective, ontological similarities among the entities that enjoy it.
But the fact that a way of being is fundamental does not ensure that it must be taken as primitive.
For some fundamental notions such as parthood, proper parthood, and overlap can, as we noted
in sections 3.4 and 5.3, be interdefined. These notions appear to admit of real definition, and thus
seem to inherit the nature of their definiens. For, in general, we can say that a fundamental
notion, F, admits of real definition if and only if, necessarily, absolutely everything that enjoys F
also satisfies some distinct but equally fundamental non-universal conditions, Φ, and vice
versa.223 Thus it seems that a fundamental way of being will contribute nothing to the nature of
the entities that enjoy it only if it does not admit of real definition and must be taken as

223

I am not here presenting a general account of real definition. I am simply attempting to say when a fundamental

notion should be taken to admit of real definition. To do this, I am requiring that the relevant conditions, , must not
themselves include F and must not apply to absolutely everything there is. The first requirement is intended to rule
out the possibility of trivial definitions (such as to enjoy F is to enjoy F), while the second is intended to ensure that
the generic, unrestricted way of being cannot itself be defined. See Rosen (2015) for a detailed attempt to provide a
general account of real definition. I should note, however, that I prefer a much more permissive account of real
definition than Rosen does.
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primitive.224 The generic, unrestricted way of being will, given its universality, only be capable
of satisfying universally applicable conditions. It will thus fail to admit of real definition. But
given that actual existence, concrete possible existence, and abstract possible subsistence are not
themselves universal, why should we think that these specific, restricted ways of being fail to
admit of real definition?
To show that a fundamental way of being does not admit of real definition it is sufficient
to show that it is intelligible to suppose that there are—or could be—entities which have the
same nature and instantiate all the same fundamental properties and relations, but which do not
both enjoy that way of being. Concrete possible existence and abstract possible subsistence can, I
think, both be show to satisfy this condition. For, as I argued in section 5.2 above, it intelligible
to suppose that there are entities that instantiate all the same fundamental properties and relations
which nevertheless differ with respect to their enjoyment of concrete possible existence. A
lonely, qualitatively bare, simple concrete individual and an utterly uninteresting, single element,
abstract mathematical structure might otherwise instantiate all the same fundamental properties
and relations, but they would still differ in an important respect: one enjoys concrete possible
existence, the other does not. Thus, there do not appear to be any distinct, fundamental
conditions that are satisfied by all and only entities that enjoy concrete possible existence.225 The
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I should mention an important caveat here: if a fundamental way of being could be defined solely in terms of

other fundamental ways of being that are themselves empty and thus do not contribute to the nature of the entities
that enjoy them, there would be no nature to be inherited from these other ways of being. There would thus be an
empty way of being that admits of real definition solely in terms of other empty ways of being. I will ignore this
possibility in what follows.
225

I thus reject a reductionist account of concreteness which holds that, necessarily, an entity enjoys concrete

possible existence if and only if it has a part that instantiates a fundamental qualitative property or relation. This

177

same can be said for abstract possible subsistence.226 Actual existence can, I think, also be show
to satisfy this condition. For, as I argued in section 5.2, it is intelligible to suppose that there
could be entities that instantiate all the same fundamental properties and relations which
nevertheless differ with respect to their enjoyment of actual existence. An actual and a merely
possible dollar could be perfect—perhaps even indiscernible—duplicates, but they would still
differ in an important respect: one enjoys actual existence, the other does not. Thus, there do not
appear to be any distinct, fundamental conditions that are satisfied by all and only entities that
enjoy actual existence. It thus seems that actual existence, concrete possible existence, and
abstract possible subsistence do not admit of real definition.

5.6 The analogy of being (continued)
We have seen that the specific, restricted ways of being that are intuitively empty—namely,
actual existence, concrete possible existence, and abstract possible subsistence are all analogous
to the generic, unrestricted ways of being with respect to their generality, their non-qualitative
status, and their failure to admit of real definition. I will now show that ways of being that do not
appear to be obviously empty—namely, Existenz, photonic existence, and simple existence—fail
to be analogous to the generic way of being in at least one of these three respects.

reductionist account incorrectly classifies a lonely, qualitatively bare, simple individual as abstract, and a
mereological fusion of an abstract and a concrete entity as concrete.
226

I do not think that concrete possible existence and abstract possible subsistence should be defined in terms of

each other. For I do not think that mereological fusions composed of both abstract and concrete entities should be
taken to be either abstract or concrete.
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I’ll start by considering whether any of these ways of being satisfy the generality
condition. Some cases seem clear. The way of being that is supposed to be enjoyed by all and
only simples intuitively satisfies this condition: entities can be alike in their simplicity but differ
greatly in their nature, while the way of being that is allegedly enjoyed by all and only photons
clearly fails to be adequately general: it can only be had by entities with a very specific nature,
namely, entities that are photons.227 Other cases are, I think, much less clear. The way of being
that is supposed to be enjoyed by all and only persons does not obviously seem to satisfy the
generality condition, but it doesn’t obviously seem to violate it either.228
I’ll turn next to their satisfaction of the non-qualitative condition. Some cases should
again be clear. The way of being enjoyed by all and only photons clearly fails to have a
qualitative status. For the property of enjoying this way of being would seem to play a
fundamental causal role at various worlds. It thus appears to be a fundamental qualitative
property. The way of being that all and only simples enjoys does seem to enjoy a non-qualitative
status. For the property of enjoying simple existence—or of being simple—appears to be non-
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If, contrary to what we assumed in footnote 212 above, the predicate ‘is a photon’ expresses a theoretical role that

might be filled by different fundamental properties, then a variety of different entities with a variety of different
natures might be able to enjoy photonic existence. Would this be enough to ensure that photonic existence is
sufficiently general? In a way, yes: there will be a variety of possible entities of very different natures that enjoy this
way of being across all of logical space. But in another way, no: there will be at most one kind of possible entity that
can enjoy this way of being at any given world.
228

If persons can have radically different natures, then Existenz will turn out to be fairly general. Indeed, if the

relation being with holds between all and only persons, then Existenz will turn out to be pervasive across this
relation. But, of course, the mere fact that Existenz spreads across this relation will not be enough to ensure that
Existenz is highly general if the relation being with is not itself highly general.
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qualitative: it does not seem fit to play a fundamental causal role. Other cases are less clear. The
way of being enjoyed by all and only persons would appear to carry content about the qualitative
nature of a person, but insofar as it can only be enjoyed by entities with that nature, it does not
appear to be freely recombinable and would seem to be tied up in various necessary connections.
I’ll turn finally to whether or not any of these ways of being satisfy the indefinability
condition. Some cases are clear. The way of being enjoyed by all and only photons must, it
seems, be taken as primitive. For, on the view in question, it is because an entity enjoys this way
of being that it is a photon. The way of being that all and only simples enjoy can, however, be
defined in terms of proper parthood. For an entity enjoys simple existence if and only if it does
not have any proper parts.229 Other cases will be somewhat less clear. I believe that the way of
being that all and only persons enjoy can be properly defined in terms of the properties that make
up the nature of persons. But this is because I accept a fairly permissive account of real
definition. For those who accept a more rigid account of real definition, it will be much less clear
whether Existenz can be defined. But this unclarity will, I think, arise from an unclarity in what it
takes to be a person, not from what it takes for a way of being to be definable.
Let’s take stock. I have shown that those specific, restricted ways of being that are
intuitively empty are analogous to the generic, unrestricted way of being with respect to their
generality, their non-qualitative status, and their indefinability. I have also shown that those ways
of being that obviously fail to be intuitively empty are not so analogous. I have, moreover,
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We will, I think, need to take the proper parthood relation as fundamental even if we attempt to define simple and

composite existence in terms of each other. For we still want the ability to say when one composite is a proper part
of another. But once we grant that proper parthood is fundamental, we will be able to define simple existence in
terms of it.
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suggested that it is unclear whether the way of being that all and only persons are supposed to
enjoy, which is neither obviously empty and nor obviously non-empty, is analogous to the
generic, unrestricted way of being. This, I believe, lends credence to the suggestion that a
fundamental way of being is empty if and only if it is sufficiently general, it lacks qualitative
content, and it does not admit of real definition.

5.7 Conclusion
An account of being’s emptiness must, I think, not only be able to capture the emptiness of the
generic, unrestricted way of being enjoyed by absolutely everything there is, it must also be able
to capture the emptiness of various specific, restricted ways of being enjoyed by only some of
what there is. I have attempted to provide just such an account in sections 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6
above. A way of being that satisfies the generality, non-qualitative, and indefinability conditions
will be appropriately empty: it will not contribute to the nature of the entities that enjoy it. We
might, if we want to maintain a thin conception of being, insist that a way of being must, as a
matter of conceptual necessity, be empty or else it will fail to be a way of being at all. We could
then insist that these ways of being should be represented in our fundamental theories by
semantically primitive particular—or existential—quantifier expressions. But while this would
allow us to hang onto the neo-Quinean thesis, it would seem to suggest that we could just as
easily do without it. For we could insist that ways of being are fundamental non-qualitative
properties that are sufficiently general and which cannot be defined in terms of other
fundamental properties or relations. So if we are to cling to the neo-Quinean thesis, it cannot be
because it helps to express the emptiness of being.
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Chapter 6: Not the Only Way to Be

Abstract: Ontological pluralism is the view that there are different fundamental ways of being.
Trenton Merricks has recently raised three objections to combining pluralism with a generic way
of being enjoyed by absolutely everything there is: first, that the resulting view contradicts the
pluralist’s core intuition; second, that it is especially vulnerable to the charge—due to Peter van
Inwagen—that it posits a difference in being where there is simply a difference in kind; and,
third, that it is in tension with various historically influential motivations for pluralism. I reply to
each of these objections in turn. My replies will help to bring out the true nature of the pluralist’s
basic commitments.

6.1 Introduction
Ontological pluralism—or pluralism about being—is, roughly, the view that there are different
fundamental ways of being. The pluralist’s core insight is, at least as I understand it, that there
are peculiarly ontological differences between certain entities, differences which lie not in the
nature of these entities, but in their being. Recent defenders of this view—such as Kris McDaniel
(2009, 2010b, 2017) and Jason Turner (2010, 2012, forthcoming)—have sought to explain the
peculiarly ontological nature of such differences in terms of quantification.230 There are, on this
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They have thus endorsed, what I shall call, quantificational pluralism: the view that there are different

fundamental ways of being which are most perspicuously represented by different fundamental quantifiers. This
view, or one much like it, appears to have first been suggested—and then quickly rejected—by Morton White (1956:
68). It later makes a cameo appearance in W. V. Quine’s Word and Object (1960: 241-2) as the view that the
difference between the way in which abstract objects such as numbers and classes exist and the way in which
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view, several fundamental quantifiers that range over distinct domains. These quantifiers are
assumed to be semantically primitive: they cannot be defined in terms of an absolutely
unrestricted quantifier and some restricting predicate. They are, moreover, supposed to be
fundamental or perfectly natural: they carve reality at the joints. Entities enjoy different
fundamental ways of being, on this view, when they are ranged over by different fundamental
quantifiers.
McDaniel (2010a: 635, 2017: 146) formulates ontological pluralism as ‘the view that
there are possible languages with semantically primitive restricted quantifiers that are at least as
natural as the unrestricted quantifier’.231 This minimal formulation leaves open the possibility
that the generic unrestricted quantifier is itself perfectly natural; that is, it leaves open the
possibility that there is a fundamental way of being that absolutely everything enjoys. McDaniel
contrasts this minimal formulation with what he calls a ‘Heideggerian’232 (or ‘neoAristotelian’233) version of ontological pluralism according to which the semantically primitive
restricted quantifiers are more natural than the generic unrestricted quantifier.234 But the less than

physical or material objects exist is due to ‘a difference in two senses of “there are”’, and appears again in Herbert
W. Schneider’s claim that ‘[i]t may be necessary to have several kinds of existential quantifiers in logic, if ontology
finds that things have different ways of being’ (1962: 10). It was also explicitly defended by Nino B. Cocchiarella
(1969).
231

Note that all it takes for a quantifier to be restricted here is for it to range over only some of what there is.
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See McDaniel (2009: 312, 2017: 34, 55).
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See McDaniel (2010a: 635, 637, 2017: 146-7, 149).
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It is important to note that while McDaniel (2010a, 2017) ultimately accepts a neo-Aristotelian version of

pluralism and thus takes the generic quantifier to be less than perfectly natural, his reasons for doing so seem to have
very little to do with trying to accommodate the perceived ontological differences between things. He denies perfect
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perfectly natural unrestricted quantifier need not be taken as a mere disjunction of the perfectly
natural restricted quantifiers, it might instead be unified by analogy.235 Thus it seems that the
pluralist can accept a generic way of being—corresponding to the unrestricted existential
quantifier of formal logic—enjoyed by absolutely everything there is.
Indeed, McDaniel gives two reasons for thinking that the pluralist must accept a generic
way of being. The first begins with the observation that we can be sure that something is, while
also being unsure how that thing is. But if we can be sure that something enjoys being, while also
being unsure about which of the specific ways of being it enjoys, then we must possess a generic
conception of being.236 The second reason is based on the observation that we can say, in one
breath, that Socrates, Smaug, and the number 2 have being and are three things. But assuming
that there is a deep connection between being, quantification, and number, the pluralist will be
unable to say such things unless she adopts a generic conception of being.237 It thus seems that if
pluralism is to be plausible, it must be combined with a generic way of being.
Trenton Merricks (2019: 601-4) has, however, recently raised three objections to
combining pluralism with a generic way of being: the first objection is that such a view conflicts

naturalness to the generic quantifier in order to capture the perceived ontological inferiority of various ‘almost
nothings’ (such as cracks, holes, and shadows). It is thus not as an ontological pluralist that McDaniel appears to
question the naturalness of the generic quantifier, but as an ontological elitist.
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See McDaniel (2010b: 695-7, 2017: 48-54).
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See McDaniel (2009: 297-8, 2017: 19). This is John Duns Scotus’ argument from certain and doubtful concepts.

See his Ordinatio I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1-2, nn. 27-29. (See also William of Ockham’s Summa Logicae I, c. 38.) Merricks
(2001: 169) alludes to this argument, but attributes it to Benardette (1989: 46-7).
237

See McDaniel (2009: 300-1, 2017: 22-3). This is van Inwagen’s (1998: 17, 2009a: 61-3, 2009b: 41-2) counting

argument. See Turner (2010: 23-5) for further discussion.
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with, what Merricks sees as, the pluralist’s core intuition; the second objection is that it is
especially vulnerable to the charge that it posits a difference in being where there is simply a
difference in kind; and the third objection is that it is in tension with various historically
influential motivations for pluralism. These objections are supposed to apply regardless of
whether or not we take the generic way of being to be fundamental (see Merricks 2019: 610 n
16). I shall reply to each of these objections in the sections below, but let me first sketch my
preferred ontological framework.238
I accept modal realism with absolute actuality (see Bricker 2001, 2006, 2008). I believe
that, beyond the realm of actuality, there is a vast plurality of concrete but merely possible
worlds populated by various concrete but merely possible individuals. These concrete possible
individuals have intrinsic qualitative characters and serve as the objects of many of our thoughts.
But given that actuality is absolute, an object’s status as actual is not, as David Lewis (1970: 1820, 1986: 92-6) would have it, simply a matter of its belonging to our world. The actual and the
merely possible are not on an ontological par. There is, instead, a genuine, objective, and
peculiarly ontological difference between those worlds and individuals that are actual and those
that are not: actual concrete entities enjoy not only concrete possible existence, but also actual
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The details of this framework are not essential to my replies. I will only rely upon it, in section 6.3, to show that

there is an intelligible distinction to be drawn between those properties that correspond to ways of being and those
that do not. I believe that this distinction could be made intelligible in an alternative framework, although I shall not
attempt to prove this here. If, however, it were to turn out that this distinction can only be made intelligible in a
modal realist framework, this would provide the pluralist with a novel argument for modal realism.
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existence as their way of being—they not only existc, but also exist@; while merely possible
concrete entities do not enjoy actual existence—they simply existc.239
I also accept a robust form of mathematical platonism (see Bricker forthcoming b). I
believe that, beyond the realm of the concrete, there is an abstract realm of mathematical entities.
Among these entities are both the ‘pure’ sets (which have in their transitive closure only other
sets) and the sui generis natural numbers (which are not themselves set-theoretic constructions of
any kind, and thus are not to be identified with either the ‘von Neumann’ or the ‘Zermelo’
numbers). These abstract mathematical entities are causally inert and entirely lacking in intrinsic
qualitative character. There is, moreover, a genuine, objective, and peculiarly ontological
difference between them and the concrete entities that populate our world: abstract entities enjoy
abstract possible existence as their way of being—they exista; while concrete entities enjoy
concrete possible existence as their way of being—they existc.
I do not, however, intend to claim that these are the only ways of being. There might, I
think, be entities that enjoy still other ways of being, which we are not—and, perhaps, could not
be—aware. And there are, I believe, entities that do not seem to enjoy any of these ways of
being. For I accept universalism about composition and thus believe that there is an entity which
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The distinction between the actual and the merely possible should, I think, be front and center in any discussion

of ontological pluralism. For, as Etienne Gilson (1949: 3) points out, ‘the very first and the most universal of all the
distinctions in the realm of being is that which divides it into two classes, that of the real and that of the possible’. It
is, moreover, one of the clearest possible cases of an ontological difference. Indeed, Kit Fine (2005: 2) takes it to be
‘almost axiomatic that . . . there is an ontological difference between actual objects and merely possible objects—
between actual people and actual cities on the one hand, and merely possible people and merely possible cities on
the other’. An object’s status as actual or merely possible thus appears to be absolute: being actual and being merely
possible do not seem to be world-relative properties.

186

is wholly composed of nothing but Socrates and the number 2. Yet this entity does not strike me
as being either abstract or concrete. It does, however, appear to enjoy generic existence: the way
of being that absolutely everything enjoys (where this generic way of being is not simply to be
understood as a mere disjunction of the specific ways of being).
I have combined the two forms of pluralism described in McDaniel (2009: 314-16) and
applied them to the ontological framework found in Bricker (2001, 2006, 2008, forthcoming b).
The resulting picture should be somewhat familiar.240 Here it is in more traditional dress: actual
concrete entities exist in reality, possible concrete entities exist in the mind (although they enjoy
a being that is in no way dependent on their being objects of thought), while numbers and other
abstract entities subsist in a Platonic third realm.
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A similar picture was developed by Bernard Bolzano, who held that:
in addition to things that have actuality, i.e., the existing ones, there are also others that merely have
possibility, as well as those which can never become actual, e.g., propositions and ideas in themselves.
([1837] 2014d: 127 / WL 4: §483, 184-5)

See Schnieder (2007) and Menzel (forthcoming) for discussion. It is not clear, however, whether Bolzano ([1837]
2014b: 44-6 / WL 2: §142, 64-7), who identifies existence, being, and actuality, should be properly thought of as an
ontological pluralist. For he seems to hold that the difference between a merely possible object, an object that is not
but could become actual, and an abstract object, an object that is not and cannot become actual, is not a difference in
their being, but rather in their non-being. He thus appears to be, what we might call, a meontological pluralist, that
is, someone who holds that there are different ways of non-being (μὴ ὄν). See McDaniel (2017: 38) for discussion.
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6.2 Merricks’s first objection
Merricks’s first objection to pluralism with generic existence is that it conflicts with the
pluralist’s core ‘conviction or insight or intuition’ (2019: 601). But what exactly is the pluralist’s
core intuition, and how should we understand it?
The core pluralist insight, as I see it, is that there are peculiarly ontological differences
between certain entities (where we can say that there is an ontological difference between two
entities just in case one of those entities enjoys a way of being that the other does not).241 I will
focus here on two such differences.242 Take, first, the difference between an actual and a merely
possible silver dollar. This difference is utterly unlike the difference between a cat and a canary,
a mountain and a molehill, or a table and a tablet. For these things differ in their nature. But an
actual and a merely possible silver dollar need not differ in their nature. They might have exactly
the same size, shape, weight, and chemical composition. Yet, for all their similarities, there still
seems to be an important and fundamentally ontological difference between them: one is actual,
the other is merely possible. Take, next, the difference between a number and a nightingale. A
nightingale has a determinate size, shape, and weight. These properties help to make up its
nature. But while a number appears to determinately lack any of the properties that help make up
the nature of a nightingale, the true extent of the difference between them does not seem to be
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Talk of ontological differences owes, as far as I can tell, to the second edition of Edmund Husserl’s Logical

Investigations. See Husserl ([1901/ 1913] 2001: 17/ HU XIX/1 252). I believe that the intuitive, pre-theoretical
phenomenon which the positing of ways of being is intended to explain is that of ontological difference. I thus prefer
to describe the pluralist’s core intuition directly in terms of ontological differences as opposed to indirectly in terms
of the enjoyment of different ways of being.
242

I shall introduce a third potentially ontological difference in section 6.3 below: namely, the difference between a

past and a present entity.
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captured solely by a difference in their natures. There is a further and, it seems, fundamentally
ontological difference between them: one is abstract, the other is concrete. I take both the
difference between the actual and the merely possible and the difference between the abstract
and the concrete to be ontological differences.243 I take, moreover, the recognition of either of
these differences to be—all on its own—sufficient for pluralism. Thus, to be a pluralist is, at
least as I understand it, to be minimally committed to the claim that there are ontological
differences between certain entities, differences which lie not in what these entities are, but in the
ways of being these entities enjoy.244
This is not how Merricks understands pluralism. He sees the pluralist’s core insight not as
a simple recognition of ontological difference, but as a complete denial of ontological similarity
(where we can say that there is an ontological similarity between two entities just in case there is
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I shall attempt to explain what it is about these differences that is peculiarly ontological in section 6.3 below, but

for now it should be sufficient to note that they are plausibly taken as ontological.
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Genuinely ontological differences should, I think, be distinguished from mere categorial differences. Some

philosophers accept categorial differences, but deny that there are different ways of being. So, for example, Peter
van Inwagen (2012) accepts a two-category ontology, according to which everything is either a substance or a
property. But he does not thereby endorse ontological pluralism. For, on his view, categories are, roughly, natural
classes whose membership comprises a significant portion of reality, which are not themselves subclasses of any
other natural classes (see van Inwagen 2012: 193-4). But, given this account of the nature of the categories, there
needn’t be anything genuinely ontological about the so-called ‘ontological’ categories; they might, for all van
Inwagen has said, simply carve out differences in the nature of the entities that belong to them. They are, I think,
ontological in name only.
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some way of being that these entities alike enjoy). For he thinks the pluralist is best understood
as denying that there is a way of being that certain entities alike enjoy.245 If he’s right about this,
then there is no hope of combining pluralism with generic existence. For if a number and a
nightingale were both to enjoy generic existence, they would thereby be ontologically similar in
this respect—there would be a way of being that they both enjoyed—and that would contradict
the pluralist’s intuition as Merricks understands it.
But if the pluralist’s core insight is, as I claim, simply that there are ontological
differences between certain entities, then it does not exclude the possibility of there being other
ontological similarities between those entities as well. This becomes especially clear, I think,
when we focus not on the difference between the abstract and the concrete as Merricks does, but
on the difference between the actual and the merely possible. There is, as I see it, an ontological
difference between an actual and a merely possible dollar: the former enjoys actual existence, the
latter does not. But there is also an ontological similarity between these two dollars: both enjoy
what I call concrete possible existence. What this shows is that, given my preferred ontological
framework, we can take there to be an ontological difference between these entities without
thereby denying that there are any ontological similarities between them.246 But if that’s right,
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Merricks takes Moore and Russell to ‘give voice to the conviction. . . that it is false that there is a way of being

that concreta and abstracta alike enjoy’ (2019: 601). He says nothing to indicate that this conviction should be taken
to be restricted to the case at hand as opposed to being perfectly general. Indeed, the general form of the pluralist’s
intuition would need to be understood as a complete denial of ontological similarity in order for the objection to
apply, as Merricks claims it does, to all forms of pluralism.
246

I believe that the distinction between the actual and the merely possible is best captured in a modal realist

framework supplemented with absolute actuality. But the details of this framework are not essential to the
distinction itself. It can, I think, be endorsed by someone who holds that there are true essentialist claims about
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then pluralism—understood merely as the recognition of ontological differences and not as the
denial of ontological similarities—appears to be compatible with a generic way of being enjoyed
by absolutely everything there is.
How should we adjudicate this dispute? We must look, it seems, at what various
pluralists say to motivate their view. I shall focus my attention on the passages from G. E. Moore
and Bertrand Russell that Merricks thinks ‘give voice to the conviction. . . that it is false that
there is a way of being that concreta and abstracta alike enjoy’ (2019: 601).247 I will attempt to
show that, when properly understood, these passages do not in fact give voice to this conviction.
But if we take, as Merricks does, the intuitions evoked in these passages to be representative of
the convictions of pluralists generally, then that would seem to suggest that the pluralist’s core
insight is not, as Merricks thinks, that there are no ontological similarities between certain
entities, but rather, as I claim, that there are certain ontological differences between those
entities.
Let’s start with the passage from Moore:
It is quite certain that two natural objects may exist; but it is equally certain that two itself
does not exist and never can. Two and two are four. But that does not mean that either

entities that do not actually exist. To have an essence or nature, on this possibilist view, is to enjoy what Henry of
Ghent calls essential being (esse essentiae). But not everything that has an essence thereby enjoys actual existence
(esse existentiae). For while I enjoy actual existence, my merely possible brothers and sisters do not. There is thus
an ontological difference between us. But there is an ontological similarity between us as well: we all enjoy essential
being. See McDaniel (2017: 263) for discussion.
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Merricks (2019: 611 n 20) sees the claim—allegedly stemming from Heidegger, Husserl, and Meinong—that ‘the

relevant conviction is justified (or caused by) the phenomenology of certain experiences’ as another ‘species of this
motivation’. I will briefly discuss this phenomenological motivation for pluralism in section 6.4 below.
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two or four exists. Yet it certainly means something. Two is somehow, although it does
not exist. (1903: 111)
What should we make of Moore’s avowed certainty that natural objects enjoy existence—or
concrete existence—as their way of being, while numbers such as two and four do not enjoy this
way of being? It appears to spring from a conviction about the nature of (concrete) existence. For
Moore tells us that natural objects such as narwhals, neanderthals, and nightingales ‘can exist in
time—can have duration, and begin and cease to exist—can be objects of perception’ (1903:
110-11), while numbers belong to a class of objects ‘which certainly do not exist in time, are not
therefore parts of Nature, and which, in fact, do not exist at all’ (1903: 110). But while this gives
us good reason to think that existence—or concrete existence—can be enjoyed by nightingales
but not by numbers, it doesn’t give us any reason to think that being—or generic existence—
cannot be enjoyed by numbers and nightingales alike. Indeed given his praise for those ‘who
have recognized most clearly that not everything which is is a “natural object”. . . [and] have,
therefore, the great merit of insisting that our knowledge is not confined to the things which we
touch and see and feel’ (1903: 110), Moore seems to leave open the possibility that there is a
generic—perhaps even fundamental—way of being enjoyed by absolutely everything ‘which is’
(1903: 110), every possible ‘[object] of knowledge’ (1903: 111).248

248

He thus seems to be in agreement with the Russell of The Principles of Mathematics, who holds that ‘[b]eing is

that which belongs to every conceivable term, to every possible object of thought’ whereas ‘[e]xistence. . . is the
prerogative of some only amongst beings’ (1903: 449). This should, of course, come as no surprise given that
Russell’s early views on being and existence appear to have themselves been strongly influenced by Moore—as
Russell (1903: viii, 1904: 204 n 2) himself readily admits. Indeed, Moore tells us that up until the winter of 1910-11,
he held:
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Let’s turn next to the passage from Russell:
Suppose, for instance, that I am in my room. I exist, and my room exists; but does ‘in’
exist? Yet obviously the word ‘in’ has a meaning; it denotes a relation between me and
my room. This relation is something, although we cannot say that it exists in the same
sense in which I and my room exist. ([1912] 1959: 90)
What should we make of Russell’s assertion that we ‘cannot say’ that a relation exists in the
same sense in which a person or a place exists? We might read this claim in one of two ways:
first, as the claim that there is no way in which a relation, a person, and a place all exist; or,
second, as the claim that there is a way in which a person and a place both exist, but we cannot
say that a relation exists in this way as well. If we were to read Russell’s assertion in the first
way as Merricks appears to do, then it would indeed give voice to the intuition that abstracta and
concreta are in no way ontologically similar to each other. But this reading is not supported by
the text. For, a page later when Russell refers back to this discussion, he says only that we have
seen that ‘such entities as relations appear to have a being which is in some way different from
that of physical objects’ ([1912] 1959: 91, emphasis added). But if the above considerations are
only supposed to show that the being of a relation is in some way different from the being of a
person or a place, then they shouldn’t be taken to show that the being of a relation is in no way

very strongly. . . that the words ‘being’ and ‘existence’. . . stand for two entirely different properties; and
that though everything which exists must also ‘be’, yet many things which ‘are’ nevertheless emphatically
do not exist. (1953: 300)
But if Moore believes that existence is nested in being and that everything that exists has being, but not vice versa,
then it should be clear that we can be, as Merricks (2019: 601) puts it, “‘quite certain” that natural objects enjoy a
way of being and “equally certain” that that way of being is not enjoyed by two or four’ without also thinking that ‘it
is false that there is a way of being that concreta and abstracta alike enjoy’.
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similar to the being of a person or a place. This provides some negative support for the second
reading. But is there any positive support for the second reading? I believe there is. For Russell,
like Moore, thinks that persons enjoy existence—or concrete existence—as their way of being
because they can exist in space and time. But relations are, he thinks, fundamentally different in
this respect; they cannot exist in space or time.249 He thus appears to leave room for a generic—
perhaps even fundamental—way of being enjoyed by everything that ‘is something’, everything
that ‘we can think about and understand’ ([1912] 1959: 90).250
Moore and Russell simply claim that there is an ontological difference between abstract
and concrete entities. They do not give voice to the conviction that there are no ontological
similarities between these entities. Thus, they do not give voice to what Merricks takes to be the
pluralist’s core insight: namely, ‘that it is false that there is a way of being that concreta and
abstracta alike enjoy’ (2019: 601). But Merricks doesn’t just take this to be the pluralist’s core
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This comes out pretty clearly in Russell’s attempts to explain why it is that the relation ‘north of’ does not seem

to exist in the same way in which Edinburgh and London exist. For, he writes,
[i]f we ask ‘Where and when does this relation exist?’ the answer must be ‘Nowhere and nowhen’. There is
no place or time where we can find the relation ‘north of’. It does not exist in Edinburgh any more than in
London, for it relates the two and is neutral as between them. Nor can we say that it exists at any particular
time. Now everything that can be apprehended by the senses or by introspection exists at some particular
time. Hence the relation ‘north of’ is radically different from such things. It is neither in space nor in time,
neither mental nor material; yet it is something. ([1912] 1959: 98)
It seems clear that the reason we cannot say that a relation exists in the same sense as a place exists is that relations
are not in space or time. This marks, Russell thinks, an important ontological difference between relations and
places. But it leaves open the possibility that there is still a kind of ontological similarity between them.
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White (1956: 63-6) makes a similar observation.
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intuition, he also thinks it is ‘the best motivation for pluralism’ (2019: 602). It should be clear
that the pluralist’s intuition as Merricks understands it provides a strong motivation for
pluralism, but it’s not entirely clear why it is supposed to provide the best motivation for
pluralism. I suspect, however, that the reason Merricks thinks it does is because he thinks that if
we deny that there are any ontological similarities between abstract and concrete entities, then
we will be best suited to avoid the objection that these entities differ simply in kind, not in being.
Let’s turn to it now.

6.3 Merricks’s second objection
Merricks’s second objection to pluralism with generic existence is that it is ‘particularly
vulnerable’ to the objection that pluralism posits ‘a difference in being where there is instead but
a difference in kind among entities that exist in the same way’ (2019: 602-3). The basic problem,
as Merricks sees it, is supposed to be with the pluralist’s claim that the difference between, say,
an actual and a merely possible dollar or a number and a nightingale is peculiarly ontological.
Yes, the objection goes, these entities are different, but that’s all there is to it. Once we say that
one is actual and the other is not or that one is concrete and the other abstract, we have said all
that needs to be said. We don’t need to—and we should not try to—express this difference by
adding that it is peculiarly ontological.251
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Merricks (2019: 602) attributes this objection to van Inwagen (2014b: 23). But van Inwagen, as I read him, is

concerned with a slightly different objection: namely, that the pluralist appears to take the observation that there is a
vast difference between, say, a number and a nightingale to motivate the claim that there is an ontological difference
between these entities as well. This, van Inwagen thinks, constitutes ‘a fundamental meta-ontological error’ (2014b:
21). For ‘a vast difference between [two things] must consist in a vast difference in their natures’ (1998: 15, 2009a:
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My response here is purely defensive. I deny that once we’ve said that an actual and a
merely possible dollar are different, we’ve said all that needs to be said. For, as I pointed out in
section 6.2 above, the difference between an actual and a merely possible dollar is utterly unlike
the difference between a cat and a canary, a mountain and a molehill, or a person and a penguin.
The latter all differ in their nature. Yet an actual and a merely possible dollar need not differ in
nature. The way in which an actual and a merely possible dollar differ is itself different from the
way in which a cat and a canary, a mountain and a molehill, or a person and a penguin differ. But
to say, as Merricks and van Inwagen suggest, that the difference between an actual and a merely
possible dollar is just a difference in kind does nothing to explain the peculiar nature of this
difference. Thus, it does not seem to be unreasonable to suggest that the difference between an
actual and a merely possible dollar is itself somehow ontological, that it should be understood
not as a difference in nature, but as a difference in being.
A similar point could be made by focusing not on modal but rather on temporal ontology.
For, if we take the A-theoretic intuition that time ‘flows’ or ‘passes’ seriously, there would
appear to be an objective difference between past and present entities: the latter bask in the glow
of the present, the former do not. But, on this moving spotlight view of time, the light of the
present does not appear to contribute to an entity’s nature. A past and a present dollar would
seem to have the same nature—indeed, they might even be perfect qualitative duplicates. Thus, it

56). But, van Inwagen claims, once we have described the vast difference in the nature of these two things, we ‘have
done everything that can be done to describe [the difference between them]. That’s what describing a vast difference
is’ (2014b: 23, cf. 2018: 216). See Williams (1962: 757) and Grossmann (1984: 169-70, 1992: 95-6) for similar
criticisms.
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does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the difference between them is itself somehow
ontological.
Merricks believes, however, that by accepting generic existence, I have left myself
particularly vulnerable to this objection. For I must now accept the following claims:
x existsa if and only if x generically exists and x is abstract.
x existsc if and only if x generically exists and x is concrete.
Yet, once I have done this, I have agreed with the monist that there are entities—such as
numbers and nightingales—which enjoy a shared way of being but differ with respect to whether
they are abstract or concrete. And if I agree with the monist about this, I must also agree with the
monist that there is a difference in kind between two entities—a number and a nightingale—
which generically exist: the number is abstract, while the nightingale is concrete. But then,
Merricks thinks, it seems like a mistake to add that the number existsa and the nightingale existsc
and to, thereby, insist that the difference between them is ultimately ontological.
My response is, once again, purely negative. I do not see why granting that numbers and
nightingales enjoy a shared way of being should leave me particularly vulnerable to the original
objection. For I can agree with the monist that there is a difference in kind between a number and
a nightingale. But I still think that we need to explain the peculiar nature of this difference. It
does not, as I suggested in section 6.2 above, simply appear to be a difference in the nature of
these entities, but instead appears to transcend all such differences. Thus, assuming that we
already have reason to believe that there are ontological differences between certain entities, it
does not seem to be unreasonable to suggest that the difference between a number and a
nightingale is somehow ontological as well.
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Merricks would not, I take it, be satisfied with this purely negative response. For he
appears to think that the pluralist arbitrarily selects certain differences among generically
existing entities—such as the difference between the abstract and the concrete or the difference
between the actual and the merely possible—and calls them ontological.252 But he also seems to
think that there is no principled reason to select these differences as opposed to others.
I have tried to suggest that the selection process is not completely arbitrary: mere
differences in the natures of things should not be taken as ontological. The difference between a
cat and a canary is, for example, solely a difference in the nature of these things and thus fails to
be properly ontological. But it will not always be clear when a vast difference in the nature of
certain entities is merely a difference in their natures and when there is, in addition to this, a
difference in their being as well. For while a number and a nightingale have vastly different
natures, the same can presumably also be said about a boson and a fermion. But while there
appears to be an ontological difference between a number and a nightingale, there does not
appear to be an ontological difference between a boson and a fermion. I thus grant that in order
to allay the arbitrariness worry, the pluralist needs to explain what it is that is peculiarly
ontological about the properties that underwrite ontological differences. I will here offer only a
sketch of what I think makes the properties of being actual, being concrete, and being abstract
properly ontological.

252

This, I take it, is the point that Merricks (2019: 602) intends to make by asking the following rhetorical question:

‘why pick ways of being that are correlated with those particular differences among generically existing entities, as
opposed to others?’
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Being—or generic existence—is the most general of all concepts, it is empty of
qualitative content, and it does not admit of real definition.253 This, I take it, is more or less what
van Inwagen (2001: 4-5, 2009a: 56) calls the ‘thin’ conception of being according to which the
being of an entity does not at all contribute to the nature of that entity. It constitutes a fairly
traditional answer to the question: ‘What is being?’ But if the pluralist accepts both this account
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These three features are drawn from Heidegger’s ([1927] 1962: 21-24/ SZ 2-4) discussion of the three traditional

‘presuppositions’ (or ‘prejudices’) about the nature of being: namely, that being is the most universal of all concepts,
that it is indefinable, and that it is self-evident. I have collapsed being’s indefinability and self-evidence under a
single heading and have attempted to draw attention to Heidegger’s claim that being is traditionally taken to be ‘the
emptiest of concepts’. See Williams (1962: 752-4) for a helpful discussion of the emptiness of being.
It is this emptiness that comes to the fore in van Inwagen’s paraphrase of what he calls ‘an incidental
remark of Hegel’s’, which he takes to provide a capsule summary of Heidegger’s three theses: namely, that being is
‘the most barren and abstract of all categories’ (2009a: 51, see also van Inwagen and Sullivan 2014: sect. 2.1). Van
Inwagen does not provide a citation for this paraphrase, but it would appear to be drawn from Hegel’s claim in the
Encyclopedia that being is ‘the poorest and most abstract determination’ ([1827/ 1830] 2010: 101/ GW 20: 92).
Hegel elaborates on this claim in his Science of Logic:
Being, pure being—without further determination. In its indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to itself
and also not unequal with respect to another; it has no difference within it, nor any outwardly. If any
determination or content were posited in it as distinct, or if it were posited by this determination or content
as distinct from an other, it would thereby fail to hold fast to its purity. It is pure indeterminateness and
emptiness. —There is nothing to be intuited in it, if one can speak here of intuiting; or, it is only this pure
empty intuiting itself. Just as little is anything to be thought in it, or, it is equally only this empty thinking.
Being, the indeterminate immediate is in fact nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing. ([1812/
1832] 2010: 59/ GW 21: 68-9).
Being can, I take it, be said to be the most barren and abstract of all categories because it is ‘the indeterminate
immediate’, ‘[t]here is nothing to be intuited in it’, and ‘[i]t is pure indeterminateness and emptiness’.
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of the nature of being and the ontological framework that I laid out in section 6.1, she can easily
capture the peculiarly ontological nature of the properties of being actual, being concrete, and
being abstract. For these properties are, I believe, importantly analogous to being. They are
highly general because they are pervasive: anything that is properly related to something that
enjoys a given way of being, enjoys that way of being as well.254 They are empty of qualitative
content because they are non-qualitative: they do not play, and are not grounded in properties
that play, fundamental causal roles.255 And they do not admit of real definition because we can
only form indexical or demonstrative concepts of them: our concept of something’s being actual
is, for example, that of its being exactly ontologically like me and everything at my world.256 It
is, I believe, this generality, qualitative emptiness, and indefinability which accounts for the
intuitive thinness of these ways of being and explains why their corresponding properties are
properly taken to be ontological. There is thus an intelligible and non-arbitrary distinction that
can be drawn between an entity’s being and its nature.
The pluralist should, I think, accept this account of what makes these properties
peculiarly ontological even if she intends to hold onto the central pillar of neo-Quinean
orthodoxy: namely, that being is perspicuously expressed by particular—or existential—
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The properties of being actual, being concrete, and being abstract are, given my preferred ontological

framework, pervasive across the relations that unify concrete possible worlds and abstract possible structures. They
are all or nothing. This ensures that these properties enjoy a high degree of generality and can be had by a variety of
different entities with a variety of different natures.
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Teller (1984: 148) plausibly attributes a similar account of the nature of the qualitative properties to David Lewis

(1983a).
256

But note that while the concept of actuality might be indexical, the property of actuality is not. See Bricker

(2006: 63-6).
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quantification.257 For without such an account, this quantificational pluralist cannot avoid the
charge of ascribing to the being of an entity what property belongs to the nature of that entity,
and thus of accepting a ‘thick’ conception of being.258 To see this, consider the following claims:
x is abstract if and only if and because ay (y = x).
x is concrete if and only if and because cy (y = x).
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This orthodoxy can, I think, be adequately captured by the following three theses:
The Neo-Quinean Thesis: being is perspicuously expressed by particular—or existential—quantification.
The Monistic Thesis: being is unitary: there are no ontological differences between any entities.
The Equivalence Thesis: being is the same as existence.

This list is inspired by a similar list due to van Inwagen (1998, 2009a). But I have attempted to isolate, what I take to
be, the core neo-Quinean commitments. The neo-Quinean thesis corresponds to van Inwagen’s Thesis 4 according to
which the meaning of ‘existence’ is adequately captured by the existential quantifier of formal logic, but removes its
apparent commitment to both the claim that being is the same as existence and the claim that being is unitary. This
thesis is shared by both neo-Quinean monists and quantificational pluralists alike. Indeed, where these two views
differ is over the monistic thesis, which corresponds to van Inwagen’s Thesis 3 according to which existence is
univocal, but again removes its apparent commitment to the claim that being is the same as existence and ensures
that the thesis concerns being rather than ‘being’. Monists about being hold that being is unitary, while pluralists
take it to be fragmentary. This is their main point of disagreement. The equivalence thesis is, however, just the same
as van Inwagen’s Thesis 2. It is something that pluralists can, but do not need to deny. Its denial strikes me as fairly
plausible if we take existence to be the same as actuality, for being does not seem to be the same as actuality.
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Suppose, for example, that the quantificational pluralist were to claim that for every perfectly natural qualitative

property, there is a fundamental way of being enjoyed by all and only the entities that have that property. This
pluralist might take the quantifier b to range over all and only those entities that are bosons, and thus hold that:
x is a boson if and only if and because by (y = x).
This would, I think, load the quantifier b with whatever qualitative content is had by the predicate ‘is a boson’. It
would attribute to the being of a boson what seems to properly belong to its nature.
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Suppose that being abstract and being concrete were to fail to be thin in the relevant respects:
that is, suppose they were to somehow lack adequate generality, contain qualitative content, or
admit of alternative definitions.259 These features might, given their presumed thickness, be
taken to belong to the nature of the entities that have them. In that case, the corresponding ways
of being expressed by the quantifiers a (which ranges over all and only those entities that are
abstract) and c (which ranges over all and only those entities that are concrete) would
themselves fail to be thin. For, on this account, these ways of being are each a kind of one over
many: they account for and explain the objective similarities between the entities that enjoy
them. But if that’s right, then any lack of generality, qualitative content, or definitional
admissibility of the properties being abstract or being concrete would have to somehow derive
from these ways of being themselves. The quantificational pluralist would thus appear to be
guilty of ascribing to the being of things what properly belongs to their natures.260
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I am assuming that for the quantificational pluralist, to say that an alleged ontological property is appropriately

indefinable is to say that it can only be defined in terms of its corresponding way of being, and that that way of
being is perspicuously expressed by a semantically primitive existential quantifier.
260

Note that this criticism carries over to the neo-Quinean monist as well. For the neo-Quinean monist will

presumably admit that:
x has being if and only if and because y (y = x).
But if being were to fail to be appropriately thin, then its thickness would have to somehow derive from the generic
way of being perspicuously represented by the absolutely unrestricted existential quantifier. The universality—or
absolute generality—of being is not in itself enough to ensure that being is appropriately thin. For, as D. C. Williams
(1962: 753) points out, the fact that being ‘applies to everything is quite compatible with its being nevertheless the
“richest” of principles, with more “content” than all the ordinary characters put together’. The desired thinness of
being must, it seems, not simply derive from its generality, but also from its qualitative emptiness. The neo-Quinean
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I have shown that the pluralist can accept a fairly thin conception of being, and that the
intuitive thinness of this conception does not simply derive from taking ways of being to be best
expressed in terms of existential quantification: the properties corresponding to the domains of
these quantifiers must themselves be appropriately thin. But if that’s right, then the pluralist
shouldn’t worry that she has ascribed to the being of an entity what properly belongs to the
nature of that entity. It should now be clear why, by the pluralist’s lights, it is not a mistake to
add that numbers exista and nightingales existc once we have granted that they generically exist
and are abstract and concrete respectively. For while the predicates ‘existsa’ and ‘existsc’ apply to
all and only those entities to which the predicates ‘is abstract’ and ‘is concrete’ apply, only the
predicates ‘existsa’ and ‘existsc’ make salient the fact that the differences expressed by these
predicates are ontological. But, if we assume—as McDaniel and Turner assume—that
ontological differences are quantificational differences, this will not be the end of the story. A
complete explanation of these differences will also need to invoke the quantifiers a and c.

6.4 Merricks’s third objection
Merricks’s third objection to pluralism with generic existence is that it ‘is clearly in tension with
the sorts of views that virtually all pluralists have tried to articulate and defend’ and that this
tension can be illustrated by the fact that ‘historically influential motivations for pluralism are
inconsistent with the claim that all entities generically exist’ (2019: 604). But why exactly is this
supposed to be a problem? Merricks doesn’t really say. I suspect, however, that the problem is
supposed to go something like this: recent defenders of ontological pluralism—such as McDaniel

cannot, I think, simply rest content by offering a quantificational account of being, but must also account for the
intuitive thinness of being itself.
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(2009) and Turner (2010)—often bill their view as part of a historically prominent tradition that
has only recently fallen out of favor (due primarily and no thanks to Quine 1948); but if the view
being put forward is genuinely part of this now forgotten tradition, then it had better be
consonant with that tradition or else it will lose one of its biggest selling points. I take this
criticism very seriously. If the historically influential motivations for pluralism are all
inconsistent with the claim that absolutely everything enjoys a shared way of being, then
pluralists who endorse generic existence would be making a radical break with a tradition they
are otherwise attempting to revive. But I don’t think that this criticism can be made to stick. I
will focus on what McDaniel (2017: 5-8) calls the three dominant historical motivations for
ontological pluralism: namely, the phenomenological, logical, and theological motivations.261 I
am willing to grant that some of these motivations might be inconsistent with a generic way of
being, but I do not believe that all of them are.
Let’s start with the phenomenological motivation.262 The basic idea—allegedly stemming
from Martin Heidegger, Edmund Husserl, and Alexius Meinong—is that different ways of being
are given to us in our experience. Merricks (2019: 611 n 20) seems to suggest that the best way
to understand the supposed content of this experience is as presenting, say, a number and a
nightingale as in no way ontologically similar to each other. The thrust of the phenomenological
motivation—as Merricks understands it—is that experience provides us with a
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Merricks (2019: 603-4), when presenting his third objection to pluralism with generic existence, focuses on the

arguments that McDaniel classes as logical and theological. He does not mention the phenomenological motivation
in this context, but briefly mentions it in a footnote when discussing the pluralist’s core intuition (see Merricks 2019:
611 n 20).
262

See McDaniel (2010b: 694-5, 2017: 6-7).
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phenomenological justification of the claim that there are absolutely no ontological similarities
between certain entities. But this claim not only motivates pluralism about being, it also
motivates the claim that there isn’t a generic way of being that absolutely everything enjoys.
It is clear, however, that the proponents of the phenomenological motivation do not all
interpret what is immediately given in experience as Merricks does. Meinong, for example,
claims that ‘one apprehends [the difference between existence and (mere) subsistence] as
immediately as the difference between blue and yellow’ ([1910] 1983: 58/ AMG 4: 73). But
since what is immediately given regarding an entity’s blueness or yellowness is consistent with
the claim that blue things and yellow things are similar insofar as they have color, what is
immediately given regarding an entity’s existence or (mere) subsistence should also be consistent
with the claim that existent things and (merely) subsistent things are similar insofar as they have
being. Indeed, when Meinong turns to considerations of mediate justification, it becomes clear
that he thinks that existence and subsistence are nested, not disjoint: ‘what can exist must, as it
were, first of all subsist’ ([1910] 1983: 58/ AMG 4: 74).263 The phenomenological motivation is
best understood as the claim that the contents of our experience should only be taken to provide
immediate justification for the claim that there are ontological differences between certain
entities, and thus it does not appear to be inconsistent with the acceptance of a generic way of
being enjoyed by absolutely everything.
Let’s turn next to the logical motivation.264 The basic idea is that various logical
considerations lead to pluralism. Consider, for example, Aristotle’s argument that being is not a
genus: roughly, if being were a genus, then no differentia would have being (for a genus cannot
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See also Meinong (1921: 18, trans. in Grossmann 1974: 228/ AMG 7: 20).
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See McDaniel (2017: 7-8).
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be predicated of a differentia taken apart from its species); but since the differentia of any genus
must have being, being cannot be a genus.265 The familiar Aristotelian dictum that being is said
in many ways appears to be a corollary of this argument: for if being is not a genus and yet is
predicated of absolutely everything there is, then it cannot be so predicated univocally.266 But,
Merricks thinks, the claim that being cannot be univocally predicated of absolutely everything
should not only be taken to motivate pluralism, it should also be taken to motivate the claim that
there isn’t a generic way of being that absolutely everything enjoys.
I cannot challenge the claim that if being is not a genus, then it cannot be univocally
predicated of absolutely everything without also undermining the logical motivation for
pluralism. It is, however, not exactly clear how we should interpret this claim. Is a genus
supposed to be fundamental or not? I assume for the sake of argument that, in the Aristotelian
framework, to be a genus is to be fundamental. But if that’s right, then all the argument shows is
that no fundamental mode of being can be univocally predicated of absolutely everything, it
doesn’t show that no non-fundamental mode of being can be univocally predicated of everything
there is. Thus the logical motivation doesn’t seem to rule out—and, more important, isn’t
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See Aristotle’s Metaphysics B.3, 998b22-7.
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Note that a different argument for the claim that being is not a genus can be found in Porphyry:
if the existent were a single genus common to everything, all things would be said to be existent
synonymously. But since the first items are ten, they have only the name in common and not also the
account which corresponds to the name. (Isagore 6.9-11, trans. Barnes 2003: 7)

But the argument here appears to proceed from pluralism—from the claim that there are ten primary ontological
categories and, hence, ten corresponding ways of being—to the claim that being is not a genus. Porphyry seems to
think that if being were a genus, there would be a single primary category to which absolutely everything belongs.
But since there is no such ontological category and, hence, no generic way of being, being is not a genus.
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inconsistent with—the claim that all entities generically exist. It does, however, seem to show
that the generic mode of being should not be taken to be fundamental.
Let’s turn finally to the theological motivation.267 The main considerations here concern
different features of God. Consider, first, divine transcendence: God appears to be so radically
different from all of His creation that univocal predication between God and created things is
impossible.268 But if being cannot be univocally predicated of God and His creatures, then it
seems that absolutely any way of being that God might enjoy must be radically different from the
ways of being that created things can enjoy. This would seem to show that there are absolutely
no ontological similarities between God and His creatures, and thus that there isn’t a generic way
of being that absolutely everything enjoys. Consider, next, divine simplicity: God appears to be
absolutely simple. He has no parts and cannot be distinguished from any of His properties.269 But
if God is numerically identical to His way of being and the ways of being enjoyed by God’s
creatures are not numerically identical to God, then any way of being enjoyed by God must be
radically different from the ways of being enjoyed by created things. This would clearly show
that there are absolutely no ontological similarities between God and His creatures, and thus that
there isn’t a generic way of being that absolutely everything enjoys.
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See McDaniel (2010b: 693-4, 2017: 5-6).
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See Aquinas’s Summa Contra Gentiles I, c. 32, and Summa Theologiae I, q. 13, a. 5, co.
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See Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae I, q. 3.
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I think I could grant that the considerations at play in the theological motivation establish
a strong form of pluralism.270 But they seem to be due more to the nature of God than to the
nature of pluralism. First, I don’t think these considerations carry over to other cases. God is
supposed to be radically different from everything else there is. It thus seems plausible to think
that there are absolutely no ontological similarities between God and anything else. But we don’t
have reason to think that an actual dollar is radically different from a merely possible one.
Second, I take it that the ontological difference between God and everything else is also
supposed to be more extreme than the ontological difference between an abstract and a concrete
entity or an actual and a merely possible entity. It would, however, be difficult to capture the
extremity of this difference if there were no more ontological similarities between a number and
a nightingale or an actual and a merely possible dollar than between God and creation. For the
difference would then be just as extreme in each case.
Let’s take stock. Only one of the historically influential arguments considered in this
section supports a version of pluralism that is inconsistent with a generic way of being. It thus
appears to be a gross overstatement to claim, as Merricks does, that generic existence is ‘in
tension with the sorts of views that virtually all pluralists have tried to articulate and defend’
(2019: 603). I thus see no reason to think that recent pluralists need to fear that they have, by
adopting a generic way of being, thereby broken with a broader and historically prominent
pluralistic tradition.
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Note that we might be able to avoid the argument from divine transcendence by restricting to fundamental (as

opposed to positive intrinsic) similarities. But no such restriction would seem to allow us to avoid the argument from
divine simplicity.
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6.5 Conclusion
We are now in a better position to appreciate the nature and varieties of pluralism about being.
The pluralist maintains that there are ontological differences between certain entities. What
makes these differences peculiarly ontological is that they lie in the being and not in the nature of
these entities. This makes ontological differences distinct from mere categorial differences. For
while there might be a broad categorial distinction between composites and simples, between
entities that have and entities that lack proper parts, this distinction merely captures a difference
in the nature of these entities, not a difference in their being. It is thus possible to be committed
to categorial distinctions—or to what we might describe as merely ontic differences—between
entities without thereby being committed to genuinely ontological differences in the being of
these entities. To be a pluralist, I have argued, is to be minimally committed to the claim that
there are peculiarly ontological differences between certain entities, differences which lie not in
what these entities are, but in the ways of being these entities enjoy. There have certainly been
pluralists motivated by considerations of divine simplicity or divine transcendence, who have
accepted stronger and more extreme versions of pluralism according to which there are no
ontological similarities between certain entities. But these pluralists have simply gone beyond
what is minimally required of pluralism as such: namely, the recognition of various ontological
differences.
The plausibility of the pluralist’s claim that there are peculiarly ontological differences
between certain entities relies upon the further claim that there is an intelligible distinction to be
drawn between the being and the nature of an entity. To maintain this distinction, the pluralist
should adopt a thin conception of being according to which the being of an entity does not at all
contribute to the nature of that entity. I have suggested that ways of being that are adequately
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general, qualitatively empty, and appropriately indefinable do not contribute to the nature of the
entities that enjoy them. If that’s right, then the pluralist who only admits such ways of being can
accept a sufficiently thin conception of being. There have been pluralists who have held that the
being of certain entities contributes to the nature of those entities and have thus accepted a thick
conception of being. But these pluralists have, I think, thereby transgressed against the very
distinction that ought to serve as their fundamental charter.
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